Nikita Khrushchev: Leadership During the Cuban Missile Crisis

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis, deserves some credit in adverting the first potential nuclear war in world history. Soviet leaders have consistently been chastised and typecast as "evil" dictators.

In particular, Joseph Stalin has been an archetypical figure which his successors have been compared to, perhaps unfairly, especially considering the sheer atrocities committed by Stalin against his own people. In short, Communist leaders have been given a bad name since Stalin, (although Stalin is much deserving of being labeled "evi1'') and sometimes unjustly. l believe Khrushchev to be such a person unjustly typecast as an "evil" dictator.

Khrushchev's actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis were in the best interests of the Soviet Union, and were based on rational decision-making. Taking into account the factual information pertaining to the personal background of Khrushchev, the decision process employed by the Premier during the crisis, the outcome, and the consequences, the Soviet Union benefited from Khrushchev's leadership just as much as the U.S. benefited from President John F. Kennedy's leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In addition, despite the political consequences to himself, Khrushchev did no hesitate to make a decision in the best interests of his country.

Born on 17 April 1894, Nikita's humble beginnings began as a peasant in the Ukraine and son of a miner. In 1918, he officially becomes a member of the Bolsheviks, and would join the Red Army a year later He will be very active in politics, whether it was at the local level, representing the miners, or later on the national level in Ukraine, as an advocate of agriculture, which he becomes successful enough at and to draw the attention of the Communist Party in Russia, and gains a reputation as being a devoted member. He was a supporter of Stalinist policies, just like everyone else, because if you were not, you were likely to be exiled, or killed.

However, after Stalin died, and when his successor, Malenkov was forced to resign on 8 February 1955, Khrushchev took over as General Secretary of the Party and immediately begins "De-Stalinization." This program, originally promised by Malenkov to win the position of General Secretary over Khrushchev in 1953, was aggressively enacted by Khrushchev. Although it was originally part of a secret speech at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, denouncing the "cult of personality,'' without actually mentioning Stalin's name, it was widely spread and understood in Russia. Nikita also sought improved relations with the West and strongly believed in peaceful coexistence between communist and capitalist nations. The result of his speech was a destabilizing wave sent through the Comintern, including China, because it altered all previous Marxist attitudes towards capitalism.

One of the major accomplishments during Khrushchev's tenure as premier was the development of the Virgin Lands Program in 1956, which revived Ukrainian farmland where a year prior bad weather had wiped out almost the entire wheat harvest.

The program allowed for additional land to be opened up to harvest, previously never used for such purposes. The result was a plentiful crop and a great year for Communism everywhere thanks to the stimulus to the economy in 1956.

This program could be interpreted as a bold move away from Stalinist economics and forced collectivization towards an opening of vast areas of land to cultivation and even allow for dramatization for the benefit of the overall economy of the Soviet Union. It was indeed on of the most successful programs instituted by Khrushchev.

Unfortunately, even such a successful move can have a negative affect on the political career of a bold leader. The conflict magnified by the Virgin Lands Program was between the Military-industrialists and the Consumer Goods advocates. Since Khrushchev was from the latter, the Military-industrialists felt threatened by his emphasis on agriculture and the consumer goods they produced. They reasoned Khrushchev would continue to divert resources away from the military and/or large industry for use in producing and increasing consumer goods via agriculture. This is precisely what happened, and perhaps, was a factor in the eventual forced resignation of Khrushchev in 1963, and certainly in the Anti-party Coup of 18 June 1957 carried out by Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. They were able to win in a Presidium vote of 8-4 in favor of removing him from office, but Khrushchev supporters were flown in for the Central Committee meeting on 22 June to consider the dismissal by his ally Marshal Zhukov, and successfully overturn the dismissal. A possible contingency factor contributed to his political downfall of 1963 was how he handled the Cuban Missile Crisis, which upset the "hard-liners" of the Communist Party, who don't always seem to have the best interests of the nation in mind.

Nevertheless, Nikita was not one to back down to political pressure very easily, unless it meant preserving the nation. He refused to crack under such opposition in his cordial dealings with the U.S. when he traveled there in September 1959 to meet with President Eisenhower, with his advisers Mikoyan, and Kozlov, while the opposition disapproved of the trip. Although Khrushchev was not allowed a visit to Disney World because U.S. officials were wary of security breeches, Nikita still managed to joke that there might be rocket-launchers hidden inside. Overall his meeting with the President wag friendly, and they planned a summit meeting in Paris for the following summer (1960).

