Power: Game, Conceit, or Realistic Strategy?

There is no real fully acceptable definition of power among the nations of the world. Many have tried. Here is one which may be close: "We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it seems, someone is always bidding for hegemony. Today it is the United States; a century ago it was Britain. Before that, it was the French, the Spaniards and so on. The 19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed modern European history as an incessant struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal."[1]

We still hear the sentiment that Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. But, the strategies of power- its use as both economic and political gain around the end of the Nineteenth and beginning of the Twentieth Century- did not serve Great Britain well. Why, in these decades did Britain lose the domination of her European rivals, even as her so-called "Empire" showed signs of resistance and crumbling? And was the fact that Victoria's DNA seemed to appear in monarchies and royalty from Berlin and Copenhagen to Moscow play a role in the initial fear of engaging in a fierce competition with Continental Europe? Despite such strong political figures in Britain in the 1800s, like Disraeli and Gladstone, Britain's needs were, for the most part, less political and even less focused on Continental Europe, than on its possessions and colonies, needed to provide raw materials for the expanding Industrial Revolution. One has to wonder if Britain, indeed, forsook political "gamesmanship" versus Napoleon III and the growing German unification threat (and Bismarck) in order to find a trade resolution with America, following its War Between the States. Can we begin with the premise that, with priorities on economic advantages, Great Britain suffered from political (and therefore "power") myopia during the last half of the Nineteenth century?

Mearsheimer tends to believe that it is survival which is the principal motive behind "great-power behavior". But, it would seem that great powers need more than survival. They require growth, not status quo. And, when and if that growth wanes and there is a crumbling of the network holding possessions and colonies and territories together, the empire collapses within time.[2]So, while Britain was still an empire bent on survival at the close of the 19^th century, Britain was facing a strengthened and newly aligned and allied Germany under a territory-and-power greedy Bismarck, for which Britain had no equal.

Many historians see Europe as being in continuous competition, especially among so-called "small states" as opposed to large empires. "The diversity of the small European states created competition. And competition among the European states, sometimes in the form of war, was a source of progress: social, political and technological. The difficulty of the European state system, however, was the risk of war getting out of control and the system relapsing into chaos; on the other hand there was a risk of a single power winning the wars and imposing a single hegemony on Europe."[3]

Mearsheimer concentrates on offensive realism and what he tends to consider a nation's lust for power. What this obviously brings to mind is that power is not something most nations care to share. While there have been various treaties and pacts and ententes over the centuries, the sharing of power usually destroys or undermines any sort of agreement over time. When Mearsheimer declares that maintaining a status quo results in a loss of domination over rivals, he obviously sees the British Empire at the close of the 19^th century. The power and dominance had shifted to Germany, allied with the Austro-Hungarian Empire (which, eventually, would also fall victim to trying to maintain a status quo). So, even if "survival" is a "given" priority, we still lack a definite rationale about how a nation (empire) such as Great Britain should, or would, react to the rise of other nations. It is one thing to see the growth of late 19^th Century America. But, that was an overseas entity, in reality non-threatening; it is quite something else to overlook or avoid the growth of a united Germany under the vigorous Prussian theory of dominating all states around them. Britain may either not have cared (since it was French territory) or been unaware of potential implications, when Bismarck's "new" Germany annexed Alsace-Lorraine. There was no doubt that Germany, even with a presence in Africa, sought far more strongly to use its unification following 1870 to gain a dominant foothold that would span Europe from the English Channel to the Ural Mountains.

