Philosophy of Science

"Observation and experience can and must drastically restrict the range of admissible scientific belief, else there would be no science." (Kuhn, 1996, p.4)

It is evident in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that Kuhn does not question the notion that scientific knowledge changes over time, and that the makeup of such knowledge can only be claimed through antirealist means. Moreover, Kuhn's thesis on scientific revolutions intrinsically defends aspects of the antirealist notion. This antirealist idea claims that because knowledge changes so frequently, access to one true realm of knowledge is difficult if not impossible. Such changes according to Kuhn, are not only spurred by changes in community belief, but also to changes in scientific worldviews. Kuhn further explains this point in his 1969 postcript that "our world is populated in the first instance not by stimuli but by the objects of our sensations, and these need not be the same, individual to individual or group to group." (Ibid p.193) Thus, for Kuhn, scientific worldview is multi-faceted and explained only through such worldviews and/or paradigms.

Kuhn is making the claim that it is sensation that determines knowledge and not stimuli. Of course one can argue that the stimuli are the same as objects of sensation, however this would be solipsism.(Ibid p.192) Needless to say, what Kuhn is referring to in this understanding of knowledge is that scientific facts are subject to the same multiplicity of meaning as made possible from the existence of differing sensations. At a different level, these sensations are assorted into 'scientific facts' and assimilated into models of understanding known as paradigms. It is through these paradigms and revolutions in these paradigms, that knowledge changes according to Kuhn. Since this knowledge is constantly changing through both differences in experimental results, research, and sensations an antirealist incommensurability emerges between different paradigms and theories. In other words, explanations of 'similar' phenomena are and can be explained in entirely different ways. This represents differing understanding of scientific knowledge and therefore does not support a realist or single-true reality. Throughout, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn offers several examples of such competing realities. For example, explanations about the composition of chemical compounds points to the idea that different understandings of reality do exist. (Ibid. p.148)

In terms of scientific knowledge, this means that differing sensations are ever present in research and experimentation. This gives rise to incommensurability, differing paradigms and therefore different perspectives of reality. In Kuhn's understanding of scientific worldview, variability of knowledge becomes more apparent, as no single worldview dominates scientific thought to the extent that a single realist reality exists. "Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction." (Ibid p.150) Such 'worlds' are based on observation and experience according to Kuhn and therefore can only be represented through the world of the senses, a world that is fundamentally antirealist .

Still anther factor defending the antirealist interpretation of Kuhn is that sociological beliefs are driving forces behind scientific habits. Such a world as that of the sociology of science is far from realist as it takes into account human beliefs, attitudes and motivations in scientific practice. "...Scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of nature to which the paradigm itself had led the way...This genetic aspect of the parallel between political and scientific development should no longer be open to doubt." (Ibid p.92-93) Hence, the social world of community belief which is apparently also partly determines what becomes scientific knowledge. Since these beliefs are themselves based on sociological facts, yet another dimension and interpretation is added to the nexus of knowledge making it anything but a single world truth. Moreover, even if such a world can be explained universally, in Kuhnian doctrine this is not the case.
Thus, Kuhn is not concerned with the realist idea that a single reality exists independently of multiple interpretations of it. Rather, he expresses that knowledge is that which it is conceived to be through scientific era's and the paradigm driven science that occurs within such eras. Kuhn's understanding of scientific knowledge is more in line with the anti-realist claim that since scientific knowledge is ever changing because it repeatedly refers to multiple ways of knowing and seeing through paradigms. So, even if Kuhn believes that such a realist reality exists, it is the reality of the anti-realist that is defended in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Section II: 'Genuine Science' according to Karl Popper.

Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper represent different understandings of scientific discovery. Popper is an advocate of logic in scientific discovery where Kuhn believes in a scientific discovery that takes into account sociological factors, rhetorical devices and problems with the use of logic as the only factor in the formation of scientific knowledge. One of Karl Popper's major claims is that scientific facts be validated through the methods of falsification and corroboration which is itself a limited and impotent methodology for Kuhn. Consequently, these differing methods give rise to a debate between Kuhnian and Popperian science.