Unfortunately, the Paris Summit of 16 May 1960 was doomed to failure after the U-2 incident of 1 May 1960. President Eisenhower refused to apologize for sending a spy plane into Soviet territory and even failing to guarantee future spy plane intrusions would not occur, citing security issues. This drove a wedge between the two leaders and bluntly declared U.S. mistrust of the Soviet Union and disrespect for their privacy.

Despite the increased tensions, Khrushchev still insisted a future mutual understanding between the two super powers was still a possibility and should remain a goal of both sides.

Despite the efforts made by Khrushchev for some sort of peace and understanding, the U.S. and "hard-liners" among the Comintern, especially China, continued to be a hindrance. Politically, Khrushchev's "hands were tied," in terms of getting together a peace settlement. So the Cold War trudges on, perhaps experiencing a climax during the Cuban Missile Crisis due to the sheer magnitude of the situation.

Preceding this turning point in the nuclear arms race and directly adding fuel to the fire was the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961.

Originally approved by President Eisenhower in May 1960, the CIA program consisted of an invasion force of Cuban refugees sent into Cuba by the U.S in order to overthrow Fidel Castro, a recently self-declared Marxist. President Kennedy enacted the ploy under intense Republican pressure on 17 April 1961. The mission failed miserably and became a grave embarrassment to the Kennedy Administration.

This incident helped convince Khrushchev that the U.S. was concerned with Cuba and its Communist dictator. This was only further confirmed when Kennedy initiated diplomatic and economic sanctions against the small island. Clearly, Kennedy considered Cuba a threat, and it would take a major ploy on Khrushchev's part to prevent the U.S. from invading Cuba again and overthrowing the sole Communist presence in the Western Hemisphere.

Perhaps having to re-establish himself and the Soviet Union as the Communist leaders of the world, Khrushchev believed it absolutely necessary to protect Cuba in order to protect the U.S.S.R. He could accomplish this simultaneously for the Comintern by placing weapons in Cuba.

Also, another important factor to consider is the U.S. placement of nuclear missiles in both Italy and Turkey, comparably as close to Russia as Cuba is to America.

At this point, Khrushchev must have felt the U.S. had the Soviets in a rather precarious and potentially disastrous disadvantageous position. The Soviets faced possible total annihilation at the hands of the U.S. The least Khrushchev could do was match the U.S. threat with some sort of counter-measure. He felt he owed that to his nation, if simply for their sovereignty and self-preservation. This rationale does not seem to indicate an irrational leader making irrational decisions on behalf of his nation.

Considering the predicament faced by the Soviets, it's no wonder Khrushchev decided to place weapons on Cuban soil. Of course, JFK naturally responded to the situation with some concern, just as Khrushchev had to the possibility of an invasion of Cuba and a subsequent nuclear war. In fact, one could make the argument that Khrushchev 'under reacted' initially by simply placing defensive only weapons in Cuba, which JFK did reluctantly allow, after assurances from Khrushchev that offensive weapons were not necessary. However, the U.S. once again decided to mistrust the Soviets and send spy planes over Cuba to ensure that it was indeed defensive weapons only being placed on the tiny island. This was a contingency Khrushchev perhaps should have anticipated, considering U.S. tendency to spy on Soviet activity. Maybe Nikita did indeed anticipate and even counted on U.S. spy planes flying over Cuba and never intended to place offensive weapons in Cuba, but to use the nuclear warehouses as a bluff tactic. Either way, his goal would remain the same: protect Soviet interests from U.S. attack.

Khrushchev made the decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba in the spring of 1962, and dubbed Operation Anadyr. Nikita defended his reasoning in his memoirs. His main objective was to "defend Cuba by deterring an inevitable American assault.'' Of course, various scholars have met his explanation with skepticism over the years. Recently, former Soviet officials have confirmed that this was indeed Khrushchev's primary motive. These individuals include Sergo Mikoyan (son of Anastas Mikoyan, closest advisor to Khrushchev), Andrei Gromyko, and Oleg Trotsky, former Khrushchev aide. The Soviets had several reasons to believe that an assault on Cuba was imminent. The very fact that it was Kennedy who had authorized the Bay of Pigs invasions was reason enough. In addition, JFK's policies towards Cuba, along with covert operations and planning combined to give Khrushchev all the more reason to be suspicious. Even if the evidence on secret aspects of JFK's policies wasn't enough, his public actions against Cuba in early 1962 certainly were. Cuba had been removed from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Kennedy Administration had levied economic sanctions. Not to mention U.S. military maneuvers in the Caribbean, which Khrushchev had received word of through intelligence reports, indicating a plan for a second invasion By April 1962, all indicators pointed towards an imminent U.S. invasion of Cuba. From Khrushchev's perspective, if he were to back down now, the Chinese would surely see him as "soft" and the U.S. could gain yet another victory over Communist movement, this time in the Caribbean.