One may well wonder why this happened, in retrospect. Perhaps Mearsheimer has one simplistic answer: "Great power politics are influenced by both security fears and by the ambitions of their leaders. They are influenced by the power available and a variety of limits to the application of that power."[4] Would it be fair, then, to assume that Alsace-Lorraine was ignored in Great Britain because both Disraeli and Gladstone and their political parties had other economic priorities? Certainly, Victoria, ever in mourning for her Prince Albert, had little or no interest in anything other than good news from the outlying bastions of her Empire. Victoria smugly wore the mantle of Empress of India, and seemed pleased with British dominance of the Suez Canal. The Empire looked East and South- seldom to the strength of Germany's central European domination on the European continent. "Queen Victoria died Jan. 22, 1901 at 81, ending her 63-year reign. During her tenure, the British Empire had gone to every part of the globe and become one of the most influential forces in history."[5]

As the new century began, though, anti-colonialism was already on the march in places like southern Africa and Egypt. Victoria's death in many ways symbolized the passing of The British Century To be sure, Britain's imperialistic policies were facing some serious threats- the Boers in South Africa, the rebels in Egypt and Afghanistan, and the continuing disputes and rebellion of what would be called The Irish Free State. But, these often petty squabbles diverted attention from what was growing on the Continent- German ambition for total domination. It is a fact that the German Kaiser wanted an entente with Britain at one time. "The Kaiser always wanted an agreement with England if he could get one without seeming to want it...he allowed himself to confess (to Britain's King Edward) 'not a mouse could stir in Europe without our permission'."[6] But, when waves of mistrust occurred in Germany, any thought of entente was eliminated. The actual "entente" which involved far-off regions of Egypt and Morocco, united France and Britain, at the turn of the century, but incurred the wrath of the German Kaiser. Was this alliance a bit of "defensive realism" on the part of France and Britain? It was, in fact, what one might call a "survival mode" a means of protecting colonies and territories from upsetting the imperialistic strengths of the two nations. For whatever reason, the anxiety about Britain that Berlin had was not returned in kind by Downing Street. Again, one must focus on Mearsheimer's notion of "defensive realism." He makes a good case for some states' paranoia: "States can never be certain about other states' intentions.....There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by them."[7]

Mearsheimer, writing at the beginning of the 21^st Century tends top modernize the power game that occurred over a century earlier. Today, in a period of high technology, satellites, nuclear threats, aggressive acts become clear more quickly. More than a century earlier, power was more a diplomatic "game." And, the word "game" is used advisedly here, because those in charge of every nation's international power motivation were aristocratic, or at least of the upper, highly educated classes. In Germany, of course, the leaders were either Junkers, a Prussian nobility, or well-schooled and experienced battle field generals. Diplomacy and foreign relations have always tended to be a "Gentleman's game." While the fate of millions might be hanging in the balance, it was the well-born or peers of the realm, abetted by some military tacticians, who sat down in smoke-filled salons to work out "agreements" create pacts of temporary peace, even divided small states into bits and pieces to fit the needs of the participants. 19^th Century power games were like chess. One may have to sacrifice some pawns to gain the eventual; victory, or, at least, earn a draw.

In that era, Germany, newly united and strengthened with the addition of coal mines and steel mills, began to look toward expansion and domination. Britain, in the throes of economic growth and labor strife as well as unrest in its colonial empire, sought to survive, tend to hold the status quo, and not ambitiously seek for more power than the nation now held. The fact that states fear one another (Mearsheimer 32) can be traced back to Athens vs. Sparta, if not earlier. What is a fact is that, unlike Lord Acton's dictum, power does not necessarily lead to absolute power. Given this enhancement of Prussia into Germany, it seems strange to us today that Britain preferred Germany (or Prussia) to its historical enemy, France, of which (for some reason) it was still afraid. This, in light of the overall question for this essay, bears out the fact that Britain neither challenged nor feared the power of an emerging German nation.

