Philosophical Proofs for the Existence of God

St. Anselm believed that if one can think of a being "than which no greater can conceive", then one can conceive of such a being which exists in reality as well as in the mind. However, Kant believed that the assumed notion of an absolutely necessary and unconditioned being lacks intelligible content since merely holding the idea does not guarantee that non-existence of such a being is impossible.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant dismisses the ontological proof for the existence of God which is based upon the premise of an absolutely necessary existence arising out of reason and the mere idea or possibility of objective reality of God. His objections are based on three premises: first, that existential propositions such as existence claims are not analytic but synthetic (arrived at conceptually); second, that existence is not a predicate (is and being are not quantifiers), and third, that negative existentials are never self-contradictory (atheists can conceive that there is no perfect being if they believe there is no God).

According to Kant, we cannot give meaning to the concept or arrive at the conclusion that God as a being necessarily exists, since neither the subject "God" nor predicate "exists" or "is almighty" can have necessity, but the concept can only be arrived at by judgments made which are ascribed to the predicates. Judgments are hypothetical and are merely assertions derived at when no denial is made of a being's possible existence. The ontological argument commits the fallacy of "begging the question" by assuming that such a being exists in fact when there might be alternative possible explanations or no existent being at all.

Kant explained his point by looking at the concept or judgment about equilateral triangles which does not change according to whether or not such triangles can be found. The predicate which adds some property to the subject (sum of its angles equal 180 degrees, has three sides) is not the same as necessary existence of the subject. The judgment simply rests upon the presupposition that existence is a positive property of ens realissimum. All judgments, so far as they refer to existence as distinct from mere possibility, only serve to define a reality that is contingently given. Even if the concept is proven to be logically possible, "it does not suffice to establish the possibility of the object of the concept." (The Ontological Proof, Smith, 529).

Both philosopher Mackie and Plantinga have pointed out that there do seem to be existential propositions in arithmetic that are analytically true, such as the claim of a prime number between 17 and 20. Kant thought propositions of arithmetic are synthetic. If we do claim numbers exist, "how do we come to have knowledge of their properties?" There appears to be a flaw in Kant's reasoning as to why theists should give up the belief that there is at least "one existential proposition -namely, that which asserts the existence of God - is analytic" (Oppy, 31).

Academic Kelley Ross tells us, "It could well be the case that Kant is right and that we will never be able to imagine the appearance of multi-dimensional non-Euclidean spaces or to model them without extrinsic curvature, however well we understand the analytic equations. Mathematicians are free to ignore the limitations of our imagination, although they then run the risk of wandering so far from common sense that the frontiers of mathematics will never be intelligible to even well-informed persons of general knowledge. Furthermore, since Kant believed that space was a form imposed by our minds on the world, he did not believe that space actually existed apart from our experience. This leads us to the ontological question: what can exist in reality? Non-Euclidean geometry was no more than a mathematical curiosity until Einstein applied it to physics.

Now the whole issue seems much deeper and complex than it did in Kant's day. If our imagination is necessarily Euclidean, hard-wired into the brain as we might now think by analogy with computers, but Einstein found a way to apply non-Euclidean geometry to the world, then we might think that space does have a reality and a genuine structure in the world however we are able to visually imagine it." (Kelley, 1).

The most disputed argument by Kant is that existence or "being" is not a predicate. He claims that the existence of an object is a matter of its being related by a predicate expression to understand the complete concept of it, however he does not show that the existence itself (or nature of being) is not some property in itself. His argument is that whenever a quantifier property is attributed to the object, we produce a new concept. However, just because the concept is relational does not mean it cannot be appropriately part of the concept of the object. Also, "the existence of the object may not be dependent on the relational predicate and also does not depend upon a possession of the concept by me or anyone else" (Oppy, 37).

Kant goes further by proving that every proposition which predicates existence is synthetic and that the consequence which results would be that its denial can never involve a logical contradiction. In order for the proposition to be true, the content of the object and the concept must be one and the same. Kant believed that having knowledge that it is possible to exist in reality does not make the judgment a posteriori, since the being would then be connected to the content of experience only. If one does not accept the subject, there is no contradiction when one does not accept the predicate which describes the subject.

