New Jersey Man Disciplined for Dreadlocks Can Sue for Religious Discrimination

According to a New Jersey appellate court, a Rastafarian corrections officer subjected to disciplinary action and facing termination of his employment for refusing to cut his dreadlocks may proceed to trial with a religious discrimination claim. In Hicks v. Hudson County Corr. Ctr., N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., No. A-2407-05T3, 8/29/07, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey noted that the correctional center, which argued that its hair length policy for male employees was necessary for safety reasons, failed to adequately explain why it did not permit male employees to pin or twist their hair rather than cut it when it allowed female employees to do so.

Jevon Hicks began working as a corrections officer at the Hudson County Correctional Center (the "Center") in Kearny, New Jersey in 1994. In 2001, the Center adopted a policy prohibiting male corrections officers from wearing their hair below collar length. Hicks, a Rastafarian who wore his hair in long dreadlocks, was initially allowed to comply with the hair length rule by tying his hair into a bun.

On November 1, 2004, however, the Center revised its grooming policy and began prohibiting male employees from pining or twisting their hair to satisfy the hair length requirement. The Center continued to permit female employees to pin or twist their hair to comply with the applicable hair standards.

Despite the revised policy, Hicks refused to cut his hair, asserting that cutting his hair would violate his religion. As a result, the Center subjected Hicks to progressive disciplinary action and possible termination of employment.

Hicks filed suit against the Center in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, on September 20, 2005, arguing that the Center violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to 42, by enforcing a grooming policy that would force him to violate his religious beliefs. Hicks certified that he was a practicing Rastafarian and that wearing long hair and dreadlocks were vital tenets of his religion.

The trial court held that the grooming policy was not discriminatory on its face, that it did not constitute a per se violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, and that there was a rational relationship between the policy and an important interest, i.e., safety. The trial court accordingly dismissed Hicks's suit.

The appeals court reversed, finding that Hicks had presented sufficient evidence to proceed to trial on the issue of religious discrimination. In assessing the evidence that Hicks introduced to the trial court, the appeals court noted that Hicks had submitted an affidavit swearing that cutting his dreadlocks would violate his religion, in addition to an article explaining Rastafarian religious beliefs. The appeals court held that even if a dispute existed as to the authenticity of Hicks's religious beliefs, the trial court should have viewed those issues in the light most favorable to Hicks when it considered the Center's summary judgment motion.

The appeals court observed that since the Center's grooming policy was neutral on its face and generally applicable to all male corrections officers, Hick's claim should be analyzed under disparate impact standards. As explained by the appeals court, disparate impact cases involve employment practices that are neutral on their face but "result[] in a significantly disproportionate or adverse impact on members of the affected class" and cannot be justified by business necessity. Under a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff is not required to prove a discriminatory intent.

The appeals court next addressed the Center's evidence in opposition to Hicks's discrimination claim. The appeals court explained that the Director of the Center had justified the Center's revised grooming policy on grounds of improved officer safety and "esprit de corps." According to the Director, an inmate could pull an officer's long hair and "yank" him "to the ground . . . injuring the officer and putting other officers and inmates in jeopardy."

The appeals court recognized officer safety as a "presumptively valid" justification for the grooming policy, but found two main defects in the Center's evidence. First, the court pointed out that the only evidence offered by the Center to establish that long hair poses a safety hazard was "common knowledge" and the Director's statement, which did not refer "to any specific incident or study that precipitated the change in policy" in 2004. The court observed that Hicks had worked at the Center for 10 years, "ostensibly without incident." Second, the court questioned "why female corrections officers are still permitted to pin or twist their long hair to meet the standard."

While the appeals court noted that "it is impossible for us to know whether [Hicks] will be able to satisfy his ultimate burden of persuasion," the court held that Hicks had presented sufficient evidence to proceed to trial with a religious discrimination claim.

Sources:

Hicks v. Hudson County Corr. Ctr., N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., No. A-2407-05T3, 8/29/07, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a2407-05.pdf.