Richard Rorty on Morality and Community

In "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism" Richard Rorty explicates his conception of the relation of morality to the community. Throughout the article Rorty distinguishes between two conceptions of this relation. One is that which he calls the Kantian and the other that which he calls the Hegelian. His own view falls within the Hegelian conception, and with respect to North Atlantic democratic institutions, he specifically calls his view Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism.

Rorty starts off with the question of whether those who marginalize themselves can be criticized for being socially irresponsible. Intellectuals have been criticized for doing this, but Rorty says that miners also have done this in the past.

In addition, Rorty claims that "one cannot be irresponsible toward a community of which one does not think of oneself as a member" (329). His examples are of runaway slaves and tunnelers under the Berlin wall. People most likely would not believe that the slave should go back to his master or that the tunneler should return to totalitarianism. Rorty believes that such criticism only makes sense if there were a super community one had to identify with, for example, humanity.

Kantians are those who do believe in such a community. Kantians also believe in intrinsic human dignity, intrinsic human rights and an ahistorical distinction between the demands of morality and the demands of prudence.

Hegelians oppose this view and historicize the Kantians, putting the Kantians in their particular historically conditioned place. Hegelians believe that humanity is a biological rather than moral concept and that human dignity is only derivative from the dignity of some specific community. Lastly, Hegelians hold that there are no impartial criteria to appeal to in order to weigh the relative merits of communities. Rorty sides with the Hegelians.

With regard to the institutions and practices of North Atlantic democracies, Rorty posits a three-sided debate. First, there are the Kantians who would like to keep the morality-prudence distinction as a buttress of these institutions and practices. Second, there are the post-Marxist philosophical leftists who believe that these institutions and practices should be eliminated along with their discredited Kantian philosophical basis. Third, there are the Deweyan influenced postmodern bourgeois liberals who want to preserve these institutions and practices while abandoning the Kantian backdrop.

Rorty's agreement with the Hegelians commits him to the belief that no ahistorical criteria exist "for deciding when it is or is not a responsible act to desert a community" (330). We are only responsible to persons or historical communities.

In opposition to this view, the Kantians believe that these ahistorical criteria do exist and accuse Hegelians of social irresponsibility. The Kantians point out that our own society is bound up with the Kantian vocabulary of inalienable rights and the dignity of man; our society has traditionally based our morality on the view that there is such an abstract vantage point.

In addition, Kantians also believe that the institutions Rorty wants to uphold cannot survive without holding on to this philosophical vocabulary. Of course, Rorty objects to this view and says that these principles are only useful in summarizing, not justifying, our hopes.

Rorty wants to offer a reinterpretation of this vocabulary in order to suit the needs of postmodernist bourgeois liberalism. He wants to loosen the bonds this vocabulary has with these institutions. His goal is to convince our society that "loyalty to itself is morality enough" (332). Kantian ahistoricism is not needed. We are only responsible to our tradition.

In order achieve this, Rorty believes that the key is to not view the moral self as an abstracted Rawlsian chooser who has shed talents, interests, views about the good, ethnicity, social economic status, etc.. Instead, one should recognize that the moral self is just a network of beliefs, desires and emotions and nothing more.

This network is constantly reweaving itself to meet "environmental pressures." Rorty writes: "rational behavior is just adaptive behavior of a sort which roughly parallels the behavior, in similar circumstances, of the other members of some relevant community" (333). Irrationality in a community is behavior that leads one to abandon the community or be stripped of membership.

Thus, our loyalties and convictions only have ground in these beliefs, desires and emotions that "overlap those of the lots of other members of the group with which we identify for the purposes of moral or political deliberations" (333). The group creates its self-image out of the distinctive features it notices through contrast with other groups, and a person's dignity comes about because they share in this contrast process.

Criticism

The emphasis on the historical genesis of any "x." does have very powerful effects on us. One has to admit that we can point out to the people, place and historical epoch that first gave rise to the distinctive Kantian vocabulary. One also has to admit that we can trace moral evolution throughout history.

Given this why should we not agree with Rorty that there are no ahistorical vantage points and no such thing as intrinsic inalienable rights and human dignity independent of the particular community one is a member of?
One might possibly use history to show how communities and rights overtime have generally been extended to larger and larger spheres of people. If we continue with this process, we can justifiably believe that someday all people should end up being a member of one community and subscribe to one set of Kantian principles.

Maybe one can posit that the discovery of the Kantian vocabulary was a discovery of the ideal universal. If there were any universal standpoints, then they necessarily would have to be discovered from a subjective standpoint in the first place, in any case. This is what the Enlightenment thinkers discovered. I suppose this position would actually make one more Hegelian in the true sense, then Hegelian in Rorty's sense.

While on the subject, this same emphasis on historical conditions can be used against Rorty's desire to preserve North Atlantic democratic institutions. Just as morality is historically conditioned, so are institutions. We know that there was a time when the North Atlantic democratic institutions did not exist and why should we try to hold onto them?

Also, Rorty left out one other possibility in the three-position debate. What about the possibility that we should hold onto the Kantian vocabulary and ditch the institutions?

I'm not exactly sure why anyone would want to do this. Though overtime, appeal to the Kantian vocabulary has been very effective in getting people to change the workings of the North Atlantic democracies to be more inline with the Kantian philosophy of universal human rights. Of course, these institutions have not been completely overturned into a new type of institution as of yet.

Rorty believes that there is nothing left of the moral self once abstracted from our particular beliefs, desires, social positions, culture etc., and so we cannot use Rawl's process of abstraction and come to some universal standpoint.

Descartes discovered an early version of this type of abstract moral subject. He traveled around Europe and experienced the different cultures of the different communities, yet he did notice reason in each of the different people. Descartes discovered a universal type of subject that would later be refined by Kant and others. One can claim that this common core is just covered up by various ways of life.

It seems that Rorty's view on being responsible only to the community one is a member of enables communities to infinitely divide. Also, even if people do agree that they are part of the same community, I'm not sure how they can decide on which parts of the tradition to emphasize.

A postmodernist bourgeois liberal and a fundamentalist Christian can both agree that they belong to the American community, yet have vastly different views on which aspects in the American tradition one should be committed to and what counts as being a responsible American.

The fundamentalist Christian might appeal to the time in American history when religious tests and established religions were still around and believe that the view that a generalized Christianity should be established as America's official religion. They might say that the first amendment was a mistake and want it repealed and a new amendment establishing Christianity.

A postmodernist bourgeois liberal would not agree and appeal to the views of people like Jefferson or Madison possibly and the current non-establishment of Christianity. Also, in many ways the postmodernist bourgeois liberal and the fundamentalist Christian do live in different communities. I'm not sure how each would be considered responsible to the other under Rorty's view.