So the stage was set for deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Through the fall of 1962, military build-up in Cuba progressed with assurances made to the U.S. by Khrushchev that it did not threaten their security. Operation Anadyr remained a secret. By late September 1962, the U.S. had yet to discover the plan to place nuclear weapons of Soviet origin on Cuban soil . However, Khrushchev acknowledged the probable and imminent U.S. discovery of offensive weapons on the small island, a mere 90 mites from its border. His aid Oleg Malinowski had been warning Nikita for several months of the dangers, but nevertheless he believed it was "too late to change anything." This certainly was true if Khrushchev was to accomplish his goal and establish somewhat an equality of power with the U.S. in order to preserve the Soviet Union.

Therefore Soviet personnel and convention weaponry continued to be transported to the island. On September 8, the large-hatch freighter Omsk arrived in Cuba carrying equipment for installing medium-range nuclear missiles. Soviet officials were constantly monitoring the operation. Khrushchev also decided to use intimidation and deceit to deter JFK from initiating a blockade or even an invasion of Cuba, warning the U.S. that any attempt to prevent further Soviet build-up on the island would be met with retaliation, including "thermonuclear war." Public addresses from Moscow continued to claim the equipment sent to Cuba was of a defensive nature only. The reasoning given was that the Soviet Union already had missiles capable of striking the U.S. within their own borders, and therefore nuclear weapons in Cuba was unnecessary. It was a misnomer, but necessary for Soviet interests to maintain secrecy of Operation Anadyr.

Besides, the objectives and motivations remained the same regardless of U.S. knowledge. U.S. preparedness also remained at the same level throughout the crisis. The last U.S. upgrade in nuclear weapons was the placement of missiles in Turkey and Italy prior to the crisis.

Speaking of which, an exploration of the background for the placement of these missiles is very critical to understand the resolution to the crisis. President Eisenhower and Washington had agreed to a plan to shore-up defenses for the West in Europe in October 1959. Turkey and Italy were the only countries to accept nuclear weapons from the U.S. Turkey would receive fifteen Jupiters, owning the missiles themselves, where as the U.S. would retain control of the warheads. As a result, both nations approval was required to fire these weapons. Construction of the missile sites did not actually begin until after the election of JFK and which gave him the option to cancel the agreement.

Heeding to his advisers, and the feelings of Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper, in June 1961 Kennedy was set to go through with the plan. Around the fall of 1961, the Jupiters were sent to Turkey and by the spring of 1962, they became operational.

However, Kennedy was still wary of missiles in Turkey, and even requested that the Defense Department devise a way to remove them on 23 August 1962. Considering the Soviet build-up in Cuba at the time, JFK believed their removal would make it more difficult for the Soviets to justify such actions. However, the Defense Department failed to take any action before the Cuban Missile Crisis began.

Perhaps had Khrushchev known of JFK's attempts to remove the missiles from Turkey, he would have seriously reconsidered deployment of weapons to Cuba so late in the game. Or he may have continued, but stopped short of placing nuclear weapons in Cuba in exchange for a U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba, and removal of its forces in the Caribbean. Whatever the case, Khrushchev's approach was dictated by U.S. threats to Cuba and/or the Soviet Union. Nikita's rationale proved to be consistent when dealing with the removal for those threats, which were mutual on both sides, as his actions indicated.

Revisiting Khrushchev's personality profile, it could be understood that in fact he had a somewhat childish, and therefore irrational nature. This may have surfaced in his foreign policy to a degree, but not to the extent that it became a hindrance to his efforts in establishing peaceful coexistence and a balance of power with the West. Simple stubbornness may have prevented him from listening to his advisor's warnings months in advance of the dangers of U.S. discover of Operation Anadyr. However, this may have save the Soviet Union form losing its position and prestige as the Communist super power, and maybe even their own relative security form nuclear destruction at the hands of the U.S. with no immediately reliable defense. In times of great peril, the best is brought out of a leader, even a Communist dictator.

