Safeco and Qwest Fields and the Neighborhood

In the late 1990s, the technology industry boom had busted and Seattle, Washington, home to Microsoft and reliant on the technology industry, entered a recession at a steeper rate than the rest of the country. In response, the city of Seattle engaged in a giant urban renewal project in the south downtown area that centered public financing the erection of new sports stadiums for the Mariners and the Seahawks (McOmber, 2003). The neighborhood is known as SoDo, originally an abbreviation for "south of the Kingdome," but adjusted to be short for "south of downtown" after the Kingdome was demolished and the city took steps to revitalize the area, and, as an exercise in place-making, attempted to commoditize the area as cosmopolitan and trendy as opposed to a giant sea of factories and warehouses). A review of case studies and literature of similar sports stadium-based renewal projects in other cities shows that such a project in SoDo is not likely to cause a long-term economic boon to the neighborhood even if new commercial and residential areas bloom, and may displace the existing residents of the neighborhood and erode the business model of pre-renewal businesses. Unless sports stadium renewal projects come with clear government guidelines to bolster the community surrounding the stadium through zoning, the end result of such projects tends to be a concentration of the neighborhood's resources in the hands of the stadium developer and increased economic disparity.

Background on the SoDo neighborhood

The SoDo neighborhood has about 3,000 residents and is traditionally a warehouse district, a remnant of the city's industrial history and prominence as a shipping destination. It is bordered to the west by the port of Seattle, a massive shipping area, to the east by Interstate 5, the area's main thoroughfare, to the south by another industrial district and to the north by a small strip of the international district and (slightly farther north) by Seattle's central business district (Kramer, 2002).

The revitalization plan for the neighborhood had many parts. The city's implementation plan included provisions for "improvements to the pedestrian environment," improved signage, public art, "event parking for baseball games, football games, and exhibitions," and "a wide variety of traffic system improvements, transit improvements, and parking management efforts aimed at reducing the traffic and parking impacts of these developments" (Seattle 7, 1998). The project also included housing and development projects and an environmental plan known as the "Duwamish Brownfields Strategy" to clean up the environmental toxins and hazards residing from the sector's industrial past and lax environmental regulation.(Seattle, 1998).

The project hinged on three large construction projects: First, there was the redevelopment of the King Street Station-the railroad hub-which included the relocating of Sound Transit's headquarters into the SoDo district (Seattle, 1998). And then there were the two sports stadiums. Previously the Kingdome had served as the stadium for both the Mariners and the Seahawks. A large, ugly functional building, both sports teams demanded new stadiums in order to stay in Seattle, daring civic leaders to let the beloved sports institutions leave and face a difficult re-election. Safeco Field, the Mariners' stadium, cost $517 million, $472 million of which was funded by taxpayers, and Qwest Field, the Seahawks' stadium, cost $430 million, $300 million of which was funded by taxpayers (Fobes 72, 1999). These three projects were the main catalysts for the change in the neighborhood. Images Nos. 1 and 3 show Safeco Field and Qwest Field. They are giant projects and loom over the neighborhood, attracting visitors from around the state and region while dominating the landscape of south downtown.

During the discussion of the revitalization project there were many worries aired about the problems of gentrification. There were worries that it would price the port out of competition. "We can have condos and sports stadiums lots of places," said Pat Davis, a pro-business activist who brought the World Trade Organization to Seattle in 1999, "but you can't bring container ships up Third Avenue" (Howland Jr., 2004).

There were also worries that the neighborhood's profitable warehouse businesses would not be able to afford the higher rents of a more yuppified neighborhood. In the 1990s an artistic community had begun to develop in the SoDo neighborhood and many people worried that they too would be driven from the neighborhood by a new mixed-use model for the neighborhood (McOmber, 2003).

Literature Review

The economic impact of sports stadiums has been studied in a lot of academic literature of both urban studies and geography. Case studies tend to show that stadiums have positive economic impact, but that this impact is not localized in the communities where the stadiums are built. One study in Chicago showed that "of the construction jobs, about 2 percent would go to residents within a mile" of the construction and that "local residents hired are likely to earn less than the average construction worker because of discrimination in the construction industry." The study further showed that "of the permanent jobs, about a third would go to local residents" but that "these jobs would mostly be low-paying, lower level administrative and service jobs" (Steinhoff 1, 1987). It has also been shown that "there is no direct evidence that a sports center would increase the pace or scope of" commercial development, although stadiums near central businesses tend to be surrounded by commercial activity (Steinhoff 2, 1987).

But some stadiums do tend to produce something called a "'ballpark village'-a mixed use development to be developed by the [team] for the use of the entire city," which can be beneficial to the city. In a ballpark village property-values increase in the short term but "long-term outcomes can only be conjectured for now" (Bentley 73, 2006). However, stadiums tend to contain many commercial and retail facilities such as souvenir shops and restaurants within their campus, which can lower the economic benefit of the stadium that the surrounding neighborhood feels (Curry 43, 2004). Ballpark villages may have positive externalities in terms of their effect on the decisions of the surrounding neighborhood (Graham 462, 2002). "The local business community may become involved in different ways than in the past, as new ballpark village businesses may complement or threaten existing offerings. Residents may become more interested in the process since they may now be able to influence what additional products and services are made available to them" (Bentley 75, 2008). Yet the built environment of SoDo, a teeming concrete mess of expensive parking lots, interstate overchanges, and wide arterials, does little to encourage the development of a livable community to be sold to a city already inundated with popular, branded neighborhoods such as Capitol Hill and University Avenue and popular tourist destinations such Pike Place Market and the Space Needle. In fact the Space Needle only cost $4.5 million to build and now its an internationally recognized symbol of the city that draws tourists and promotes a civic identity and has had immeasurable positive growth for the city, while building a new stadium does little for the regional economy (Howland Jr. 3 2004). Urban renewal projects, if planned correctly, need not be costly to provide large-scale advantages to cities.