Even though Kuhn and Popper advocate different spectrums of scientific practice, Kuhn appeals to his use of logic to assert that the divide between he and Popper in terms of their reasoning is not as vast as Popper makes it seem. Kuhn does this by both discrediting logical positivism and advocating a use of logic similar to Popper's. In so doing, Kuhn successfully argues that Popper's and his own use of logic are similar. "Sir Karl and I are united in opposition to a number of classical positivism's most characteristic theses. We both emphasize for example the intimate and inevitable entanglement of scientific observation with scientific theory..." (Kuhn 1970, p.3) Kuhn also claims that both he and Popper are investigating the same aspects of science. "Sir Karl's view of science and my own are very nearly identical. We are both concerned with the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is acquired rather than with the logical structure of the products of scientific research." (Ibid. p.1) Thus, Kuhn states that the problem between his understanding of scientific discovery and Popper's is the gestalt switch; that is, Popper's rabbit, is Kuhn's duck where both duck and rabbit are the same phenomena.

More specifically however, in reference to testing of scientific theory. Kuhn claims that it is not the theory that is tested but the researcher.(Ibid. p5) That is, for both Kuhn and Popper scientific discovery involves the use of research testing, however Kuhn believes that it is ultimately that researcher who is judged negatively if the testing does not support existing scientific knowledge. Secondly in regard to scientific testing, Kuhn claims that Popper's method of severe refutation only rarely leads to an overthrow of an existing set of scientific beliefs and is consequently not an accurate reflection on the growth of scientific knowledge. "The tests Sir Karl emphasizes are those which were performed to explore the limitations of accepted theory...Among his examples, all of them startling and destructive in their outcome...Sir Karl misses something terribly important about them. Episodes like these are very rare in the development of science." (Ibid p.5) So not only do tests test the researcher and not the theory, they very hardly ever lead to an overthrow of an existing paradigm. That is to say, tests only test theory in a period of extraordinary science when serious anomalies threaten the productivity of an existing set of scientific beliefs. So Kuhn is claiming that testing does occur, but not for the purpose of refutation as Popper claims, but for the purpose of testing the researcher so long as the period of science in which the testing occurs is normal which it often is.

Another area in which Kuhn describes his duck as Popper's rabbit is in the case of syntactic and experimental falsification. Kuhn claims that Popper does not fully articulate how such a feat is to be performed. That is to say, it is one thing to falsify a statement with another statement, but another thing to falsify the reality which that statement represents through experiment; Popper does not illustrate how the latter can be done and therefore offers an incomplete argument according to Kuhn. "Rules (of testing)...require that both the epistemological investigator and the research scientist be able to relate sentences derived from a theory not to other sentences but to actual observations and experiments. This is the context in which Sir Karl's term 'falsification' must function, and Sir Karl is entirely silent about how it can do so." (Ibid. p.15)

Although Kuhn claims that he and Popper both use some form of logic to understand and account for scientific discovery, Kuhn's logic is far less traditional to Popper's as it allows for methods and beliefs that are not conducive to traditional scientific practice. That is to say, Kuhn makes note of "shared rhetorical imperatives" in scientific discovery whereas Popper sees no such connection between disciplines. (Ibid p.22) Thus, Popper's understanding of scientific development according to Kuhn is limited in scope and incomplete for the above reasons. Popper does not budge away from the use of a unified system of logic only, in scientific research whereas Kuhn advocates the presence and consequent influence of other areas of knowledge such as that of psychology and sociology.

Section III: Definition of 'Prototype Model' and their importance in Science.

"A prototype model is a theoretical model which functions, in theory development, as a donor for the construction of some target model." (Rothbart, 1998) Such models are not only specifically defined, but also serve important functions in the development of science.

