Oppression is in the Eye of the Beholder: Family Planning in Islamic Countries

As a race, humans tend to simplify what they don't know into stereotypes or generalizations. It is much easier to group all Muslims and "Eastern" behavior into one category and attribute everything to Islam that is reported by the media rather than critically learning about the situation and forming one's own conclusion. This typical behavior is what prompted inquiry into what influences affect the advent of family planning within Islamic countries, and whether culture or religion plays a larger part in hindering its popularity and advancement, as well as the past and present effects of family planning as documented through sociological research and literature.

When seeking to support a stance from religious text, proponents and opponents of family planning programs in Islamic countries often use the same verses from the Qur'an to justify their stances on family planning. This is because unlike Christianity, there is no organized clergy or authoritative body that doles out rulings universally in the Islamic faith (Maguire 112-114). Historically speaking, neither the Qur'an nor prophetic traditions take an absolute stance on birth control or family planning, so it's left to the interpretation of local religious authorities. Researcher Donna Lee Bowen did fieldwork in Morocco and other Islamic countries and concluded that many local religious leaders who oppose contraception have relatively limited education in Islamic scholarship, and these local regions are the ones that often have the most impoverished residents and the least resources to support large families (Maguire 119).

While the Qur'an itself does not have any passages directly referring to contraception or family planning, there is record of one practice being condoned by the Prophet, azl. Also referred to as el azl, or coitus interruptus, azl was practiced and documented during the time of the Prophet, with his knowledge and without condemnation (Ben Hamda 1). The Prophet did mandate that the husband had to ask his wife's permission before withdrawing, and granted rights to both partners for entitlement to sexual pleasure and the right to offspring. This is further evidence of the Islamic priority to grant rights to women regarding the choice to bear children, as well as sexual expression. The logic can then be extrapolated that the Prophet would condone contemporary contraceptive methods because they are temporary methods for avoiding pregnancy, similar in manner to azl (Maguire 113-114). It is universally accepted that surgeries rendering the subject permanently infertile, such as a vasectomy or tubal ligations, are considered to be interfering with God's will, and are impermissible within Islam unless there are extreme extenuating circumstances (Maguire117).

Quality of life is a concept that is stressed often in the Qur'an and family planning emphasizes the idea of improving the quality of children's lives versus increasing the quantity of one's children. Numerous children also allow parents less time and deprive them of the energy that is necessary for the spiritual and religious introspection required in Islam. The Qur'an also recommends that a mother should suckle her child for two years, which theoretically prevents the unhealthily small birth intervals that Islamic mothers often experience when they're not able to control their pregnancies (Maguire 119). Some Islamic scholars believe that Islam itself allows for birth control, but that if used to prevent child birth and not to protect women's health, it demonstrates a lack of trust in God to provide (Esposito and Haddad 23). In contrast to that, Al-Ghazzali, a renowned Islamic scholar, asserts that a family with children beyond the parent's means could be cause to resort to unlawful means in order to stay alive and well (Maguire 110). The Qur'anic concept of khilafah, relating to every individual's right to the freedom of choice, supports Al-Ghazzali's stance because according to Islam, God trusts in the ability of each human to self-awareness and capability (Maguire108). Al-Ghazzli also notes that fewer material burdens are an aid to Islamic scholarship. He also noted the detriment to the wife's physical appearance that several births may cause and that in order for the marriage to be enjoyable and sustainable, the wife's attractiveness needed to be maintained (Maguire 110).

Maulana Maudid, a Pakistani Islamic scholar, opposes contraception due to his opinion of women's character:

The last obstacle that may keep a woman from surrendering to a man's advances is fear of illegitimate conception. Remove this obstacle too and provide women with weak character assurance that they can safely surrender to their male friends and you will see that the society will be plagued by the tide of moral licentiousness" (qtd. in Maguire 118).

The Qur'an often receives a lot of attention for the hadiths that are interpreted to diminish women's capability, such as the statements that limit female testimony in court as being worth half that of a man and the limiting of inheritance for a woman versus a man. However, there are also many statements granting women the right to manage their own property and conduct their business (Obermeyer 42); as well as protecting a woman's right to sexual enjoyment and choice (Ben Hamda 4).The viewpoints that deny a woman her autonomy are mainly rooted in cultural norms versus Qur'anic text, and further supports the idea that many modern issues of reproductive choice function out of the political context that defines gender issues (Maguire 113).