And, what about Britain's attitude toward the growth and economic dominance of the U.S. in the last half of the nineteenth century. Mearsheimer feels that "....it did not build powerful military forces between 1850 and 1898, and it made little effort to conquer territory in the Western hemisphere"[8] Americans tended to feel that the Atlantic Ocean prevented attacks from Europe, as much as the British felt protected by the English Channel. And, yet, Britain HAD to be concerned about the economic superiority of the U.S.- its abundance of natural wealth, its growing industrialization and, of course, the human resources to build factories, steel mills, coal mines, string telephone and telegraph wires, and eventually mass-produce low-cost automobiles. Yet, Britain continued to look inward, economically: "Between 1840 and 1860, Britain controlled almost 70% of European industrial might, nearly five times that of France...."[9] Britain, therefore, seemed impervious to the U.S. (especially when the South attempted to influence Britain during the Civil War to choose sides). And here is where Mearsheimer (235) points out a similarity between Britain and the U.S. during this period- neither nation sought to create a strong military force. The U.S. was taming the West, while Britain had no interest in dominating continental Europe. This, according to Mearsheimer (237) is surprising because it used a strong military force to conquer and control territories outside Europe.

Unlike the situation in Europe- Britain vis a vis Austro-Hungary, Germany, Italy, Russia and France- there was never the thought of fear between the U.S. and Britain. There was no military threat. There was no economic threat (as opposed to today's globalization where mega-corporations, like termites, are eating the underpinnings of once-domestic industries). It is not a re-hashing of the facts that Britain SHOULD have developed some sort of fear of the powerful industrial-military-political machine that emerged after 1870 in Central Europe. We are familiar with the Nazi slogan of the 1930s: "Today Germany, Tomorrow the World!" This goal of domination on the part of Germany was equally true, although perhaps less recognized, and even narrowed to Europe and some offshore colonies in the last generation of the 19^th Century. Britain seemed to ignore this, or, even worse, felt they would not be involved. The causes of the First World War began festering much before 1914, but Britain's policies at the time was not to challenge what was happening on the other side of the English Channel.

It may be simplistic to say so, but the causes of World War I were economic. Of course, there are those who claim it was the imperialistic power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the rise of Prussia to dominate middle Europe. But, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was merely as small match to a combustible bundle of European straw. The economics required France and Britain to ally themselves with Russia. Never mind the actual; relations between the English crown and the Russian Czars. It was a matter of the wide open spaces and the emerging consumerism that economists could see in Russia Again, we need to realize that nationalism, ethnic claims of superiority, political maneuvering, expanding colonization in Africa and Asia all led to one true cause of World War I and its aftermath: the dollar, the franc, the mark, the ruble, the schilling: It was economics. This was now the new politics of power- and the desire NOT to share economic growth. In the conflict of emerging qnd competitive economies, war seemed inevitable even at the turn of the century. . As writer Randolph Bourne is quoted by Howard Zinn: "War is the health of the state" [10]. It would be easy- but totally mistaken- to claim that it is patriotism that fuels conflict and violence. It was the conflict of economic priorities that created world-wide havoc.

It is important, at this stage of our interpretation of the struggles of, and for, power to link the need for industrial expansion with the power struggle of nations. Mearsheimer mentions the idea of "balancing", whereby "a great power assumes direct responsibility for preventing an aggressor from upsetting the balance of power"[11] But, if we look at Britain's foreign policy before and shortly after the turn of the 19^th into the 20^th Century, there seems to be little effort made to stem the aggressive nature of a rising Germany, allied with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. One has to ask why this seeming nonchalance. Perhaps then economic situation in Britain's empire was causing greater concern than what was happening on the European continent. It was France and Russia who, in Mearsheimer's terms, "drew a lone in the sand and warn(ed) the aggressor not to cross it"[12] Of course, as the Century progressed, that line was not only crossed, but obliterated.

And yet, looking Westward, it was evident that the U.S. had no desire to be drawn into an economic and political power tug of war thousands of miles from its shores. Just as happened generations later, at the outset of World War II, the U.S. was basically isolationist, concerned only with protecting the Monroe Doctrine and, therefore, the integrity of the Western Hemisphere, over which the U.S. easily reigned. Thus, there was no aggressive nature, no balancing act, no buck-passing between the British Empire and the United States. It was almost a laissez faire situation, both nations wending their way to define their economic status and protecting it. It took some pressure from Western European allies to finally drag the U.S. into the First World War, just as the U.S. was not willing (until Pearl Harbor) to become fully engaged in World War II.

