Metaphysics: Forming the Hypothesis on Freedom

What is freedom? Does it deal with legality issues or choices over peas and carrots? I believe I had free choice to write this article, and used text from Neil Campbell. There are multiple ways to interpret freedom, depending on what situation you are contemplating on. Campbell has the first position on this matter. He states that we examine our experiences on choosing freedom to gain the concept of freewill. He claims that we all have the idea that free will is a pre-condition of moral responsibility and that we should examine the concept of free will. When humans attempt to observe free will, we sometimes make exceptions for wrong choices due to the agent's environment. This implies moral effort if the agent that made the wrong decision had different intentions. Moral effort is necessary for freedom and responsibility, but there are more aspects that are needed. These accounts that show the ability to choose otherwise demonstrates the presence of limited freedom. Campbell claims that we have and exercise free will only in a narrow set of circumstances. We need to address the issue on why this limitation of free will is only directed in a moral state. This brings to question the importance of free will and determinism (as Hamilton would call 'necessity') and how they both contain concepts that we cannot understand. The acceptance of these concepts contains the problem that the idea of free will requires the role of an uncaused cause in the human agent. Something seems wrong with this position because when we perform an action, there are reasons on why we had. This idea of necessity then requires us to accept the idea of an infinite regress of these events that were causally connected. John Stuart Mill is an advocate of the moral theory of utilitarianism. He evaluates Hamilton and finds evidence to disagree. Mill argues that we do not need the notion of an infinite regression of causes, but needs a first cause, or 'universal cause.' This is the point of which is unknowable because of the complexity. The second argument parallels what Campbell's theory, which all comes to the option of choosing otherwise. Mill claims that we could have chosen other options if we had preferred them. Furthermore, these preferences could have been different only if the conditions were different. I have a view that correlates with this. We can also return to the other preferences providing we find ourselves in the same circumstance. I came up with a helpful example; a man named Joe decides to assist an elderly woman in a city across Main Street. In this situation, he chose what we deem a socially positive action. A month later, the same conditions apply, even the smallest conditions such as weather. He chooses not to help the elderly women standing on the street corner, with the consideration of what he did in the first condition. Even with the consideration of the first event, he chose otherwise even though the situation was the same. The presence of morality in this example does not apply to Joe's decision. Did he make a free choice?

Sartre explains that humans create themselves through choice. We do not possess an essence or fixed nature, as he would say. He states that actions are intentional and place us into the future or realm of possibilities. Within any given situation, we base our actions on intentions based on our immediate or long term needs. Sartre also explains that we are free to choose who are to become. In other words, create our existence freely. This means that we are not limited by moral restraints. 'A soldier who is drafted into military service might think of himself as an unwilling participant in a war. As such he may say to himself that he is the victim of circumstances beyond his control.' We ultimately have options in choosing our consequences whether the outcome is what we expected or not. The only thing we are not free of is freedom itself because the condition of our existence is something we can never escape. The next reading by Berofsky entitled 'On the Absolute Freedom of Will,' provides thought on the claim that the will is free in an absolute sense. If we accept the idea that the will is completely free, then we are forced between two positions: 'we are never un-free to act since one does not act when one is compelled, or we can distinguish between having perfectly free will and a restricted freedom of action.' Will knowledge restrict the will? If it does, then the view that the will is completely free is wrong. He uses an example, and in this case we will talk about flying. If I know that I cannot fly, then I cannot even try to fly, which makes the will un-free with respect to flying. Say I was drunk and believed I could fly; when I became sober I would come to know that I could not. My freedom to flying would again be diminished in the sense that I would not try again. The last text introduced is 'Quantum Mechanics, Free Will, and Determinism,' from Henry Margenau. In this case, quantum mechanics is introduced and is used to help explain freedom. He claims that there are two types of freedom; elemental and practical. Practical freedom is defined as freedom from internal or external constraints such as compulsion, coercion, or addiction. On the other hand, elemental freedom is the kind of freedom that we feel is read and that is in conflict with causal determinism. When there is an action, many complicated processes are involved. He claims that there is a mental or psychological act of choosing, the resulting behavior, and in between both of these are many physical events. There are three possibilities to go along with this; psychology can be reduced to physics, psychology depends on, but cannot be reduced to physics, or psychology cannot be reduced to physics. When making decisions, physical processes are present. He takes this further and uses quantum mechanics to explain the role of chance in the process. Some physical events are uncaused, and not because we are ignorant or unable to discover these hidden quantum events. On the other hand, Henry claims that there are no causes such as these to discover. There is a consideration of chance. 'This consideration allows us to introduce the idea of chance into what happens in our brains when we make choices.' This kind of chance does not fully explain elemental freedom but is a crucial part of it, and strengthens concept of freedom which was threatened.

