Roy Sorensen's Sorites Meta Paradox

Roy Sorensen uses the modular theory of mind to explain the sorites meta paradox. The modular theory of mind is the view that distinct parts of the brain evolved in such a way to solve particular problems that beings now called "humans" have dealt with in their evolution.

Sorensen also believes that he has an impeccable logical proof showing that vague terms such has "heap" do have sharp boundaries, and that these boundaries are what most people reject.

The sorites meta paradox has to do with the fact that people, even highly educated philosophers, fail to accept Sorensen's solution showing that these boundaries must exist.

In what follows, I will give a quick overview of how Sorensen solves the sorites paradox, an explanation of the modular theory of mind and show how Sorensen connects these two to explain the sorites meta paradox.

Consider the sorites paradox about the heap of sand. Take one grain of sand away. Is it still a heap? Continue to do this, and you eventually reach one grain of sand. This surely is not a heap. When did the transition take place?

If we continue with the induction step, if n grains of sand constitutes a heap, then n -1 grains of sand constitutes a heap, then we come to the conclusion that one grain of sand is a heap. The argument is valid and so one of these premises must be false.

Sorensen points to the induction step as the problem. This argument shows that vague terms actually do have thresholds. A heap really does turn into a non-heap, though we can never know when.

This not knowing has caused many philosophers to reject boundaries altogether. Some attempt to either apply alternative logics or claim that the term has no clearly defined meaning, but Sorensen says that these are not the correct solutions to the problem. We must take heed of the dictates of classical logic.

The modular theory of mind has been most effectively demonstrated with optical illusions, but Sorensen claims that linguistic illusions also arise because of this modular nature of our minds. The modular theory of mind postulates that different areas of our brain developed to solve different tasks. In a sense, we have a bag of tricks. Inconsistencies can arise when these different "homunculi," as Sorensen calls them, come together to give us an answer to a certain problem.

For instance, take the iterated Poggendorf illusion. One "homunculus" makes a long range colinearity judgment and another makes a local judgment. From the long range view, the discrete line looks straight while from the local view of each discrete part the lines do not look to be collinear. These homunculi clearly contradict each other.

Finally, the illusions brought to us by our linguistic apparatus' lead us to believe that no boundaries exist and most people try to apply this type of thinking to vague terms. Since the inconsistent nature of the different interacting systems lead us to see the absence of boundaries, our nature is very tough to overcome, even when logic dictates that we must accept otherwise than what these linguistic systems tell us. Sorensen says that this is the reason why the sorites meta paradox arises.

Thus, we reject the boundaries or vague terms partly because our minds let us get around in the world just fine with the underlying contradictions which arise and because of the fact that the thresholds are unknowable under any advance in knowledge.