But, there can be no essay discussing power politics only in terms of centuries past. The gentlemen who once agreed have long since left. Perhaps only in England and France are there still high education opportunities for those who wish to seriously pursue a diplomatic career. On other nations, especially in the U.S. diplomacy has become the plaything of political appointees- from John Foster Dulles to Condaleezza Rice. Where once gentlemen's agreements (or disputes) provided both war as well as peace, now the world is ruled by various factions, seeking power by whatever means possible. Power is now wielded by nuclear threats, suicide bombers, or economic manipulation. The line in the sand now consists of nuclear threats and biological warfare potentials. Where once so-called "super-powers"- the U.S. and the USSRT were matched as the sole nuclear weaponry depositories, the "Nuclear Club" has grown: China, India, Pakistan, probably Israel, and now threats from Iran and North Korea. The politics of power has shifted from what Mearsheimer considers "great nations" to amoral entities seeking some sort of world recognition beyond their earlier means. Santayana's dictum about not forgetting history lest we repeat it, is an anachronism today.

As Mearsheimer explains, there is a shift of the so-called "great powers: "Others might argue that America's allies from the Cold War- the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Japan- should count as great powers.....They do not qualify for that ranking, however, because they depend in large part on the United States for their security; they are effectively semi-sovereign states"[13]

Mearsheimer wrote this book in 2001. Much has changed since then, including, of course 9/11. The very notion of foreign nations still depending for their security on the U.S. seems irrational, at best; given that the U.S. has involved itself in a struggle with radical Islam- a struggle anathema to most of the Western nations. It is the failure of professional diplomats to find a common ground with radical religionists for whom diplomacy is a Western (and therefore anti-Islamic) invention that now lies at the root of power politics.

"Power" is now identified as being a member of the "Nuclear club." What Americans seem to forget (or overlook) in this "game" of power politics is that "many more countries can make nuclear weapons than do...The gradual spread of nuclear weapons has not opened the nuclear floodgates"[14] While most nations in the world, according to the authors seem to able to leave in peace with their neighbors, it should be clear that nuclear proliferation is still a monumental fear The idea of power politics, to reiterate, now is the power of fear, politics aside. The Bush Ad ministration seems to concentrate on what one might consider "aggressive defense"- a far stretch from Mearsheimer's definition of "defensive realism."

The inescapable fact of the power grid in today's world eliminates Western Europe (more involved with its European Union and economic benefits). We can eliminate Russia, now too busy dealing with an Al Capone type Mafyia problem of corruption and murder. China, while allowing more foreign investors to help build its economy and domination of, first, Southeast Asia, and then the rest of the Western world, may be concerned with North Korea, but seems uninterested and unwilling to play a role in the West vs. Islam imbroglio that now causes so much domestic and foreign controversies.

Defensive realism, nevertheless, reached its zenith in the U.S. during the Reagan Administrations and its purported Star Wars defense system which was never built. The idea, as Sagan and Waltz state, was "Wouldn't it be better to protect the American people than to avenge them?"[15]

Sad to say, the current situation in which the U.S. finds itself continues to change the balance of power. Mearsheimer seems to feel that the major threat for the 21^st Century comes from China's potential to become "a giant Hong Kong...it would probably have on the order of four times as much latent power as the United States does"[16]

Mearsheimer tends to paint a pessimistic picture in the power structure of the 21^st century world. Yet, despite nuclear threats, armaments, disarmament discussions, defensive machinations and outright threats, we again must state the obvious: It is economics that drives the balance (or imbalance) of power in the world, just as it has done for generations.

The European Union sees a common market of inter-developing economic and commercial agreements as its strength.

Japan continues to focus on its expert advantages, especially electronics and automotive.

China, while still a Communist nation, is opening doors for entrepreneurship and foreign investors as well as developing its own export opportunities (which have already caused a trade imbalance with the U.S.).

India is graduating more engineers now than the U.S. and has become a center for American outsourcing.

