Proportional Representation Arises When a Political Party Feels Threatened

In 1897, thousands of workers, organized by the fledgling Swedish Social Democrat party, protested for increased representation in the Swedish parliament, the Riksdag. About 10 years later, on May 15, 1906, the conservative Swedish government instituted proportional representation in the second chamber of the Riksdag.

Turn of the century Sweden is a fine example of the University of Chicago professor Carles Boix's theory of when and why democracies choose to change their electoral systems from a non-proportional method to a proportional method. Sweden's socialist movement was growing and the conservative political party, fearing an uprising, instituted proportional representation in order to maintain some power.

The lodestar of Boix's theory is that "the selection (and preservation) of different electoral rules can be traced to the strategic decisions made by the current ruling parties , foreseeing the coordinating consequences of different electoral systems, to maximize their representation in parliament." (1999: 621) Essentially, Boix views changes in electoral systems as happening in a mono-directional pathway from non-proportional to proportional--he equates higher proportionality with an increased "electoral threshold." A majority political party, Boix argues, will allow a change to proportional representation when a minority party is rising in popularity and is on the verge of instituting a political coup on the power of the majority. Boix believes that majority political parties are the political equivalent of homo economicus and will always act to maximize their political power. He points to four different historical factors that can shake the political landscape enough that those with political power would transfer to a more proportional system: "the extension of universal suffrage (Western Europe in the 1910s or new democratic nations in the postwar period); the introduction of competitive elections (Eastern Europe and several African nations in the 1990s); a massive political realignment among voters (the rise of socialism at the turn of the century or today's rise of protectionist parties, which would partly explain why France temporarily switched to PR in 1986-88); and a high turnover in party organizations (France and Greece in this century)." (1999: 621)

Boix is the only academic to venture a unified field theory of how countries pick electoral systems. Nevertheless, the literature is replete with the theories of armchair analysts about specific causes for the change in electoral systems in specific countries. The common observation of these analysts is changes to an electoral system are the result of the work of reformers. The Economist notes that in the early 1990s, efforts to make Italian democracy less representative and to make British democracy more representative were both caused by the perception that the twin systems were unfair. Changing the electoral system in Italy and Britain, The Economist argues, was a method to create meaningful change--no matter what kind--to bring the faith of the citizenry back to government. (1993: 22) In the United States, Kathleen Barber characterizes the movements in the beginning of the 20th century toward proportional representation as an offshoot of the Progressive Era. She maintains that reformers saw proportional systems as tools for prying away power from powerful political parties and their omnipotent bosses.

Sources

Amy, Douglas J. 2002. Revitalize American Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press.Amy, Douglas J. 2002. Revitalize American Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press.

Barber, Kathleen. 2001. A Right to Representation: Proportional Election Systems for the Twenty-first Century. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Blais, Andre. The Debate over Electoral Systems. 1991. International Political Science Review 12(3): 239-260.

Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." American Political Science Review 93(3): 609-624.

"Good Government? Fairness? Or Vice Versa. Or Both." May 1, 1993. The Economist. pp. 9-21.

Hertzberg, Hendrik. 2004. Politics: Observations & Arguments, 1966-2004. New York: The Penguin Press.

Lijphardt, Arend and Bernard Grofman, eds. 1984. Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives. New York: Praeger.

Norris, Pippa. 1997. Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian, and Mixed Systems." International Political Science Review 18(3): 297-312.