Proposal for the Reconstruction of Iraq

The proper handling of Iraq's reconstruction was perhaps the most hotly debated topic of 2005. How, exactly, does someone take a country that has been subject to a violent dictatorship for thirty years and turn it into a free, equitable society? To Quote Bill Cosby, the first thing to keep in mind is, "the key to failure is trying to please everybody." There is no solution that will produce 100% satisfaction with the Iraqi people.

What Iraqis need is the best alternative: something that will produce the greatest amount of satisfaction for Iraqis as a whole. To attain maximum satisfaction, an order of focus must be determined from the four areas of security, politics, social factors, and economics. Once the order has been defined, it will be possible to lay out the groundwork for each specific area.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the Iraq reconstruction is the determination of a primary focus of attention. In determining this primary focus, it is easy to get into a chicken versus egg type of situation. It is not possible to have a stable government without a secure environment; however, there cannot be security without an organized government to enforce security with a military. There is, however, a way around this conundrum. Instead of looking at four, mutually exclusive areas, look at the areas as interdependent areas that flow from one to the next.

For example, if the current primary focus is the establishment of a legitimate government, there will still be attempts to secure the country. This is not to say that the events are lumped together in one homogeneous sum. There are still events that will dominate at specific times; however, just because something is not the primary focus of the moment does not necessarily exclude it from thought or consideration. That being said, the first focus area should be security. After securing the country, the government will have a chance to take hold.

With security in place, it will then be easier to tackle the major social and economic issues facing the country. All of this change will take time and, as the saying goes, Rome was not built in a day. It cannot be expected of Iraq to do so. Expecting Iraq to become stable within 5 years from the fall of Saddam in 2003 is unreasonable. It took the United States fifteen years and two government systems before it became anything resembling a stable government. It is likely that Iraq will be in a similar situation.

Before anything else, the security of the Iraqi people needs to be established. The easiest way to establish security is with a foreign security force; however, the Iraqi people have traditionally been very suspicious of foreign influencers and, in fact, the presence of foreign forces may be increasing the insurgency violence. This creates a catch-22 situation. Security cannot be attained without the help of foreign forces, but foreign forces also promote the insecurity of the country through increased insurgent activity. The ideal way out of this situation is best described through the analogy of learning to ride a bike.

When learning how to ride a bike there is plenty of contact between the child and the parent, at first. Once the child learns the fundamental motions, they can start to be shadowed so that if something happens the parent will catch them. After a while, the parent lets the child go on its way. Iraq is the like the child learning to ride and the United States is like the parent. The United States must have an initial presence to simply hold back the insurgency and protect Iraq from immediate collapse. During this time, the US should train the Iraqi military as well. Each time a unit is ready to fight, they should be integrated into US forces so that the US can shadow them just as a parent shadows their child when teaching them how to ride a bike.

The third step is for the US to gradually stop shadowing Iraq and let them ride off on their own. Once the foreign forces are gone-or at least minimized-the insurgency will shrink to a more manageable level. This will last throughout the reconstruction effort, but with most progress will take place before the handling of social issues. Now that a general framework of instilling security has been formed, it is possible to determine exactly how accomplish this goal.

It will be impossible for the United States to pass over security responsibility to Iraq if there are no Iraqis willing to join the Iraq military. Therefore, recruitment is the first step to building a secure Iraq. Not many people are willing to risk their lives if they do not expect to get anything in return. This is especially true in countries with low national identity, as is the case in Iraq. As a result, in order to recruit people for the Iraq military they must be given proper incentives. Iraq should offer land titles in addition to current benefits to attract new recruits. The land to be given out would be government owned land in all parts of Iraq ranging from Kurdistan to Basra, urban to rural. If for some reason none of the land offered to the soldier were adequate for his needs, then a land subsidy up to the value of the land offered would be provided.

Land ownership incentives would not only provide Iraqi soldiers and their families with an opportunity to live wherever they would prefer, but it would also have a role in improving the economic and social situations of the country for reasons that will be discussed later. The costs of such a program would be small because if the soldier accepts the government land, the only costs would be those associated with marking lots and the paperwork associated with creation of a title.

The United States should focus on training a small number of Iraqi troops at a time. Each time a new unit is ready they will be integrated into US troops for a short period until there are enough troops and officers to start coordinating their own operations. As the number of independent Iraqi troops increases, the number of US troops present will decrease. The process will repeat until there are a minimal amount of US troops in Iraq. This will serve a large part in the reduction of insurgency violence because much of the insurgency is fueled by the presence of US troops (Bennet, 2005). When the violence in Iraq has been reduced to a level controllable by the Iraqi military, Iraq will be able to focus on its government.

Once a relatively secure Iraq has been established through the aforementioned plans, the country can start to form a government. The Iraqi government should be almost confederate in nature because of the major divisions of Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd. This confederate system would consist of three regional governments similar to the current Kurdish government. Iraq should establish a small central government to handle taxes, the armed forces, and to provide a platform for the regional governments to talk to each other. The division of the eighteen provinces would be as in Figure 1.

