Review of Hired Swords: The Rise of Private Warrior Power in Early Japan by Karl F. Friday

In Hired Swords, Karl Friday seeks to dispel many of the incorrect assumptions and beliefs about the warrior class of Nara and Heian Japan. He notes that many earlier authors have argued that the ineffectiveness of the decadent political system in Japan contributed to the ability of the warrior class to seize power. However, most scholars of this time period, including Friday, now dispute this fact, asserting instead that the warrior class had power all along, yet waited to assert it, and that the ruling classes were stable and maintained power throughout this period. Yet this generates something of an anomaly-the relative political power and strength held by the warrior class could have easily been exerted at any time, yet the samurai waited until the twelfth century to do so. His primary questions, then, are why the samurai waited to seize power, and why the court allowed itself to be put "in the potentially (and indeed, ultimately) precarious situation of contracting for its military needs with private warriors." (p. 7)

From the time of the Taika reform, the Japanese military system had been essentially organized around two principles: state control of the military and mandatory conscription by which Japanese men could serve the state. These principles were detailed in the ritsuryÇ codes, which remained intact, in one incarnation or another, throughout most of this earlier period. Friday details three additional fundamental points about the 8th century Japanese military system. First, Japan lacked a standing army. Second, the emperor and his court controlled the military system. Third, conscription spanned all classes, meaning that in addition to largely untrained peasants, the military also included well-trained members of higher social classes. He asserts that the first and third points ultimately made change necessary, while the second point supports his idea "that the changes of the eighth century represent adjustments to-not the abandonment of-the state's military apparatus." (p. 32) In fact, if a warrior from the beginning of the 8th century were able to examine the ritsuryo codes of a mere century later, he would barely recognize the system, but would be able to identify how the system he knew had evolved into the system in place in the 9th century.

However, if this same warrior saw the military system later in the 9th century, he would find that the ritsuryo codes had been largely discarded, primarily for reasons of efficiency-the state simply did not have the resources available to continue to rely upon unreliable peasant soldiers. Instead, the court and emperor were turning to the services of private warriors or professional mercenaries. Many Japanese men who came from families wealthy enough to provide them with the leisure time necessary to train in martial skills were now able to hire themselves out to the ruling classes, enabling them to gain both influence and wealth. The Heian government attempted to keep these forces in check through a variety of methods, working through many methods before finding one that worked efficiently.

Many authors have cited these facts when looking for an explanation as to why the warrior classes were ultimately able to take over-they asserted that the ultimate effect of the reliance on hired swords was a decline of political power among the ruling classes, as it slowly filtered into the hands of the mercenaries. Friday contradicts these assertions, noting that he and other authors have begun to understand that "[t]he creation of the Kamakura shogunate [at the end of the Heian period] . . . mark[s] not the end of the ascendancy of the civil court nobility, but merely the beginning of the end." (p. 169) Throughout his book, Friday clearly shows how one can understand the Heian era and the emergence of the Kamakura shogunate in this way, while explaining where early authors have gone wrong in their interpretations.