When the crisis began on Tuesday, 16 October 1962, there was little to be done to make the situation worse. A U-2 plane discovered the nuclear weapons on the island 90 miles off the coast of the U.S. two days earlier. The information from the CIA was given to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and a member of (Ex-Comm) He, in turn passed the message on to President Kennedy in the morning, which initiated the crisis. At this point, the only question was the nuclear missiles in Cuba operational? The assumption was no, as the evidence indicated, but assumptions are dangerous in these kind of times.

The next few days were spent devising and examining options on how to respond by the U.S. to the Soviet nuclear missile discovery. Was an air strike intended to take out the missiles before they became operational, a broader attack on the military installations and a blockade of Cuba to prevent Soviet warheads from reaching the island at all, or an all out invasion of Cuba, suggested by Robert Kennedy the best option? These were the three choices initially discussed by Ex-Comm, all which would certainly provoke a strong reaction from Moscow.

The following day, Wednesday, October 17, the President hoped to maintain secrecy from the public in order to keep the peace. Also, a non-military option on how to respond surfaced. Charles Bohlen, U.S. ambassador to France, suggested that diplomacy be By Thursday, JFK still believed an air strike to be the best option, while his brother Robert was leaning towards a blockade. The proponents of a blockade or quarantine argued that a military strike was too inflexible and cause Khrushchev to respond in a much more severe manner. With a blockade, other alternatives could still be used, such as negotiations, unlike with an air strike. JFK had believed a general air strike was the best option up to this point, but now was beginning to lean towards a blockade. Discussions over the following three days were a commitment to such an action.

On Friday, Kennedy went on a weekend campaign trail to Ohio and Illinois but made an excuse that he had an upper respiratory infection in order to get back to Washington by Saturday morning, and work on the crisis, and not to arouse public suspicion. U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson suggested in an Ex-Comm meeting that afternoon that a quarantine was preferable to a military strike, but that it was not sufficient, and that the U.S. must withdraw its missiles in Turkey and Italy and promise not to invade Cuba. He was sharply condemned for the suggestion by many of his colleagues, even the president himself. However, he may have effectively helped bring about a pro-blockade consensus among Ex-Comm members, since a simple blockade would be much more preferable than the concessions Stevenson was asking for.

On Sunday, Kennedy made the final decision to quarantine Cuba after meeting with a group of officials who would have been involved in an air strike. While all this was going on Soviet and Cuban officials were attempting to determine the level of knowledge the Americans had on the nuclear missiles in Cuba, and if they were then planning on attacking the island. It was agreed upon that it was probable that the U.S. did know because of the U-2 flights over Cuba, and General Gribkov in Cuba sent an encoded message to Defense Minister Malinovsky. However, the message may not have been relayed to Khrushchev since the operation was the defense minister's responsibility.

The American public had been kept in the dark for almost an entire week. On the evening of Monday, 22 October 1962, the President addressed the nation. By that time, the President had decided on a "quarantine" against Cuba, and it was announced as such after revealing the presence of "offensive missile sites'' being built in Cuba by the Soviet Union to the American public, and the justification for their actions. "JFK stressed the issue of deception." The U.S. had made public warning before dispatching missiles to other countries, while the Soviet Union failed to do so, and in fact deliberately lied about their missiles. However, the Soviets are well known for their high regard for the importance of secrecy. In a Machiavellian sense, they were justified: the ends justify the means.

Khrushchev endeavored to respond immediately to the Kennedy address, in kind and a similar tone. Also, when Kennedy took steps to make the situation less dangerous by reminding his military commanders that they could not fire Jupiter missiles from Turkey without his permission, Khrushchev took the same steps with the Luna missiles in Cuba.

The next day, Tuesday, 23 October, Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy. He condemned the blockade as illegal, a violation of international laws protecting free sea travel, and urged Kennedy to cancel it. The President in the meantime, signed Proclamation 3504, formally establishing the blockade to go into effect the next day.

Later in the evening, JFK responded to the letter warning Nikita not to challenge the blockade.

On Wednesday, the blockade took affect at 10 AM. The U.S. Strategic Air Command moved to alert posture DEFCON 2 for the first time ever. The Soviet ships stopped at the quarantine line some 500 mites outside of Cuba, and some even turned around, as Khrushchev had decided after consulting with his ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin. Ships not found with any weapons or related equipment were allowed to continue on to Cuba. However, in another letter sent by Khrushchev to Kennedy that day, he argued the opposite position he had taken with Dobrynin that the Soviets were not obligated to recognize the blockade. Perhaps Khrushchev had changed his mind, and did not want to be portrayed as weak, and lose the strategic edge in the crisis he had developed.