However, it has been shown that there is a close connection between existence and the quantification of that existence. As in math, the values of the variables may determine the sum of the whole especially in terms of the nature of its total being or existence. Are there different modes or degrees and kinds of existence such as past, fictional and possible?

Kant's claim in the "Transcendental Dialectic" that there can be no being whose nonexistence is impossible seems to conflict with his earlier remarks in the "Transcendental Analytic" that space has a necessarily existent being. Further, space appears to be a necessary presupposition of experience and thus necessarily exists, although "space being no thing in itself" (Oppy, 235).

We also need to be able to distinguish between actual states of affairs or being from logically possible or probable alternatives. When one makes the judgment that something does not have a certain state of affair or being, that does not imply what that being may be alternatively, if at all. For example, to say that something is not hot, does not imply that it is cold - it may simply be warm. Philosopher Hegel calls this "indeterminate negativity" which means that the denial of one understanding leaves the reality of what something may be an open question or what something is unable to be determined.

Being merely possible is not the same as being actually or necessarily existent or existing in reality. "Actual states of affairs or being do have differentiating factors which separate them from logically possible being, otherwise they would both be ontologically equivalent" (Spitzer, 2). Maps simply represent the nature of places of being or describe the "where" and clocks indicate the "when," although they themselves are not the actual essence of "time" and "place" which are concepts of the mind.

Often we ask, why is this state of being true and not one of the equally logically possible alternatives? Reality must cause some kind of unrestricted act of understanding which makes the reality be transparent to itself. We cannot even begin to comprehend "understanding" unless we are self-aware of having this state of mind, "I think therefore I am," as Descartes tells us. However, as has been shown, this does not establish that I or others necessarily exist. Also unlike other predicates, existence appears "not to admit of internal negation" (Oppy, 160) in otherwords is it possible to negate our own beliefs? Either we must attribute objective validity to the idea or deny the ability of the mind to know reality (Oppy, 273 citing Wolz at 359 (1951). Can a proof for God's existence be constructed without the assistance of God? Would the author of being and the Ideal of Reason need to explain the nature of being to our understanding?

Contemporary philosopher William Alston believes that the ontological argument has often been criticized on the grounds that it mistakenly supposes the term "is" (exists) to be a predicate. First, before we can attach any predicate to anything (i.e. "Jones [is] difficult to understand"), we must presuppose that Jones exists. Alston believes that we cannot openly admit A does not exist or express ignorance about whether A exists and still predicate B, otherwise this would be deceitful. For example, to say that Jones is difficult to understand when there is no Mr. Jones in actuality.

Also, the denial of any positive existential statement would be self-contradictory. For example, in order to say that a "perfect" tennis player does not exist, one would need to presuppose that a "perfect" tennis player is "possible" which constitutes a substantive claim. Even Descartes' "perfect being" can only be denied if we first presume that the existence of a perfect being would be possible. (Alston, 455).

It becomes very unclear what is meant by necessary existence unless the concept includes a notion of place such as whether this place includes fiction, imagination, the real world or Australia. Alston claims that we must have in mind some specific mode of existence in order to clarify any assertion being made about what is necessarily actual. Although Descartes' existence is contained in the idea of a perfect being, Anselm refered to a being "than which nothing greater can be conceived" - which is existence in the understanding. Anselm said that "whatever is understood, exists in the understanding," but must real existence be attributed to this definition of "understanding" without contradiction? Anselm also presupposes that all predication assumes the existence of a subject. Usually it is the logical stance of the predication which is limited, not the predicate term such as greatness.

