Nixon's Visit to China

Nixon's trip to The People's Republic of China on February 21, 1972 confused most average American's of the time. For one thing, most American's had come to believe that all communist countries were evil, and that it was American's duty to rid the world of such threats - hence the military involvement in Vietnam. So, you can imagine their confusion when they saw Nixon shaking hands with a communist leader in the name of friendship. After all, if communism was the enemy, and China was communist, didn't that make them the "bad guys?" The confusion was well warranted. During that period, America was quickly discovering that "[i]nternational politics was not a fight between a 'good' side and a 'bad' side," and coming to the conclusion that maybe, "[a]ll states, communist or noncommunist, had the right to exist and possess legitimate interests."[i] However, the vast majority of American's at the time simply saw the visit as nothing more than a political stunt by Nixon. Little did they know, however, that Nixon's plan to open China held many important factors. Few knew that one of the most important of those factors was using China as leverage against the Soviet Union, to keep a balance of power and stop the expansion of the world power.

Contrary to popular belief, Nixon had a great interest in China many years before his visit in 1972. The many claims that Nixon's trip was simply for political benefit, and had little to do with actual foreign policy since in the past Nixon was a huge opponent of communist nations is more fiction than fact. In truth, even before his presidency Nixon expressed interest in China. In 1965, during a trip to Asia, Nixon told deputy chief of mission at the American embassy of Singapore, Arthur W. Hummel Jr., that "Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime would never achieve its dream of returning to the mainland," and that American "relations with the People's Republic of China would have to be improved."[ii] Nixon also knew that China could be of great help in dealing with the Soviets. Also, in 1967, Nixon expressed to then Secretary of State Dean Rusk that American should "stop falling all over [itself] to improve relations with Russia, since that would make better relations with China impossible."[iii]

Shortly after Nixon was elected in 1969, "a series of border skirmishes broke out between the Soviets and the Chinese."[iv] Nixon's National Security Advisor at the time, Henry Kissinger "became increasingly worried about the possibility that the Soviets would invade, defeat, or intimidate China" for their own benefits.[v] Kissinger was very concerned that the Soviet Union was attempting to expand, and felt that the United States could benefit in using China to restore the balance of power in that section of the world. It was during this time that various secret meeting and communications took place between the United States and China to discuss the possibility of President Nixon visiting to speak about foreign policy issues. One communication stated that one of the issues to be discussed would be Vietnam, but China wasn't interested in Vietnam. A White House memo at that time stated "the Chinese [were] interested in talks primarily for their impact on [dealing] with the Soviets."[vi] Kissinger took note of this, and knew that he could use the Chinese hatred of The Soviet Union to America's benefit. In effect, he attempted to create a duel policy in dealing with China - first, to establish friendly relations, and secondly to use those relations against the Soviets. In a memo to Nixon, Kissinger wrote, "We want our China policy to show Moscow that it cannot speak for all communist countries."[vii] Therefore, it was really issues involving The Soviet Union that pushed talks with China.

However, the Nixon administration knew that convincing China that they had good intentions wasn't going to be easy. "Beijing had for years complained about alleged American-Soviet collusion to isolate and contain China."[viii] Also, many world powers of the time "had been trained by prior experience to believe that in any conflict between the Soviet Union and China, Washington would side with the Soviets."[ix] To get around this, Kissinger and other Nixon administration officials decided to use the common hatred of The Soviet Union between China and the United States to their benefit. Kissinger reminded Chinese officials that "the Soviets [had] compared Mao to Adolf Hitler and the Chinese to the Mongol hoards who overran Russia a millennium earlier."[x] Using the Soviet card, Kissinger was able to make much leeway in his secret negotiations with China, further preparing for Nixon's official visit in the future.

Before Nixon's visit, however, there was still one more matter to discuss - the issues of secrecy. Nixon had made it clear that he wanted to keep all negotiations with China a secret until his official visit took place, but many people to this day still don't understand why. Some claim that Nixon was just up to dirty tricks, or that he was just a paranoid man in general, and secrecy was just how his administration dealt with things. However, recently declassified documents tell us otherwise. In reality, the main thing that worried Nixon was that "Chiang Kai-Shek's minions in Washington might learn about the trip and try to stop it."[xi] Nixon was also quite worried about political opponents finding out about the trip, and using it against him somehow in upcoming elections. A CIA study on United States and China negotiations reveals that during a trip to Beijing in July of 1971, Kissinger specifically told Chou Enlai that the President wanted "no political visitors" before Nixon himself made his visit.[xii] A few days later, at yet another secret meeting in Paris, Kissinger elaborated on his comments, telling the Chinese that any talks involving the anti-war movement in the U.S. were "off limits," and that they were "not only to shun Democratic leaders, but also 'keep their distance from American left groups.'"[xiii] So, the secrecy seems to mainly have been motivated by partisan politics, more than anything else. Also, playing the secrecy game helped to confuse the Soviets, who were probably paying close attention to The United States sudden interest in forming relations with China. Kissinger and Nixon felt that keeping the Soviets on their toes, and constantly guessing about which side they would choose in a possible Soviet and China conflict was in their interest, and would give the U.S. much more power if such a conflict ever occurred.

So, in essence, a major factor in Nixon's trip to China involved keeping a balance of power. The administration was worried that The Soviet Union was becoming far too dominant, and didn't want to see them manipulate - or possibly conquer - other states. Therefore, Kissinger and Nixon used the balance of power model to form a coalition with China in attempt to stop The Soviet Union from "achieving superiority over" other states.[xiv] While other factors were involved - such as Vietnam, Taiwan, and various economic issues - one can't overlook the importance of the United States maintaining such a balance. The trips also essentially put an end to the old ways of dealing with communism - stating quite clearly that the United States was no longer going to focus on fighting all forms of communism, but rather focus its target on Soviet-style communism.

Geopolitics also played a big factor. If the border wars between the Soviets and the Chinese resulted in a major conflict, that section of the world would have been devastated. Virtually the entire Eurasian continent would have been affected in some way or another. Basically, you would have had two powerful states extremely close together trying to use their "spheres of influence" against one another. The results on the nations surrounding the two states would have been catastrophic to say the least.

So, while Nixon's visit to China had many important implications, the main one seems to have been a way to contain The Soviet Union from expanding and gaining power. It was also an attempt to reform America's old view on the domino theory, and focus instead on Soviet-style communism, rather than declaring that all communist states were evil and needed to be destroyed. Lastly, geopolitics played a role as well - after all, it was Kissinger himself who said that "his main interests were geopolitics and the balance of power" when it came to communist states.[xv]

Works Cited

Hook, Steven W., and John W. Spanier. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. 16th Ed. ed. Washington, D.C: CQ P, 2004.

Mann, James. About Face: a History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton. 1st ed. New York: Alfred a. Knopf, Inc., 1998.

Papp, Daniel S., Loch K. Johnson, and John E. Endicott. American Foreign Policy

History, Politics, and Policy. New York: Pearson Longman, 2005.

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[i]Hook and Spanier American foreign policy since World War II 145

[ii]Mann About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton 17

[iii] Ibid at 18

[iv] Ibid at 21

[v] Ibid

[vi] Ibid at 24

[vii] Ibid at 35

[viii]Hook and Spanier American foreign policy since World War II 146

[ix]Mann About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton 20

[x]Hook and Spanier American foreign policy since World War II 146

[xi]Mann About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton 32

[xii] Ibid at 29

[xiii] Ibid at 30

[xiv]Endicott, Johnson, and Papp American foreign policy history, politics, and policy 16

[xv]Mann About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton 55.