On Thursday, Kennedy responded to the most recent letter from Khrushchev by defending the American position and implicating the Premier as the aggressor, although both could be labeled as such. Meanwhile, the Kennedy Administration dismissed a public Cuba-for-Turkey trade, although the primary goal was still the removal of the missiles from Cuba. U.N. Secretary General U Thant attempted to and succeeded to convince Kennedy to suspend the blockade and Khrushchev to ensure his vessels stayed away from the blockade line, so Kennedy could avoid a confrontation with Soviet ships for a few days in order to allow time for the development of a peace settlement. Once again, Khrushchev had expressed his willingness to work out a resolution.

The following day, Friday, the first Soviet ship to be stopped and boarded by the U.S. Navy was the Marucls. The Russians on board did not retaliate or resist. Later in the day, ABC reporter John Scali met with KGB officer Alekstant Feklisov in Washington. In their meeting, an unexpected possible solution to the crisis developed.

The three points plan included: Khrushchev would remove missiles form Cuba under U.N. inspection, Castro would agree never to receive such weapons again, and Kennedy would pledge not to invade Cuba. David Rusk, U.S. Defense Secretary asked Scali to arrange another meeting and communicate the administration's interest in their proposal.

After this second meeting, Feklisov finally reported to the KGB headquarters on the proposal. However, the message would not arrive until the following afternoon on Saturday. Khrushchev, with no knowledge of the proposal, sent a letter to Kennedy expressing his emotional concern over the possibility of war and proposed his own settlement: Kennedy would promise not to invade Cuba, and end the quarantine, and then the missiles in Cuba would no longer be necessary. That letter, now known as the famous Khrushchev's "first letter'' to Kennedy, demonstrated incredible bravery on the part of the premier, and proved vital to the end of the crisis.

Meanwhile, Castor prepared for an invasion and war, as did the Soviet troops stationed there, further adding the pressure onto Khrushchev.

The following morning, still before the arrival of the Scali-Feklisov proposal, on Saturday, 27 October, Khrushchev, via Radio Moscow, addressed the double standard imposed by the Americans on the Soviet missiles in the Caribbean, some 90 mikes from its coast, whereas there were American missiles in Turkey, right next to Russia's border.

Now Khrushchev, admittedly more demanding then the first, had offered another revised deal. The new proposal by Khrushchev was simply the removal of U.S. missiles form Turkey and a promise not to invade Cuba for the removal of the Soviet missiles and a promise not to attack Turkey, with U.N. inspection of missile removal, of course. Two subsequent incidences muddied the water, however.

Following the radio message, between 10:15 and 11 AM, an American U-2 plane was intercepted over Soviet territory by Soviet MiG planes, but the U-2 managed to leave the territory before weapons could be fired. At Noon, another U-2 plane, low flying over Cuba, was fired upon via order of a trigger-happy Soviet military commander, acting without authorization. The lone casualty of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Major Rudolph Anderson, was the American pilot killed.

This incident contributed to Kennedy's continued reluctance to promise not to invade Cuba. However, he felt more concerned about ensuring Castro remained in power rather than agreeing to remove the obsolete missiles from Turkey, which he had originally intended to do prior to the crisis. Furthermore, the President and his advisers acknowledged avoiding war was more important than retaining the ability to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro. Therefore, the decision was made to disregard the second Khrushchev message in favor of the "first letter." The U.S. was willing to promise not to invade Cuba in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles from the island. The Jupiter missiles in Turkey would not be a part of the deal, at least not yet, and certainly not publicly.

Rusk requested a third meeting between Scali and Feklisov, which they did. Scali expressed his displeasure with Khrushchev's second proposal of October 27 with Feklisov, which had included the Jupiter missiles as part of the deal. Feklisov, however, insisted there was a communication problem and time lags, pointing out that Khrushchev's message of October 27 had come before he received the positive American response to his letter of October 26.

At 7:45 AM, Ambassador Dobrynin met with U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy at his office in the Justice Department in Washington. The President's brother laid out the basis for a settlement. America would not invade Cuba in exchange for the removal of the missiles from the island. Also, the missiles in Turkey would be removed, but that part of the deal would remain secret, or less the trade was off. At 8:05 AM, JFK's letter to Khrushchev was sent to Moscow and also released to the press at the same time calling for Soviets to remove the missiles from Cuba under U.N. inspection, for the end of the U.S. quarantine against Cuba, and a promise not to invade it.