Prototype models are exemplars of explained phenomena and are therefore non-inductive and non- deductive. That is to say, since the prototype explains and illustrates a certain set of phenomena that themselves have been independently tested and induced as such; thus, the model only represents already conceived knowledge. The prototype is exemplar in the sense that it mimicks a pattern of behavior, which has proscriptive force in a community. In this sense a paradigm is an artifact construct or an example X that represents and illustrates phenomena Y. (Masterman, 1970 p.77) Masterman also says that this model reflects an analogical gestalt switch itself. That is to say, for a phenomena to be recreated as a model it must undergo a change of form not unlike that encountered in a 'gestalt switch' or change in what is being perceived. Furthermore, the prototype model 'donates' itself to a 'target model' that is generally symbolic of the scope and/or potential phenomena able to be revealed in further research. That is to say, a prototype model enables and facilitates the growth of knowledge, such knowledge is described as the target model. Examples of prototype models include the 'wave model of water', kinetic model of gases, billiard ball model of matter, and Earth-Moon system model. These models provide an analogical relationship that presents known similarities, differences and neutral/unknown relationships between systems. (Rothbart, 1998) Moreover, in the Earth-Moon system model, the analogue of symbolic representations of geometric points, objects in space and their movement illustrates the phenomena of mass, velocity and external forces that themselves have been induced independently of the Earth-Moon model that represents them.

Prototype models are important in the development of science for several reasons; they allow for transition, improvement and development of scientific knowledge. In other words, a prototype model in the process of acting as a donator of information to a target model acts as a bridge of knowledge from explanation to another. The prototype, unlike the target explains a set of phenomena and therefore is conducive to the explaining of new phenomena through empirical knowledge of existing phenomena. In this sense, the prototype model allows for 'development' of knowledge. For example, the Earth-Moon system model describes how explained phenomena work i.e. the motion of a satellite in space. With this model, 'scientific knowledge' is codified into a utilizable map or reference tool.; the experimental observations of lunar motion are recorded in a model. In turn this model is used in the expansion of, and further articulation of information. That is to say, when new observations are made, for example the velocity of the moons motion around the earth to the nth degree, this is then added to the prototype model and consequently marks an 'improvement' in the development of scientific knowledge.

Developments such as these are used in the explanation and research of unknown phenomena such as the existence of life in other solar systems. In this sense the scientific problems are solved by exemplar. Through manipulation of symbols and images of a model whether it be a model of light or matter, new events and circumstances can be conceived and reproduced for further experimentation. For example, a physicist studying the nature of light waves will create models to both illustrate and explain an experiment involving light such as in the famous two slit model. This model not only aids as a learning tool for those researching scientific discovery but also serves as a spring board for further investigation.
The unknown phenomena not explained by a prototype model are represented through the 'target model' and a transition from unexplained phenomena to explained phenomena occurs when the model assimilates new information or goes through something similar to a 'paradigm shift' or change in the content of knowledge. This change in knowledge is important to scientific development precisely because it reflects and understanding of reality that would otherwise not be known. Moreover, with prototype models scientists can effectively utilize experiments and research as the models provide a method of instruction from which to carry out research.

Section IV: Why not all scientific knowlege is not necessarily arrived at through causal factors rooted in belief.

The causal thesis of the sociology of knowledge is not consistent with the ways in which experimental data from analytical instruments are made credible. This is so for several reasons regarding the experimental data, phenomenal events, and hypothesis testing used in scientific practice. Moreover, the 'credibility' experimental and actual events as well as the interpretation of such events with the aid of analytical instruments is not wholly determined if at all by underlying sociological beliefs.

To illustrate why the advocates of the Stonge Programme are incorrect in their claim of credibility, the doctrine of the programme will be briefly illustrated. The programme seeks to uncover causal conditions underlying scientific thought, treating beliefs as effects of sociological factors such as indoctrination, and inculturation of neutral, rational standards. According to advocates of this programme, such belief is a 'cult of rationalism' not far different from myth in the sense that it is a belief just like any other. The question becomes, not whether such practice of rationalism is a belief or not, but whether its credibility is determined by the belief itself. That is to say, is experimental data confirmed or disconfirmed by the belief or the results of scientific practice itself?