When we conceive of things in understanding we test the subject by reflecting upon it and relate it to real dispositions in our realm of experience as Kant pointed out. However, as Alston shows, any statement which attaches a predicate to something which exists in my understanding can have no implications for the real world except for the fact "that I have, or have had, certain thoughts." (Alston, 468). No statement which attributes something to a non-real being can have the logical status or implication of a statement of real existence. No mode of existence can be construed as an attribute, for example, "King Arthur exists in legend." Note though that saying "King Arthur was in my dreams last night" does say something about what existed in my subconscious thought although King Arthur is simply a figure of the imagination, the reality of such a thought in existence or the concept can be real.

Philosopher Hugh Chandler says that the ontological arguments contain a two-fold purpose because they are also designed to prove the existence of a legitimate object of worship. "If such a being exists and is a person, we are free to designate him or her. However, if there is no such thing, or there is but it isn't a person, then we are defining something or someone else." (Chandler, 19). This would imply that any name given as designator as to what is metaphysically possible is "rigid" but the description of such a being is not. Greatness could be descriptive of many a being besides Jesus, but Jesus would need to be necessarily great in actual being. Also, is it possible that someone should exist necessarily great?

Presumably, it is "a matter of definition or a grammatical rule that God be either necessary or possible. To even consider a being which does not exist or could do so (not exist) implies a being which is not great nor God. Also, there is nothing inherent in the concept that should imply that only if it is coherent, this shows that God is logically possible." (Chandler, 28) Neither Anselm nor Kant refer to God as individual or universal (see also the Monologium, Chpts 26-27), therefore God perhaps "does not fit any syntax in our language by which an understanding of the subject can be understood without a defining predicate" (Chandler, 31).

Many including philosopher Graham Oppy and Alvin Plantinga have suggested that a lack of knowledge of the essence of God does not necessarily prevent us from attaining self-evident knowledge of God's existence. To say that God does not exist, is also a form of begging the question or making false assumptions. Anselm's argument was a "theoretical construct," so therefore any comprehension about the essence of God may not need to be a part of the ontological argument.

Kant's dismissal of the ontological argument falls short because he has made three main premises which may not be true: that no existence claims are analytic, that existence is not a predicate, and that negative existentials are never self-contradictory. As we have shown above, our contemporary understanding of analytic math, logical constructs and the language of concepts and understanding may prove Kant to have been mistaken.

Kant believes that the concept represents something that may or may not exist and in order to determine existence we must refer to actual experience. Since any assertion is synthetic, there is a difference between a possible idea and the idea of a possible thing. Things can be known by perception or presented in experience only according to Kant. Under Kant's rules, a necessary being must be unconditioned and a priori certain so the mind searches for a concept to satisfy these requirements. However, the argument becomes inconclusive since the problem is not whether the existence of an absolutely necessary being can be demonstrated as much as how such a being can even be conceived. Kant thinks that the concept itself is illogical and criticizes the idea of unconditioned necessity.

"The principle, that if the conditioned be given, the whole series of conditions up to the unconditioned is likewise given, must no longer be accepted as a basis for argument." (Smith, 529). Also, concepts represent things which may or may not exist. In order to determine existence we must refer to actual experience. Can there be an absolute necessity that is purely logical? Although Kant agrees with Hume that the answer is no, contemporary science and philosophy may prove otherwise.

WORKS CITED

Alston, William, "The Ontological Argument Revisited" Philosophy Review 69 (1960), pp 452-474

Chandler, Hugh S. "Some Ontological Arguments", Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993), pp 18-32

Hartnack, Justus, Kant's Theory of Knowledge, "The Transcendental Dialectic," New York: Harcourt Brace (1967), pp 133-137

Kant, Immanuel, trans. by Smith, Norman Kemp, A Critique of Pure Reason, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1965

Oppy, Graham, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995

Ross, Kelley L., PhD, "The Ontology and Cosmology of Non-Euclidean Geometry" on-line at http://www.friesian.com, copyright 1999

Smith, Norman Kemp, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: The Transcendental Dialectic, "The Ontological Proof" New York: Humanities Press (1962), pp 527-531

Spitzer, Robert, "A Lonerganian Interpretation of the Proof Of God's Existence from the Distinction Between Actuality and Mere Possibility" International Philosophical Quarterly, September 2000.