Although this gives the Shi'a Region a large proportion of the population, with nearly ten million people, the Shi'a represent 60 percent of the population of Iraq. This division structure makes the distribution of provinces is approximately representative of the distribution of people (Provinces of Iraq, 2005). The division is also logical in terms of historic precedent. The divisions of the provinces are roughly with the historic boundaries of the Persian states of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul (Hopwood, 2003). Another consideration made in the distribution of provinces was the location of oilfields. The Kurdistan and Shi'a regions contain a vast majority of the oilfields in Iraq; however, major pipelines that transport the oil from Kurdistan to nearly any location all go through the Sunni Region (Iraq: Oil Infrastructure, 2003). Although this may initially appear as a downside, it is actually advantageous.

Since the Kurds have no choice but to send their oil through the Sunni Region, they must cooperate with the Sunni if they wish to make use of their oil reserves. The Sunni, on the other hand, must cooperate with the Kurds if they want to benefit from the shipment of oil through their region. A similar situation will exist for the Shi'a, although to a lesser extent because of their ability to export oil without the need to cross regional boundaries. With the one exception of a confederate system, the current Iraqi constitution should remain intact. Even with two provinces voting overwhelmingly to reject the constitution, the vast majority of the rest of Iraq supports the constitution (Iraq Voters, 2005). With this regional separation, a governmental structure that ensures communication and coordination of the three regions must be defined.

The structure of the regional governments and their respective provinces, for the most part, would be determined by the regions; however, there would be some standard features common to all the regions. One of these standard features would be a modification of the four-branch government as presented in Chapter 3 of the current Iraqi Constitution. At present, there are the three traditional branches of government, legislative, judicial, and executive; and a fourth "Independent Associations" branch that is responsible for various agencies and commissions. The first three of these branches will be present in each region. The fourth will be on the national level alone. Within each legislature, a Prime Minister will be elected from parliament and the Prime Minister will choose a cabinet. Each legislature will also nominate someone from any of the three legislative bodies to be the President of Iraq. The Iraqi people will then vote for the president from the nominees.

For an illustration of this, see Figure 2. Elections for parliamentary seats would be held every four years with presidential elections taking place midway between. The benefits of this hybrid system include the preservation of separation of powers while providing an opportunity to get legislation passed relatively quickly. Both of these attributes are important in a new, relatively unstable country. This type of system also takes into account ethnic differences. Because each region-which is roughly divided among ethnic lines-is relatively autonomous, most laws and government business would be able to be customized to fit the needs of each region. The national government would only be in charge of matters that were relatively neutral in respect to ethnic differences-such as the military.

With the government in place, the central focus can now shift to building a civil social society. The most important social aspect of a civilization is education. Education shapes the future beliefs of the people and provides opportunities for economic expansion. Due to this, a large proportion of Iraq's tax income should be allocated to education spending. This money would be used to build new schools, train teachers, and provide up-to-date learning materials for all students. Educational spending should equal approximately 7% of total GDP. This is a greater than average spending per dollar GDP than the average country; however, it is warranted because the goal is not only to increase the education of the Iraqi people, but to also build the infrastructure needed (Nationmaster.com, 2005). Provided these resources, it will be possible to increase the education level of the Iraqi people. The higher education level will reduce the tendency to react to differences through violent means. The country will become even more stable.

In addition to educational spending, medical spending needs to be improved. According to the World Health Organization, the lifespan of a typical Iraqi is 55 years. This is significantly below the average of more than 66 years for the world's population. Total spending on healthcare in Iraq only equals 1.5% of GDP, which is the lowest of any country (World Health Organization, 2005). Because the Iraqi people are particularly socialist, it may be prudent to have a large, public healthcare system. This will allow the millions of Iraqis who cannot afford adequate healthcare, access to medical services. This would be a nationally run system to ensure equality in distribution of healthcare funds and to help build Iraqi unity through goodwill. Increased healthcare and education, however, will only go so far in building national identity and unity. Fortunately, there is something relatively simple that will bring the Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurds together as Iraqi.

Pride and ego are two very powerful motivators of action. To build national identity, Iraq needs something that will make them proud to be Iraqi and appease their my-daddy-is-better-than-your-daddy-like need for satisfaction. They need something with worldwide attention. They need something competitive. A war with another country would do the job quite nicely. The Iraqi people would be able to unite against a common enemy and with a common goal. This, however, would attract the wrong kind of worldwide attention. A less bloody and more politically appealing solution to the national identity problem is through competitive sport. Iraq should invest in improving their standing in the international athletics arena through both the Olympic Games and the World Cup. To achieve this, the government should invest in obtaining world-class trainers and coaches as well as provide increased funding for athletic programs and facilities. The trainers and coaches would provide a small but relatively immediate boost to the performance of the athletes, which would increase support and interest in athletics. Increased funding in athletic programs would serve a dual purpose. First, it will increase the future athletic ability of Iraqis, which would in turn build more national identity through the pride they get from higher world ranking. Second, and more importantly, it would keep young Iraqis occupied, diverting their energies from what could end up as insurgency violence. Similar to the increased funding for athletic programs, increased athletic infrastructure would provide a dual purpose. First, the increased quality of the facilities would create a sense of professionalism that would surly translate to the performance of the athletes. Second, there would be increased employment due to the construction of these facilities.