Another widespread argument against family planning within conservative Islamic scholars is a defense in response to the polarized duality of the "Islam vs. the West" schema. Western influence encroaches on many traditions and cultures in the Middle East, and more often than not this is celebrated as modernization and progress by the rest of the world. This offensive trend coupled with a history of colonization and political meddling from the Western world has produced some paranoia and resentment common through some conservative Muslims. This all combines to fuel the belief that contraceptive usage is a conspiracy from western powers to limit the influx of Muslims into the world arena, as well as a step towards the sexually permissive attitudes flaunted in western society (Maguire 106). Advocates of this theory then argue that opposing family planning is the only way to maintain an Islamic identity and preserve their culture. Ironically, family planning is one of the strongest avenues to furthering the development of many struggling Islamic countries by improving their economy and health standards. Professor Abdel Rahim Omran supports this in saying:

Muslim countries have been forced to acquire debt, import food and rely on foreign aid to cope with the needs of growing populations. The result is a vicious cycle or poverty, ill health, illiteracy, overpopulation, and unemployment being compounded with social frustration, extremism, and social unrest "(qtd. in Maguire 116).

Many countries realizing the reality of increasing fertility rates are trying to curb population growth from the top down rather than the bottom up. For example, in 1993 the Iranian Assembly passed a law that prohibits paid maternity leave after the fourth birth, government-subsidized day care for female employees, and government subsidies for health insurance premiums after the fourth birth (Aghajanian 68). With even more economic disadvantages for large families, it's imperative that women have the option to limit their family's size.

On a more personal, emotional level, women deserve the right to be autonomous and shape their life situation. There is a general positive attitude towards sex during marriage as well as acknowledging the female's right to sexual enjoyment in Islam, and the choice should not have to be made between abstinence or economic struggle just because of current political and social forces (Obermeyer 43). The reality of reproductive choice in the Middle East is one of limits and there's room for improvement. This is showcased by the frequency of early marriage, the gap between stated fertility preferences and observed fertility levels, the lower percentages of education and employment for women than for men, and the indicators of poor reproductive health as measured by maternal mortality rates (Obermeyer 43).

There are two countries that have been celebrated as displaying the positive effects of family planning programs: Tunisia and Iran. Both countries have progressive policies regarding family planning, and the statistics show that their family planning policies are making a difference in decreasing population growth and fertility rates by increasing the availability of contraceptives (Obermeyer 41-46).

The Tunisian government has been outstanding in furthering progressive women's rights and equality; it was the first Arab country to codify completely equal rights for women and put them into practice (Curtiss 2). Tunisia's success in regards to family planning can be accredited to the mass cooperation of the government on social, political, and educational agencies (Curtiss 1). Female education is a key factor in lowering fertility rates as well. In Tunisia, women who have attended high school or university have no more children than do Europeans (Esposito and Haddad 157). Today, education is compulsory up until the age of 16, which aids the government in implementing sexual education as well as general education (Curtiss 2).

Tunisia also supports a Personal Status Code that outlaws polygyny, requires the bride's consent in marriage, and grants equality in divorce legislation between men and women. The rights that are granted to women in the updated Personal Status Code set a precedent for legislation that staunches the efforts of those opposing contraceptives and family planning (Ben Hamda 4).

In gaining control of the population growth rate, Tunisia is fostering improvement in the education and health care available to all citizens as well as advancing Tunisia's standard of living and economy (Curtiss 1). All government family planning services are available to Tunisians free of charge; Tunisia has one of the lowest levels of maternal mortality in the region (Obermeyer 46). Tunisia's fertility rate was 7 children per woman in 1956. Today it is 3.4 children per woman, and the government has set the goal of 2 children per woman by the year 2026 (Curtiss 2). When Tunisia became independent of colonizing France in 1956, the infant mortality rate was at 4 percent, and in 1993 it was 2.5 percent (Curtiss 1). The contraceptive usage rate is at 42 percent in Tunisia, paralleled by the remarkable 90 percent of Tunisians who have access to health care (Obermeyer 45). In Tunisia, the percentage decline in total fertility rate from 1975-1990 was 37% (Maudlin and Ross 358).

Tunisia is the only Arab country to allow a woman to have an abortion without the permission or knowledge of her husband or another male family member (Curtiss 2). Islamic countries often vary in their stances on abortion. Many fatwas have been issued in Tunisia authorizing abortions under the conditions that it occurs before the pregnancy had advanced beyond four months, that the family is poor, and that the pregnancy constitutes a threat to the mother's health (Ben Hamda 4).

Iran's history with family planning and contraception had been tumultuous, but is currently taking aggressive measures to discourage population growth. From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, The Iranian Islamic Revolution had a great impact on fertility rates and family planning progress in Iran. The population rate grew on an average of 3.8% per year between 1976 and 1986. The leaders of the revolution laid heavy focus on the importance of marriage and procreation after the war, without considering the detriments of significant population growth. Many family planning clinics were closed, the Family Planning Council was dissolved, and the fertility control policy was officially discontinued. In 1988 Prime Minister Moosavi began to realize the effects of such a huge population growth, and reintroduced population control as a problem to be dealt with. Moosavi reaffirmed the Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa from 1980 in 1988 regarding the national family planning program. The fatwa has declared family planning to be a concern of all social classes, not just an upper class urban issue focused on by educated women as in the past (Aghajanian 68). The percentage decline in total fertility rate from 1975-1990 was 21% (Maudlin and Ross 358).

