Prosecutor V. Charles Ghankay Taylor: Human Rights Violations in Liberia

On March 7^th, 2003 an indictment was filed and an arrest warrant was issued for Charles Taylor. At the time he was the Head of State of Liberia and in Ghana. In August of the same year, Taylor stepped down from his position as Head of State and took up residency in Nigeria.

The Sierra Leone Special Court took jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the time that Taylor was Head of State. He was charged with seventeen counts including crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

Taylor was accused of intending "to obtain access to the mineral wealth of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond wealth of Sierra Leone, and to destabilize the state." In addition, he "provided financial support, military training, personnel, arms, ammunition, and other support and encouragement" to armed rebel groups in the Sierra Leone conflict.

His crimes include "'terrorizing the civilian population and ordering collective punishment', sexual and physical violence against civilians, use of child soldiers, abductions and forced labor, widespread looting and burning of civilian property, and attacks on and abductions of UNAMSIL peacekeepers and humanitarian assistance workers."

Law

Taylor argued that as a Head of State he is entitled to immunity for his actions as a Head of State. He cited the case of Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium to show that he as a Head of State enjoys immunity under international law. Taylor also argued that serving the indictment and arrest warrant in Ghana was a violation of sovereign equality which "prohibits on state from exercising its authority on the territory of another." In turn, he sought to invalidate the indictment and the arrest warrant.

The prosecutor pointed out that Taylor "cannot simultaneously evade the processes of the court by refusing to appear before it and also use the processes of the court by filing motions before it." Additionally, the prosecutor strikes down the reference to the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium by stating that it "concerns the immunities of an incumbent Head of State from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state," while international criminal tribunals, including the Sierra Leone Special Court which adheres to international law, are in fact able to indict sitting Heads of State.

Furthermore, the prosecutor also claimed that Taylor was acting in a private capacity and not an official one. Finally, the prosecutor responded to the sovereign equality argument by explaining that "the transmission of documents to Ghanaian authorities could not violate the sovereignty of Ghana.

Holding

The court immediately dismissed Taylor's claim that the Sierra Leone Special Court does not have jurisdiction because the issue of immunity that he raises is not a jurisdictional issue, but one to be raised during a trial. Moreover, the court stresses that Taylor must first be present at the court to claim immunity; "An accused who has not made an initial appearance before this court cannot bring a preliminary motion."

In regards to Taylor's claim that the Sierra Leone Special Court violated the sovereign equality of Ghana, the court reiterates Security Council Resolution 1315 which created the court.

"Persons who commit or authorize serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible and accountable for those violations and that the international community will exert every effort to bring those responsible to justice in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law," it has been made clear that the Special Court was established to fulfill an international mandate and is part of the machinery of international justice.

Furthermore, the principle of sovereign equality does not apply because the Sierra Leone Special Court is a court under international law and is therefore not simply the state of Sierra Leone prosecuting the crimes of someone in the country of Ghana.

According to the decision, even if immunity was an issue that a preliminary motion could address, the point would be null and void according the Statute of the Special Court.

The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such a person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.

The Statue went on to emphasize the invalidity of Taylor's immunity claim.

The Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.

Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.

In addition, the Article 7 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal states:

The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Department, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.

This is further supported by Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter.

The fact that a person who committed an act which constituted a crime under internal law acted as Head of State or responsible official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.

Citing all of these instances in international law, the court denied Taylor's preliminary motion.