Political Philosophies: Theories of Commercial Pacifism and Legal Institutionalism

Carli Guyon
John Locke and Jeremy Bentham, along with Adam Smith and Joseph Schumpeter, "share the distinction of defining the ordinary reputation of Liberalism in world politics" (Doyle, 1999: 213). Collectively "Liberals protect human rights, support international cooperation, profess international law, and support international norms" (213).

Legal institutionalism is based in human nature. It is committed to protecting human rights and enhancing cordial relations between states through the ratification of laws and institutions (214). However, "[c]ommercial pacifism rests on the view that market societies are fundamentally against war" (Smith, in Doyle, 1999: 230).

The state of nature for legal institutionalism, is that there is a clear set of natural laws that present the natural rights and duties of the individual. Those rights are the preservation of "life, liberty and property" (217), and the duties are all those in which "no one ought to harm another man's right to the same. Individuals in the state of nature also have the right to enforce these laws and punish those who violate them. They obtain this right because the laws must be upheld and in the state of nature there is no institution to oversee it.

In a speculative move, it would probably be acceptable to say that the state of nature for commercial pacifism follows closely to that of legal institutionalism because in a state of nature one does not have the option of a market society, except for maybe bartering, in which there is a limit to how much of an item to own. However, when a state is formed and money is implemented there is no limit to how much one can acquire if they are clever in business.

The state of nature for Locke and Bentham is not necessarily a state of war, more a state of troubled peace (249). In the state of nature rights and laws are known and are binding on moral individuals (217). War is not a condition, but an act or intention of action (217). However, the state of nature may deteriorate into a state of war. To avoid such occurrences, men consent to a civil society, which under this liberal view are governed by "prudent strategists pursuing general interests" (220), or legal egoists.

In commercial pacifism, the market is believed to pacify any irrational self-interests of the state or those running the state. The state is only there to do what the market is unable to address. The states have three duties: defense, the administration of justice, and implementing and maintaining public institutions. The likelihood of war in this version of liberalism is the product of a cost-benefit analysis; "the larger the spoils, the lower the opportunity costs, and the higher the chance of victory, the more likely the war; and vice versa" (237).

The international system for legal institutionalism is characterized by three inconveniences according to Locke; bias and ignorance of law, the impartiality of the implementation of law, and that fear and weakness will impinge upon the execution of the law (223-4). Betham further explains how to address these particular problems by offering corrective measures; an impartial common adjudication, education, and collective security including disarmament.

For commercial pacifism, the international system is characterized by free trade and economic integration. Smith once quoted, "[t]he wealth of a neighboring nation, however, though dangerous in war and politicks, is certainly advantageous in trade" (Smith, in Doyle, 1999: 236). Smith believes that the insecurities of relative power gains could be curbed because if one uses positive sum games to acknowledge the advantages of trade for both nations.

Doyle, Michael W. "Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism." W W Norton & Co Inc. 1997.

Published by Carli Guyon

Graduated in May 2005 with a B.A. in International Studies from Bradley University. Studied abroad. Focused on politics, business, and foreign affairs with some emphasis on European relations. Beginning M....  View profile

To comment, please sign in to your Yahoo! account, or sign up for a new account.