Perspective and Ahistorical Questions in Hitler's Thirty Days to Power

Henry A. Turner, Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1996).

The common perception of Adolf Hitler's ascension to the leadership of Germany in 1933 suggests that his takeover was that of a dictator seizing power illegally. Beliefs about the power of the SS and the SA, combined with hindsight gleaned from watching Hitler's later actions, contribute to the way in which most people view the beginnings of the Nazi state. Henry A. Turner's book, Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933, dispels this myth by showing the process by which Hitler legally became Chancellor of Germany, the stepping stone which allowed him to seize complete power only a short time later. Such a close examination of the month in which Hitler's goals were realized does have its problems, but offers an interesting perspective on the topic.

Turner chronicles the events of the month of January, 1933, by examining the daily lives of the primary actors in Hitler's ascension to power. Figures such as former Chancellor Franz von Papen, President Paul von Hindenburg, Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher, and Hitler himself receive careful consideration in their actions during this critical month. By proceeding through this month day by day, Turner is able to show how extreme opposition to Hitler becoming chancellor eventually turned to a sense of acceptance of this inevitability.

The meeting between von Papen and Hitler, on January 4, 1933, marked the end of Hitler's "political isolation" (p. 45), and the beginning of his rise. Without this meeting, Hitler would not have won the support that he needed from one of President von Hindenburg's close advisers, von Papen. Without the support of this one man, Hitler's chances for power would have been diminished substantially. Thus this meeting, during which Hitler and von Papen reached an understanding, became the first real step in Hitler's ascension to power.

Another significant part of Hitler's rise to power rested in the faulty assumptions of Chancellor von Schleicher. The Chancellor believed that (1) Hitler would behave as most politicians faced with a possible revolution and new elections would, giving up ground "in order to cut their losses" (p. 87); (2) Hitler lacked the political friends and connections necessary to gain support; and (3) Hitler did not actually want to become Chancellor. Turner suggests that it was during this month that von Schleicher solidified his faulty assumptions about Hitler, and that he "knew little during January 1933 about the activities and intentions of the man who would soon succeed him." (p. 89) Had von Schleicher not underestimated Hitler, particularly during this critical month, he might have been successful at preventing Hitler's rise to power and possibly even the total defeat and dissolution of the Nazi Party.

The events of January, 1933, reached the point of no return in the final four days of the month. When von Schleicher resigned on January 28, and von Papen was asked by the President to "explore the possibilities for a new cabinet" (p. 135), Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship was virtually guaranteed. Although von Hindenburg still expressed some resistance, von Papen, along with other von Hindenburg aides, was able to advise the President to accept Hitler as Chancellor. As is the case with much political negotiating, many of the decisions that needed to be made came down to the last moments. The crisis situation that was vaguely threatened, the possibility of a Schleicher-led rebellion, helped the principle actors keep things moving in the direction they desired.

On January 30, "Hitler himself reportedly marveled at how, as so often before, he had been rescued just as all seemed lost." (p. 160) To most observers at the end of 1932, Hitler's appointment as Chancellor of Germany seemed like a virtual impossibility. Just one month later, however, it seemed very much as though his fortunes had reversed.

Although the bulk of the events that brought Hitler to power did occur in the span of a single month, there are indications that earlier events contributed as well. Turner mentions both Hitler's success as a politician in the summer of 1932 and the campaign for votes in Lippe in late 1932. He also acknowledges that "[t]he events of the first thirty days of January 1933 do not suffice to explain why Hitler got power. For a full understanding of what happened, broader scrutiny of the German past would be required." (p. 165) Although it is true that a fuller examination of this topic could be beneficial, the extremely narrow focus of Turner's book allows him to go into great detail on an aspect of German history that is not well known to many modern readers.

In addition to his in-depth study of the events that transpired to bring Hitler into power, Turner also considers the possibility of what might have happened if events had not gone Hitler's way. Suggesting that military rule would have been the other possibility for Germany, he notes that the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime would not have occurred in this situation. While speculative history of this sort is typically ahistorical, in that it forces one to make assumptions often based on a series of "what ifs," Turner's conclusions on this topic seem valid and well-reasoned, based on the evidence at hand.

Turner notes that "if one traces many chains of causation that have shaken the world since January 1933 back to their origins, it becomes apparent that a great deal of what has happened since then was contingent on the turn taken by German politics during that month." (p. 176) Without the sequence of events that Turner details in his book, the Third Reich would not have come to power, there would be no casualties of World War II, the racial genocide of the Holocaust would not have occurred, and Germany would not have been a divided nation for nearly half a century. Hitler's rise to power in the course of a single month seems fantastic, but when one considers the evidence, assertions of the importance of January, 1933, become clear.