Life, Liberty and Property: What Does it Even Mean?

In both the 5^th and 14^th Amendments to the United States Constitution, it is stated (with minor wording differences between the two Amendments) that no state shall deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Although this particular phrase is easy to remember, its components are unusually difficult to define and apply in a real-world context. Over the years, the Court has faced major definitional problems in regard to the meanings of almost every word/concept mentioned in the clauses.

Although one might expect the vagueness of "life, liberty, or property" to pose the most difficult definitional challenge as the Court interpreted the due process clauses, one of the most crucial definitions had nothing to do with what the government shall not deprive any person of without due process of law, but with what the term "deprive" even means. The Court has always held that "deprive" means "to take away," which is the word's most basic definition, but it has also had to consider that "deprive" can also mean "to prevent from getting." Because the difference between these two definitions could make all the difference in the world for people who never had a chance (as opposed to people who had a chance but lost it), the Court's interpretation of the concept of "deprivation" held the possibility of drastically affecting the American political, social, and legal landscapes. Furthermore, the Court had to decide whether every loss was a deprivation, or if there was a spectrum of governmental taking (or possibly preventing from getting) that did not meet the definition of "deprivation." The Court's decisions on these definitions had massive implications for each other definitional issue within the due process clauses.

For the Court, the definition of "life" was the least difficult issue to determine. There was no question of a deprivation of life meaning anything other than the government physically ending a person's life. Even though many people would argue that certain government practices (or lack thereof) could degrade the quality of or even shorten their lives, the Court defined life as life and left it at that. The definitions of "liberty" and "property" posed much greater problems, and are far from resolved today.

The concept of "liberty" initially seemed to be a relatively simple matter for the Court to define. However, in the 20^th century, it began to consider that "liberty" might mean something more than simple freedom from physical restraint. Ever since it decided in the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska that "liberty" could essentially mean the right to be left alone, the Court has been dealing with the implications of this definitional matter, especially relating to the deprivation of a person's reputation. However, the tendency of the Court thus far has been to put the due process standard fairly low in whatever cases it determines actually fit the more expansive definition of liberty.

The question of "property," for the Court, required it to determine whether or not property simply meant property (in much the same way as life means life), or if "property" could even include things like the means of acquiring property (employment) or an individual's status in an entitlement program. As with the expansion of the "liberty" definition, any signal that the Court was willing to expand the notion of "property" prompted an ever-greater flow of cases hoping to expand it even further. Although the definitions of the substance of the due process clauses are still far from settled, the Court's interpretation of "life, liberty, or property" means little without its definition of "due process" itself.

Definitionally and procedurally, the Court had to determine exactly what the promise of "due process of law" meant in the American governmental framework. On this matter, the Court has ranged widely in its interpretation, especially because "due process" likely does not mean the same thing in different situations. Two main interpretations have emerged in the Court over time. The first, named the Goldberg rules, was developed by Justice Brennan as a systematic list of procedures that comprise "due process." This interpretation moved the definition of "due process" procedurally closer to the standard of a courtroom. The second main interpretation was formed under Justice Powell, and placed the procedural emphasis on maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency, rather than on individual rights.

Ultimately, the Court has spent the better part of 200 years defining and refining each component of the due process clauses for the basic purpose of ensuring that the United States government is not allowed to do anything that has a significant impact on any citizen in an arbitrary manner. As such, perhaps it would have been simpler if the first Congress had stated the due process clauses that plainly from the very beginning. If it had, the Courts would not have to determine what is "liberty" and what is not, but could focus entirely on the arbitrariness or non-arbitrariness of government action, which surely would be easier to define and address. That way, at the very least, we (the American people) would not have to be so appalled to learn that what we thought was our liberty or property, for instance, never was.