Protesting War: Political Dissidence in America

Before the first bombs fell on Iraq several years ago, a massive international movement was busy trying to stop it. Men and women of all classes and professions in America, England, Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and South Africa (just to name a few) came out onto the streets in millions to halt the onset of unilateral war.

These people marched in the face of insults and indifference from world leaders and other citizens in their respective countries. Their sensitivity to the loss of human life was judged to be infantile and naive, their stance on policy unpatriotic and cowardly.

As operations on the ground have soured and casualties soared, and after the evidence that brought America to war has turned out to be trumped-up or falsified, American policy makers have started to believe that "staying the course" might be more difficult than had been optimistically (and foolishly) believed at the outset.

Why did no one listen to the protesters?

To understand this question, one must go back to the birth of America. No one can doubt that America's very beginnings rose from political dissidence. Visionary leadership, with a healthy dose of good luck, granted this nation a chance to form a new republic invested with qualities that defined a new global paradigm.

As America grew, new domestic policy problems arose. Women won the vote through protest, labor unions demonstrated for pay and the right to work without the threat of injury, and the civil rights movement gave African Americans the right to be treated equally under the law.

Few people would now deny that all of this dissidence came from cowardice or "un-Americanism," or that the bravery of these people did not grant to all Americans a better and more equitable country. These people stood against heavy opposition in their respective eras, but eventually they did manage to effect positive change. The general public could not stand in the way of such compelling social change because the dissidents were passionately engaged with their message, and were in it for the long haul. In other words, people eventually listened.

This begs the question: If these protesters eventually attained their goals with single-minded force of message, then what makes them different from protesters now?

The difference involves the kind of perceived threat. For example, in wars where nation-states are involved, there is a clear threat that is characterized as an "other." In domestic disputes threats cannot be identified monolithically. In a country that does not allow you to simply eliminate the people you disagree with, the battle lines of the domestic dispute become blurry. An external threat can provide a rallying cry, a unifying force that can seem to be attacking our very way of life.

World War II provides the best historical example. Hitler succeeded as a politician partially by focusing the enmity of the public outward, towards nations and peoples who had made them (the German people) suffer (as a result of the reparations from WWI). In fact, Hermann Goerring said it best at the Nuremberg Trials:

"Of course the people don't want war. But after all, it's the leaders of the country who determine the policy, and it's always a simple matter to drag the people along whether it's a democracy, a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism, and exposing the country to greater danger."

The key is to manifest fear in the public and direct it towards an outward and easily identifiable source. Dissidents are then seen to be undermining the safety of everyone, not serving a larger social good. I posit that fear focused towards an external source in this way effectively damages the ability of the public to listen to the message of the dissenters, however well reasoned. Additionally, for those who require this kind of fear from people in order to justify political and military action, externalized fear has the added benefit of creating mass paranoia that feeds and foments without much further assistance from above.

The Bush administration engaged in these fear tactics before the war through statements to the media that included direct lies, misdirection, and ambiguous threats concerning further terrorist attacks. Using these tactics, Bush's regime succeeded in creating the fear they knew would be necessary to grant them a war in Iraq. "Support our Troops" became (and has remained) the essentially meaningless rallying cry for people to attack anti-war protesters with. After all, why would sending troops into unnecessary conflict be supportive of them? Does it not instead signify a manifestly disgusting waste of human life to ask men and women to lay down their lives for falsified and flawed reasoning? This is the kind of hostile ambiguity that protesters have been faced with.

What is left at the end of the day is a culture of expedience, tied lockstep to the authority of its leadership through manacles of fear and blinders of willed ignorance. Protesters continue to march and persevere, as they have always done, but they cannot succeed until the public becomes aware of the tools used to manipulate their will in the face of moral and ethical decisions. Only then shall we become truly free, and only then can we return our government to its intended state: a body in service of the people, not in service of itself.