In a signal generator such as a spectrometer (an analytical instrument), the character of sub-atomic events are determined through the union of the apparatus with nature. From the perspective of a scientist, neither the apparatus or the nature and consequently the character of sub-atomic events are not determined by sociological factors. That is to say, the apparatus is not made 'credible' by how many scientists belief that the apparatus actually works as the 'Strong Programme' would claim. Rather, the researchers would claim that the results yielded from the apparatus either conform to or do not conform to a hypothesis or proposed set of expectations. If an experiments fails, the failed information is just as useful as if the experiment confirms the hypothesis, therefore, credibility is not determined by a cultural belief in the rationality of science. In other words, new information is not rejected if it does not conform to existing paradigms, scientific knowledge or cultural belief. Rather it is simply ignored, set aside for later investigation, or becomes a genuine anomaly of science. In all three cases the information is still credible in the sense that it is a documented event or experimental result that can confirm or disconfirm existing methods and is therefore credible in and of itself. In this sense, sociological factors have no impact on the credibility of such information as it is a fact of nature that is detected through a set of beliefs and not determined by a set of beliefs. In other words, the sociology of knowledge is able to explain how a sub-atomic event is interpreted but does not determine the event itself.

To illustrate further, "Each analytical instrument is a technique intended to retrieve information about a specimen by creating experimental phenomena (phenomenal realm) from the union of material apparatus and nature (material realm) according to a plan of instrumental action and natures reaction (cognitive realm)"(Rothbart, 1998) The Strong Programme's 'Causality thesis' is only able to explain a limited part of this scientific practice. That is, the physical substance of the analytical instrument is something independent of the sociology of knowledge in much the same way as critical judgment regarding experimental results are independently determined by the researcher in question. Sociological beliefs do not and should not determine whether a scientist regards certain experimental results as favorable over other results. A sociologist of knowledge would argue that this example of the dogma of objectivity is precisely representative of the causal thesis. However, the sociologist is mistaken to think that the researcher actually adheres to dogma in his practice. In other words, researchers do not always follow dogma, sometimes, as in the case of the Watson Crick Model, research funding gets cut and the scientists continue their investigations. Nowhere in this scenario is inculturation and indoctrination of credibility present. Thus, the causality thesis only serves as a general principle that guides scientific research and not the experimental results themselves and even further the actions of the scientists.

Still further, using an analogy, if an analytical instrument is a horse, and the scientific event is the horse race, and the sociological belief is the organization of the horse race, the credibility of the horse is not determined by the organization of the race, but by the horses ability to run. When an analytical instrument is used, certain real world processes are anticipated. Such processes themselves occur regardless of the sociological explanation for why and how the event occurs. This is so as the causal thesis asserts that a belief determine the credibility of a result; to sense and experience an event does not imply judgement and therefore credibility. Yet, a researcher is able to sense and perceive events in nature with or without analytical instruments. Consequently, the ability to apply credibility to the event is made possible by the causal thesis, but does not imply that such a credibility must occur. In other words, research is no doubt guided by some extent by sociological factors, but these factors do not determine the value of experimental results independently of the experiment. Hence, the credibility of experimental data is inconsistent with the Strong Programmes causality thesis because it is both undetermined as an event, and because these events are critically judged by the researcher apart from the sociological beliefs that make the experiment possible.

To elaborate more, in the case of the 'absorbtion spectrometer', cell characteristics are defined using wavelengths of energy that pass through the cell. (Rothbart, 1998) Such a device as this includes a radiation source, signal generator, detection system and readout device, and portrays information about an 'analyte substance'. This analyte contains properties of substance that allow for energy exchange that are used during an experimental event. Sociological belief has little influence over whether or not the analyte will behave one way or another, rather it determines to a varying extent if the experiment should occur, and how the information from that experiment should be used. Thus, the causal thesis is again inconsistent with actual scientific investigation.

Hence analytes, just as the individual researchers critical judgement, and the actual event are credible from their existence as independent phenomena occurring regardless of sociological belief. The causal thesis suggests that such phenomena's value and use is determined by sociological beliefs and this is true at an organizational level, and then only partly. At the experimental level, the case is even more to the contrary where the credibility of experimental outcomes, substances, and judgements is subject to phenomenal and judgmental criteria outside of the sociological influence.

Sources:

Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996,
Kuhn, Thomas. 'Logic of Discovery or Pyschology of Research'. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970
Masterman, Margaret. 'The Nature of a Paradigm'. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Rothbart, Daniel. 'Kuhn and his Critics'. Philosophy 618. George Mason University Course, Spring 1998.