The next few hours in the late evening and early morning were perhaps the most tense filled moments in the history of the planet. Khrushchev felt the situation getting out of control, considering Castro's request that Khrushchev should attack the U.S. with nuclear missiles immediately should the island be invaded or if an agreement couldn't be reached. The unauthorized firing on the U-2 also signified the situation in Cuba was increasingly becoming volatile and out of his control. Indeed, if an agreement were not to be reached immediately, surely a nuclear war would ensue.

Khrushchev met with his senior advisers on the morning of Sunday 28 October.

Once again, the overall feeling was that an agreement must be reached quickly or Cuba would be invaded, and war would follow. Therefore, feeling he had little choice, he accepted the Kennedy proposal of yesterday and persuaded his officials that it was the right, and only thing to do. He then dispatched a letter to Castro, to calm the volatile dictator and discourage any drastic actions taken on his part.

The Khrushchev acceptance was broadcast on Radio Moscow at 9 AM, Washington time. The missiles in Turkey were not mentioned. The crisis, in effect, was over.

Who was the most responsible for the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis? Our American slant of history tends to implicate JFK as the primary reason for the crisis' resolution, along with his Ex-Comm staff. However, I contend Khrushchev himself, and his advisers to a lesser extent than Ex-Comm, deserve just as much credit as Kennedy for his efforts to avert a nuclear catastrophe.

Simple communication lags can be partly blamed for the incorrect and potentially detrimental assumptions made on both sides. Also, this contributed to misinterpretation of the respective sides. Khrushchev, therefore, cannot be blamed for the crisis coming so close to a destructive conclusion. Personality clashes were not a major factor, nor was Khrushchev's supposed periodic childish attitude, a contributing factor.

Rather, Khrushchev should be praised for his willingness to work with Kennedy to avoid war. Also, containing Castro was an important and difficult a job for Khrushchev to undertake. Although many historians have viewed Castro's role as merely a pawn, the simple fact is if the dictator of a small island has been able to withstand U.S. pressure for the better half of a century, he certainly had a larger role in a crisis-taking place on his own soil. Khrushchev was able to keep his cool in the face of tremendous pressure from three sides. He fended off hard-liners within the Soviet Union and China, Castro, and the U.S.

The aftermath of the crisis had everlasting effects on the entire face of the Cold War. Instead of one super power having a drastic strategic advantage over the other, as the U.S. did over Russia, the doctrine of MAD (mutually assured destruction) was developed as a result of this crisis, which made the idea of a first nuclear strike unrealistic. Détente also became a policy enjoyed by both super powers until the 1980s when Reagan became President. Although the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis did not mean the end of the Cold War, it nevertheless lessened the fear of a Soviet-U.S. nuclear war over the very precarious Berlin situation.

Was there another alternative available to Khrushchev other than placing missiles in Cuba, which would have allowed him to still achieve his foreign policy objectives? Or perhaps he was pressured into the decision by hard-liners of the Comintern, making any other alternative detrimental to the Soviet position in the world. I have argued the latter. Khrushchev felt he had to maintain his nation's influence, or the Soviet Union would cease to exist as a world power and his vision of peaceful coexistence would have never been attempted. In concluding, Khrushchev was indeed acting rationally and for the best interests of the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev was a man born in the Ukraine and the son of a peasant miner. He became a successful politician and agriculturalist, which helped him develop the Virgin Lands Program after becoming Premier of the Soviet Union. Succeeding Stalin and Malenkov, Khrushchev has faced an up hill battle with American historians who continue to stereotype most Communist dictators as "evil." The conflicts that arose under Khrushchev were political problems, which he dealt with admirably, and always had what was best for the Soviet Union in mind. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a perfect example of Khrushchev's willingness to compromise and come closer to a policy pf peaceful coexistence with the West, despite the hard liner opposition, which ultimately may have cost him his position in 1963. Nevertheless, Khrushchev prevailed in the Cuban Missiles Crisis, as well as Kennedy, and deserves equal credit in diffusing a situation, which each side equally helped create. The final resolution became acceptable to both sides in the realization that not coming to one would be far more dangerous and unwise. This was a rational conclusion drawn by Khrushchev, who was able to help bring a peaceful settlement between the two super powers, and still maintain the Soviet position as such. The Soviet Union, as well as the rest of the world, especially America, should be thankful that Khrushchev was the leader of the second greatest super power on the brink of a nuclear disaster.

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