Napoleon's Russian Folly

Napoleon's invasion of Russia in the latter half of 1812 was the largest land invasion up to that point in history. His Grande Armée, some sources say up to 691,501 men, over 300,000 of them French, was represented by nationalities all across Napoleon's vast empire, with Italians, Germans, Poles, Swiss, and even Croats listed in the numerous corps which crossed the Nieman on June 24^th. In Diary of a Napoleonic Foot Soldier, Jakob Walter, a Württemberg conscript, depicts his experiences from 1806 to 1812, the vast majority of the account settling on the invasion of Russia. His memoirs, for the most part, show a lack of organization, motivation and discipline, which suggests that the vaunted Grande Armée functioned well when and only when French troops and leadership composed the overwhelming majority in the field, the allied and satellite troops providing a secondary role in the entire conflict. His account helps illustrate central themes of the paradoxical relationships between states and war, the rising stakes and cost of such endeavors, and the increasingly political nature of war.

Bonaparte was aware of the quality gap, for the forces sent by the King of Württemberg were delegated to a support role even in 1806 and 1807. Walter mentions little of the action in the text itself, only bits and pieces of action against the Prussians on the Baltic coast and the Tyrolean peasant revolts. The Württemberg regiments, editor Marc Raeff apprises, "had no part in the big fighting of the Eylau-Friedland campaign...never exposed to the kindling close influence of the major leaders" (129). Walter's account reflects a certain indifference and bearish incompetence under fire. This is evident with the failed assault at Glatz, when he mentions that they retreated and "returned to camp in the "finest" disorder" (16). This illustrates a lack of motivation of the vassal state troops to risk battle and casualties, the latter certain to be invariably high in this period. One is reasonable to surmise that the German units, especially those of the Rhineland states, lacked the kind of training and experience which benefited the French Guard, or even Poniatowski's Polish forces, thus unable to contribute to the independent, mobile battalion carré system of the Grande Armée.

In addition to lack of motivation and martial skill, the issue of logistics did little to help the fighting proficiency of the Grande Armée, especially in Russia. In central Europe, the large armies benefited from essentially being on home territory. However, in Russia, a combination of a scorched earth policy and the logistical aspects of supply of such numbers over such a great distance proved devastating to an army that was dependent on unit and independent foraging. In the march into Russia itself, meager living conditions offered, at best, "nothing except milk and cabbage" (47). Peasants proved recalcitrant, and the army lost much of its numbers even before reaching the capital.

The retreat proved worse, Walter further writes. The organization really breaks down here, and in the withdrawal from Moscow, there exist cases where French Cuirassier Guards would take from the Germans (70) and structure would break down to the extent where a soldier was lucky to each once a week. This system of foraging proved to be fatal to the unit cohesion, especially those not French.

"For the poor discipline of certain Württemberg units was such that the King at the home-coming review addressed them as his brigands," mentioned Raeff (129). The lack of discipline, even in suppressing a peasant revolt in northwestern Austria, demonstrates the gap in quality found in the Grande Armée. With some German units assigned to guard the lines of communication, others placed as reserves and garrisons, it's clear that Napoleon only intended on using his trusted forces, mainly French and Polish, in combat.

In conclusion, the 1812 invasion of Russia by Napoleon's Grand Army proved a disaster and served as a reason for not utilizing such large amounts of troops under the limitations of supply and organization. Further deprived of morale, it is no small wonder that the fighting strength of the army declined so precipitously since the beginning of invasion, reaffirming that the French fought better alone, without a multi-ethnic, multi-national force with reluctant and indifferent auxiliaries. The loss of his army in Russia proved to be a turning point in the war, as Napoleon never completely regained initiative. The consequences of such a loss were so strategically and diplomatically expensive that his empire was ruined. Indeed, war made Napoleon, and Russia unmade him.