This area is broken down into four main philosophers that each carry on the aspects of the views outlined above, which are Campbell, Mill, Sartre, and Berofsky. Campbell tries to make sense of the question if the self has free will. First we have to understand what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility. Campbell did this through three main points starting with the designation of overt acts and inner acts. He says we should primarily focus on inner acts because we can observe them. Campbell outlines this main point using the following example as he states "We do not consider the acts of a robot to be morally responsible acts; nor do we consider the acts of a man to be saved in so far as they are distinguishable from those of a robot by reflecting an inner life of choice." From this point we understand that moral freedom is in conjunction with inner acts. His second point claims the act must be regarded as the sole author. This is obvious because if there were any other determinants then the act would not pertain to the self. Campbell further explains this point of the self and the sole author; "...since even the most unfortunate victim of hereditary or environment does, as a rule 'will' what he does. It is significant, however, that the ordinary man, though well enough aware of the influence upon choices of heredity and environment, does not feel obliged thereby to give up his assumption that moral predicates are somehow applicable." It is hard to deny that the sole authorship is a necessary condition for a morally responsible act. Now we come to his last point which has had controversy surrounding it. An act of the agent being the sole author, does that sole authorship suffice to make the act a morally free. Campbell states that we may be inclined to think it does, but then we must consider that a person subject to moral judgment that he cannot perform. Campbell sums up his position by saying that a man can exercise free will morally only if he is the sole author of that act and if he could have chosen otherwise. He moves on to discuss the Common Sense's practice. In his words he explains the Common Sense's belief; "...in moral effort we have something for which a man is responsible without qualification, something that is not affected by hereditary and environment but depends solely upon itself." This belief runs in conjunction with the authorship by the agent of a moral act.

Next, we go to John Stuart Mill, who explains the freedom of the will. In this section, he works with credited equal, Hamilton. He claims that free will and necessity are inconceivable, but on the other hand, the mind is also unable to fathom an infinite regression of the chain of causes. "A determination by motives cannot, to our understanding, escape from necessitation. Nay, were we even to admit as true, what we cannot think as possible, still the doctrine of a motiveless volition would be only causualism; and the free acts of an indifferent will. How, therefore, I repeat, moral liberty is possible in man or God, we are utterly unable speculatively to understand." He claims that in order to 'be conscious of free-will, must mean, to be conscious, before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way.' What we are able to do is not a subject of consciousness. We are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be. At this point, Mill is striking upon the necessitations for indubitable thought marked about the highest conscious realms the agents of the mind are capable of escalating the imperative relation of consciousness and free will.

Sartre is the next thinker on our list, who focuses on the being and doing of freedom. Sartre uses very clear examples to illustrate his main points. He first explains that our primary observation is that an action is intentional. Sartre explains that if we do not choose or create choice, then we are not acting as a conscious human being. We saw a relation of what he said to the debate of Terri Schiavo. While we were discussing, we formed the question; must choices be made in real-time? Hypothetically, if she had a living will that stated what was to be done if she in that situation was that still a choice, versus what actually occurred? "The ultimate meaning of determinism is to establish within us an unbroken continuity of existence in itself. The motive conceived as a psychic fact. The refusal of freedom can be conceived only as an attempt to apprehend oneself as being-in-itself; it amount to the same thing. Sartre also explains that humans continually fail to recognize freedom even though it is intentions which drive motives that support the concept of freedom as something that isn't free. Was I free to right this article? You decide.

SOURCE:

Freedom, Determinism, and Responsibility: Readings in Metaphysics
Neil Campbell