Pakistan is a danger because of its ties to radical Islam and its possession of nuclear capabilities which, in one infamous case, have already seen a leading Pakistani scientist "sell" nuclear secrets and raw materials to other nations.

Without oil reserves, the Middle East would sink back into theocratic, tribal feuds and governments.

And the U.S. is so bent on "democratizing" the third world that its deficit and tax legislation are affecting its future economic growth. Maybe Bill Clinton, in 1992,m had the right approach: "It's the economy, stupid!"

We have come a long way from the opening thoughts about power and the gentlemen's agreements on diplomatic initiatives which were prominent in the 19^th and early Twentieth centuries. Measrsheimer's 2001 book is, alas, out of date today. One has to wonder if an updated version is not now required., For example, ion his conclusion, Mearsheimer writes: "States occasionally ignore the anarchic world in which they operate, choosing instead to pursue strategies that contradict balance-of-power logic"[17] The mere fact that he sees American culture as "deeply liberal" is ignoring the controversies of power politics within the government and public opinion today.

We cannot ignore the fate of Britain, which has lost its empire and its standing within Europe. Economically it tends to be a footnote in 21^st Century internationalization. Britain's reluctance to join the European Union (and turn the pound into euros) may eventually affect its own political power to, at least, have a say in future relations.

It is the U.S.- which so dominated power during the 20^th Century- perhaps reaching its heights with the post-World War II Marshall Plan, which now stands to lose the most. The bumbling Bush administrations misshapen foreign policy and its need to "spread democracy" to nations historically unable or unwilling to democratize- has caused the vision of the U.S. as the center of world moral as well as fair economic leadership to crumble. Sad to say, the world no longer looks to the U.S. for guidance and for a fair determination of power for the good of the nations of the world. Mearsheimer (31) makes an assumption that great powers are rational actors: "states pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequence of their actions."[18] In today's international political battlefield, the U.S. seems unable or unwilling to recognize this. This nation is not willing to concede, as we quoted at the very outset: that power is not a natural monopoly and that the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal

LISTED REFERENCES;

Cooper, Robert "EUROPE: THE POST-MODERN STATE AND WORLD ORDER"

New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer 2005

Ferguson, Niall: "The End of Power" Wall Street Journal online June 21, 2004 www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005244

Mearsheimer,. John: Review of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

FUTURECASTS online magazine www.futurecasts.com Vol. 4, No. 5, 5/1/02

Mearsheimer,. John: The Tragedy of Great Power PoliticsNew York: W.W. Norton % Co (2001)

Sagan,. Scott D. and Waltz, Kenneth N.: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons New York: W.W. Nortonm % Co. (2003)

Tuchman, Barbara: The Guns of August New York: Dell Publishing (1962

Wattenberg, Ben and Mazzetti, Mark: 'ROUGH RIDING INTO THE 20TH CENTURY American Legion Magazine, Sept., 1998

Zinn, Howard (1995): A People's History of the United States New York: HarperPerennial Books

[1] Ferbusoin, 2004 1

[2] Mearsheimer,. John: Review of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

FUTURECASTS online magazine www.futurecasts.com Vol. 4, No. 5, 5/1/02

[3] Cooper, Robert "EUROPE: THE POST-MODERN STATE AND WORLD ORDER"

New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer 2005 p. 46

[4] Ibid 7

[5] Wattenberg, Ben and Mazzetti, Mark: 'ROUGH RIDING INTO THE 20TH CENTURY

American Legion Magazine, Sept., 1998 p. 32

[6] Tuchman, Barbara: The Guns of August New York: Dell Publishing (1962 p.19

[7] Mearsheimer 2001 31

[8] Mearsheimer 2001 235)

[9] ibid 235

[10] Zinn 1995 350

[11] Mearsheimer 156

[12] ibid 136

[13] Mearsheimer 382

[14] Sagan and Waltz 2003 42-3

[15] ibid 177

[16] Mearsheimer 401

[17] Mearsheimer 401

[18] Mearsheimer 31