The basis for these social plans is a theory called the Broken Window Theory. Essentially this theory suggests that relatively small changes in the physical environment can create large changes in social behavior. Broken Window Theory originally suggested that fixing broken windows in poor neighborhoods could decrease the incidence of violent crime in those neighborhoods. This was because if someone saw lots of broken windows or graffiti they would assume that nobody cared about this area and they could get away with more in these types of areas than in nice looking areas (Gladwell, 2002). This theory can be adapted for use in the reconstruction of Iraq. The increased education and health funding and the increased international presence via athletics would make the citizens of Iraq feel like they have something that people care about. The broken windows would be fixed. This would show that Iraq is a place where people care about what happens and there would be a reduction in Ethno-religious divisions as people come to identify themselves with Iraq more than with their religious affiliations. These religious tensions may never be completely dissolved but that is not necessarily a bad thing. Once differences are reduced, the differences will start to be thought of as diversities. Diversity breeds innovation and creative thought. Therefore, the current biggest hurdle of Iraq could become one of its greatest strengths.

Although it is the last primary focus chronologically, the Iraq's economy is the most important factor that will ensure the long-term success of reconstruction. If Iraq cannot overcome the hurdle of a meager economy, the country will be stuck in the cycle of violence and instability that has plagued many third-world countries. Currently Iraq is dependent on oil to survive economically. This, in the long run, cannot sustain the country. Although oil consumption around the world is on the rise, the supply of oil is increasingly becoming a concern. According to the US Energy Information Administration, with a 2% annual increase in consumption, oil production will peak in 2037 for the expected value of oil reserves (2004). Because of this, Iraq must eventually transition from an economy reliant upon oil to one independent of non-renewable resources. Possible solutions include a manufacturing economy or a technology economy. These changes will be possible through the increase in the education of Iraqis.

Whatever form Iraq's economic driver takes it should be a free market with no price‑regulated industries. A free market provides the greatest return for expenditure per person, on a macro scale, and stimulates innovation through competition, something essential for an industrialized country. A completely free market also takes care of many black-market issues by allowing the market to adjust through supply and demand. Iraq should also pursue free trade agreements with large, oil-consuming countries. This will benefit them in two ways: first, it will reduce the cost other countries pay for the oil it exports, which will increase its demand relative to other oil-producing countries. Second, it will reduce the cost of importing goods from these oil-consuming countries. These goods would increase the quality of life of Iraqi citizens. It is not, however, the increased revenues from oil or the imported goods themselves that prove most beneficial; it is the technology gained from close contact with the industrialized world that will, in the long run, benefit Iraq. This increase in technology is essential for increasing the economic situation of a country (DeLong 2001).

Another factor that will increase the Iraq's economic position is land ownership. As previously discussed, land ownership can be an incentive for recruiting Iraqi soldiers; but there are many economic benefits to land ownership as well. Currently, about one in four people living in urban areas of the Middle East do not legally have the right to live on their land. Although this sounds like a social issue (and it is), it is also an economic issue. This is because land ownership has the potential to increase current tax revenue without raising rates, increasing the income of future Iraqis, and stimulating spending. The evidence for this comes from 8000 miles away in the barrio of San Francisco Solano, just outside of Buenos Aires. Resulting from a quirk in the Argentinean legal system, half of the people of San Francisco Solano own their land and half do not. Those who own their land feel they have a reason to invest in improving their homes and their children stay in school longer (Moffett, 2005). These factors help the economy by increasing spending, not only on things like building materials, but also on materialistic goods such as televisions and furniture. This increased spending will increase sales tax revenue. The increased education of the children of the "titled" homes will serve to provide these people with better, higher paying jobs which will not only increase their disposable income but it will also provide a boost to income tax revenue. Another, more subtle, but perhaps more significant benefit of titling would be the increased belief that individual initiative leads to success (Moffett, 2005). This belief is one that will make the difference between a capitalist society that fails and one that succeeds. It is because of these factors that Iraq should engage in titling efforts to maximize land ownership. Will these solutions produce the greatest amount of satisfaction from Iraqis as a whole? The answer is they will if these solutions are what the Iraqi people want. These solutions will create a stable Iraq. There may be, however, alternative solutions that produce varying amounts of satisfaction with varying amounts of success. In the end, it will be up to the Iraqi people to decide whether they will become a free society or tumble back into a dictatorship, as so many countries have in the past.