In reality, in SoDo, so far the change to the local economy and neighborhood has not been as dramatic as it may have been hoped. The main draws around the neighborhood remain the sports stadiums; surrounded by parking lots and highway interchanges, the district has seen little redevelopment or rebranding of the neighborhood as a destination for something other than a ballgame and an Ichiroll. There has been relatively little gentrification, and the warehouse district is still largely intact (Caupin, 2004).

However, it is still early. The Seahawks stadium only opened in 2002, (McMahon, 2002) and many effects on the neighborhood could take years or decades to play out. Already, the price of homes and retail space in the international district-the area between SoDo and downtown-has risen and some residents have been priced out (Caupin 13, 2004). Image No. 2 shows an Industrial City apartment building with a first floor repurposed as a commercial bar to serve patrons of Seattle Mariners and Seahawks games. Apartments such as this have gone up in price since the beginning of the urban renewal project, drawing customers and thus profitability from the new stadium amenities.

There have been additional plans to continue the urban renewal in the SoDo neighborhood with a large building project on the waterfront near the port. Frank Stagen, a local real estate magnate, has proposed building "an iconic structure similar to the Sydney Opera House amidst a 21st-century creative community of housing offices, and green space." These projects have faced setbacks due to chronic budget setbacks and other funding sinkholes such as the gargantuan Alaskan Way Viaduct (Howland Jr. 4, 2004).

The long-term effects of Safeco Field, Qwest Field and King Street station are not yet evident in the SoDo neighborhood. However, examples of sports stadiums in other cities seem to suggest that the economic benefit of these large-scale renewal projects is ambiguous at best and often harmful for the inner city's residents (Zirin, 2007). In many cases the economic benefit goes mostly to the rich developers of stadiums who enrich themselves on the profits from publicly-funded stadiums. While the stadiums do tend to provide jobs in the short run, the jobs are often low-paying, and in the long-term, the stadiums can erode communities and provide less wealth to the communities than they invested. What is the worth of low-paying jobs to a neighborhood that doesn't provide affordable housing options, and thus forces employees to live farther away and commute? Seattle officials would be wise to wait to see the consequences of the current renewal projects before engaging in any new ones. Indeed, after the construction of these two behemoths, the city stubbornly refused to publicly finance a new stadium for the Seattle Supersonics; after a contentious legal battle, the new owners of the team promptly moved a professional sports team with a 40-year history to Oklahoma City, eager to construct a publicly financed stadium of their own.

An overarching lesson that Seattle officials can gain from other cities' attempts at using sports stadiums for urban renewal projects is that certain parameters have to be set for the projects to be successful. Handing out large contracts to firms to construct and build a stadium and community will do little to truly build the urban scene. Instead, these firms will not have motivation to incorporate the whole community into the construction and realization of the stadium-they will not hire local workers. Neither will they have more than a peripheral motivation to provide for community building outside of the gates of the stadium. It behooves a stadium-builder to put the restaurants and shops inside the stadium so as to maximize the profits they realize, which can lead to a gaping disparity between the outside of the stadium and the inside.

Instead, Seattle officials should use economic leverage to ensure that the building of stadiums work as true urban renewal projects to stimulate not just the stadium, but the community. Officials can put in mandates in their contracts with the stadium-builders that stadiums higher a certain percentage of their workers from locals or that they higher construction workers from the local workforce. Seattle officials should be careful also about the risks of pricing citizens out of their neighborhoods. Steps can be taken to keep prices down in the neighborhoods and to make sure that the neighborhoods retain their character and that their citizens are brought along with the revitalization, not left behind it.

Sources

Bentley, Anna O. 2006. It takes a ballpark village: stadiums, coalitions, and growth in two cities. Thesis (M.C.P.)-Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 2006.

Caupin, Andrea. 2004. Community power, corporate welfare and major league baseball: a case study of Safeco Field. Thesis (M.P.A.)-The Evergreen State College, 2004.

Conklin, Ellis. "It's gritty, blue collar and sometimes home." Seattle Post-Intelligencer, April 11, 1998.

Curry, Timothy J., Kent P. Schwirian, and Rachael Woldoff. 2004. High stakes: big time sports and downtown redevelopment. Urban life and urban landscape series. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Fobes, Natalie, Frank Wetzel, and John W. Ellis. 1999. Diamond in the Emerald City: the story of Safeco Field. Seattle, Wash: Seattle Mariners.

Graham, J. Todd. 2002. "The neighborhood-friendly stadium". Sage Urban Studies Abstracts. 30 (4): 415-517.

Howland Jr., George. "So Long, Sodo." Seattle Weekly, April 28, 2004.

Kramer, Ari. "SoDo rezone pits industry against developers." Urban Development. September 26, 2002.

McMahon, Patrick. "Projects Building Up Seattle." USA Today, August 9, 2002.

McOmber, J. Martin and Seattle Times business reporter. "Big Urban Playground for South of Downtown? Vision Includes Grand Park, Lake, 10,000 Apartments." The Seattle Times, February 7, 2003.

Phillips, E. Barbara. 1996. City lights: urban-suburban life in the global society. New York: Oxford University Press.

Seattle (Wash.). 1998. Implementation plan: proposed south downtown investment strategy. Seattle, Wash: The Office.

Steinhoff, Stephen. 1987. A new sports stadium: can it bring economic benefits to residents of the Near West Side? [Chicago]: Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement, University of Illinois at Chicago.

Zirin, Dave. 2007. Welcome to the Terrordome: the pain, politics, and promise of sports. Chicago, Ill: Haymarket Books.