Origins of the Cold War

Origins of the Cold War

Robert Paxton, author of Europe in the Twentieth Century[1], discusses the events which took place during World War II and what events he feels led to the Cold War. This essay discusses main points made by Paxton relative to the inevitability of the Cold War, and a review of Paxton's analysis.

The Cold War, according to Paxton was inevitable, based on the actions of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. The United States made the decision to hold off on making political commitments to the Soviet Union in the beginning of World War II, creating weak military matters, causing tension between the two countries when the Soviets sought recognition for their 1971 frontiers and received only military alliance.[2] Similarly, Churchill went against his beliefs in anti-communism when agreeing to an alliance with Stalin in 1941.[3] The early 1940s was a time of hesitation and half-truths between the U.S. and Britain towards the Soviet Union.

The United States began making political decisions concerning World War II in the summer of 1943.[4] Postwar settlements were being made between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill before the war had even ended, which required hasty agreements between the allies in order to ensure victory over Germany.[5] Poland, which was a major factor leading to the Cold War, was ignored by Roosevelt at the Teheran Conference in 1943 because he didn't want to chance losing Polish voters in the upcoming elections.[6] The settlement of postwar Poland was of extreme importance to Stalin, but the U.S. was more concerned about Soviet commitment to the newly formed United Nations.[7] However, nothing was formally settled at the Teheran Conference; allowing each ally to envisions their own postwar agenda which differed among all three.

Roosevelt continued to make weak and careless negotiations as demonstrated in the 1945 meeting at Yalta,[8] where he gave Eastern and Central Europe to Stalin in exchange for alliance against Japan, which turned out not to be needed.[9] This agreement of Soviet occupation gave Stalin extreme power in Europe; the Soviet Union was quickly becoming equal to the U.S., in which they would not need our alliance. The events mentioned above were the building up mistrust and tensions between Allies.

The Cold War became truly inevitable once Roosevelt passed away; making Truman President and then Churchill was replaced. Previous agreements between Stalin and Roosevelt were not honored, such as the reparations arrangement which were agreed upon at the Yalta Conference.[10] Stalin's original postwar settlement in Poland was reduced and consequently, Stalin only took on two pro-western Polish ministers when reforming the Polish government, after originally agreeing to more.[11] Stalin and his allies had very different ideas of a postwar Europe. Stalin was preparing for a postwar communist Europe as seen in 1945, when he was hand-picking the new Polish government with communist supporters, forming the Communist Lublin Committee.[12] The United States on the other hand, had a design in mind for Europe, one in which would knock down all barriers to trade and investment, a pluralistic world, favorable to the U.S. economy as well as American emotional preference.[13] The United States' plan was conflicting for the other allies. Britain was not in agreement with the postwar economic recovery enforced by the U.S. which made the dollar the strongest currency; the Soviet Union however, was powerful enough to create its own economic influence which excluded American investors, traders and tourists.[14] It is easy to see the divide between the two superpowers which caused the both to be suspicious of each other. The Soviet Union and United States found themselves to be in constant conflict with each other over capitalism and communism.[15]

The constant tension between the United States and the Soviet Union during and after World War II was an indication of the Cold Wars inevitability.

Churchill had a part in the events leading to the Cold War. In the beginning of World War II, when the U.S. finally agreed to join political and military forces, Roosevelt and Stalin were more often-than-not in agreement with plans for a postwar Europe. Churchill however, was not in agreement with the other two leaders even though he did not voice his opinions and usually went with the majority.[16]

Paxton discusses how Churchill overwhelmed with plans in the Eastern Mediteranian and did not want to support Stalin in the opening of a second front in the west.[17] Roosevelt and Stalin went ahead without Churchill's consent which resulted in Europe being split through a North and South divide; giving Stalin free reign in the Balkans and Eastern Europe with no Anglo-American influence.[18] Based on Paxton's description of this event, Churchill did nothing to stop them from overriding his decision. Churchill however, did try to rectify the situation by meeting with Stalin and convincing him to split influences in the Balkans; with Greece, half of Hungary and Yugoslavia to be of British influence.[19] Surprisingly, Stalin honors these arrangements after World War II, at least until 1947.[20] This says something about how Stalin viewed Churchill. Although Churchill was not one to speak up or enforce his opinions, he did honor agreements and worked with Stalin rather than making half-true agreements and working on his own agenda such as Roosevelt did. The United States had been continuously going back on their agreements since Roosevelt passed away.

Based on Paxton's argument describing Churchill's participation in World War II, it is unlikely that Churchill precipitated the Cold War; it is possible however, that had Churchill been more adamant about not allowing Soviet occupation in the second western front, thus eliminating the divide of American and Soviet powers, the Cold War could have been prevented.