The Iranian national family planning program was started in 1989, and continues to pursue three primary goals: to encourage birth intervals of 3 or more years, to discourage pregnancies among women younger than 18, and to limit family size to three children (Aghajanian 68). In a study done by Akbar Aghajanian and Amir Mehryar, the population growth rate in Iran was as follows: in 1956 it was 2.2%, in 1986 it was 3.8%, and in 1996 it was 1.5% (2-3). The contraception prevalence rate among married women 15-49 years old in 1976 was 37% (53.8% urban, 19.9 rural) and 72.9% in 1997 (77.4% urban, 65.9 rural) (13). It's important to note that rural areas are always lagging behind urban areas and this can be connected to the lower education level.

The Iran Fertility Study found that contraceptive use in 1976-1977 varied greatly by uses' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Levels of contraceptive use rose with increasing levels of education among both women and their husbands (Aghajanian 67). Regarding women alone, 28.3 percent of women with no formal education used a contraceptive versus 76.6 percent of women with 12 or more years of education (Aghajanian 67).

In 1973, the Iranian Parliament repealed the strict abortion laws that the pronatalist government had instated previously and wrote a new law that went into effect in 1976. The new law stated that "any type of medical or surgical procedure to be performed by a recognized physician with the agreement of those who have the right to consent to the procedure in accordance with rule and regulations approved by the government." The way that this was written, a legal loophole exists for abortions because they're not specifically prohibited (Aghajanian 66).

It's important to note that Iran will be faced with an influx of potential mothers as the women who were born during the 1976-1986 period will enter the reproductive age group within the coming decade, and the demographics of these additional estimated 12 million women bearing children are potentially frightening. This is additional motivation to increase the availability of birth control and achieve lower fertility rates (Aghajanian and Mehryar14).

As with most issues, it is difficult to separate religion from culture in regards to family planning. When a society is so strongly rooted and related to religion, finding a definitive answer to whether culture or religion has a stronger influence becomes a paradox of "the chicken or the egg". In the case of family planning in Islamic countries, the aspect of women's autonomy is being eclipsed by the strains that continued population growth will entail for these countries that are already home to stark economic disparity.
Sources:

Aghajanian, Akbar. "Family Planning and Contraceptive Use in Iran, 1967-1992." International Family Planning Perspectives 20 (1994): 66-69. 13 Mar. 2006.

Ben Hamda, Wassila. "A Country Report On Tunisia: Women's Rights in Islam; the Position of Islam in Family Planning." The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs Xvii: 69-73. 14 Mar. 2006.

Curtiss, Richard H. "Demographics: Maternal Health, Family Planning Unqualified Success in Tunisia." The Washington Report On Middle East Affairs 12 (1993): 55-57. 12 Mar. 2006.

Jain, Anrudh K. "Fertility Reduction and the Quality of Family Planning Services." Studies in Family Planning 20 (1989): 1-16. 15 Mar. 2006.

Lee, Kelley, Louisiana Lush, Gill Walt, and John Cleland. "Family Planning Policies and Programmes in Eight Low-Income Countries: a Comparative Policy Analysis." Social Science & Medicine 47 (1998): 949-959. 13 Mar. 2006.

Maguire, Daniel C., ed. Sacred Rights the Case for Contraception and Abortion in World Religions. New York: Oxford UP Inc., 2003. 105-128.

Makhlouf Obermeyer, Carla. "Reproductive Choice in Islam: Gender and State in Iran and Tunisia." Studies in Family Planning 25 (1994): 41-51. 14 Mar. 2006.

Mauldin, W. P., and John A. Ross. "Family Planning Programs: Efforts and Results, 1982-89." Studies in Family Planning 22 (1991). 15 Mar. 2006.

Mehryar, Amir H., and Akbar Aghajanian. "Fertility Transition in the Islamic

Republic of Iran: 1976-1996." Asia-Pacific Population Journal 14 (1999): 21-42.

Mohammad, Kazem, Farideh Khalaj Abadi Farahani, Mehdi Rahgozar, and Mahmood Mahmoodi Farahani. "Fertility in Islamic Republic of Iran: Levels, Trends and Differentials During Three Decades." Canadian Studies in Population 29 (2002): 227-244. 14 Mar. 2006.

Yazbeck Haddad, Yvonne, and John L. Esposito, eds. Islam, Gender, & Social Change. New York: Oxford UP Inc., 1998. 1-229.