The 1945 Yalta Conference was seen by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill a celebration of the three allies increased cooperation with one another and the inevitability of German defeat; according to Paxton.[21] A lack of communication between the three allies seemed to deter these men from seeing the obvious signs of the Cold Wars inevitability. The Soviet Unions first priority, according to the author was their countries security,[22] whereas the United States was looking to create trusteeships in European colonies in Asia[23] and a world open to trade and investment which would be in the American economy's favor.[24] Britain's plans were less acquisitive; they wanted security and assurance that the growing power of the Soviet Union would be limited with British influence.[25] It seems that Britain had an idea of what was to come, and took some precaution, the U.S. however, did not show any sign of knowing the problems that were arising right in front of them. Yalta represented the disillusionment of the United and States and to an extent, Britain as well.

Paxton's arguments as to the origins of the Cold were interjected with a lot of author opinions. Many of Paxton's comments seemed accusatory towards the United States, for example, when he states that Roosevelt and the American delegation spent much more time pinning down the details of the United Nations than on resolving immediate problems in Poland and Germany.[26] Paxton also assumes the feelings or determinations of the allied representatives. Paxton writes that Stalin no doubt deeply resented his Western allies' insistence on dealing with Poles who represented for him the expansionist Poland of 1919 to 1920;[27] this opinion of Stalin's resentment towards his allies, taints the accuracy of Paxton's historical account.

Paxton feels Poland was the first battlegrounds of the Cold War.[28] The author's assumption that the future of Poland aroused the most feelings of distrust and bitterness among the Allies at the end of World War II[29] was well supported. Poland's frontiers were discussed as being part of the reason for the conflict between allies. Paxton details the argument with a historical timeline dating well before World War II. The Curzon Line is the starting point of the issue, when the Russian-Polish frontiers were formed in 1919.[30] Paxton goes on to explain the expansion of Poland into Soviet territory after the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, [31]and Stalin's impatience in reclaiming the front. Stalin did this with the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, with secret clauses which Hitler backed Stalin's plan for the acquisition of the Soviet-Polish frontier; he did this knowing it could be construed as a violation of national self-determination.[32] This demonstrates Paxton's assumption that Stalin was primarily concerned with military plans, as well as the basis for Stalin's consistent inquiry about his rights to the Polish fronts.

Paxton seems sympathetic to the Soviets. The author makes the statement that; with justification, the Russians looked on the eastern front as the main theater of the Second World War.[33] He supported this statement by noting that in World War II, Russia had endured the most massive battles on their own soil and suffered the largest loss of life with a possible eighteen million dead. He compared Russia's role in World War II to the French in World War I.

The author believes that the Soviet opinion of the Marshall Plan was negative; that any nation to accept the aid of the Marshall Plan would be a part of the American economy. This Paxton supports with Stalin's stepping in a stopping Poland and Hungary from participating in the Marshall Plan when they seemed to be interested. The Soviet territory closed themselves off from American influences.[34]

According to Paxton, American leaders tried to confine wartime diplomacy to military matters, as if these decisions had no political implications.[35] The United States creation of the United Nations and the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941 are examples supporting his accusation.[36]

The many conclusions that Paxton makes are acceptable because of the large amount of support he provides with each. He does seem however to be biased with his opinions of America, being more supportive of Soviet actions. The reader gets a feeling of blame towards America for the occurrence of the Cold War. This bias leads to the author providing more of the negative actions of the United States during World War II and the onset of the Cold War.

Paxton gives a detailed description of the events leading up to the Cold War and the explanations for why the Cold War was inevitable. The author's arguments, though at times bias, are well supported with historical accuracy.

[1] Robert Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century, 3rd ed. (Ft. Worth, Harcourt Brace College, 1996).

[2] lbid., 462.

[3] lbid., 460.

[4] lbid.

[5] lbid., 463.

[6] lbid.

[7] lbid.

[8] lbid., 465.

[9] lbid., 465-466.

[10] lbid., 470.

[11] lbid., 469.

[12] lbid., 476.

[13] lbid., 473.

[14] lbid., 475

[15] lbid..

[16] lbid., 462.

[17] lbid., 464.

[18] lbid.

[19] lbid., 465.

[20] lbid., 471.

[21] lbid., 465.

[22] lbid., 471.

[23] lbid., 475.

[24] lbid., 472-473.

[25] lbid., 475.

[26] lbid., 467.

[27] lbid., 478.

[28] lbid., 476-478.

[29] lbid., 476.

[30] lbid.

[31] lbid., 477.

[32] lbid.

[33] lbid., 458.

[34] lbid., 484.

[35] lbid., 461-462.

[36] lbid.