Shiloh: The Federal Right

The fighting at Shiloh on 6 April quickly devolved into several separate battles. The fighting on the Federal left was to be dominated by a position now known as the Hornet's Nest. On the Federal right a counterattack was organized under fire, numerous fighting withdrawals were executed, and several stalwart defensive lines were accomplished in the face of fierce enemy attacks. To two officers, one a trained professional the other a political appointee, fell the responsibility of holding the Federal right flank with predominately green troops, some of whom had never been issued ammunition before that day, and with many officers who had never commanded as much as a corporal's guard in combat. And it was at Shiloh that a professional American army was born.

In early April of 1862 the Federal Army of the Tennessee was encamped at Crump's Landing and Pittsburg Landing, on the western shore of the Tennessee River twenty-two air miles northeast of Corinth, Mississippi. Crump's was not suitable for encamping the entire Federal army (some 46,000 men total). Most of the army -- five of six divisions, amounting to 39,000 -- was encamped at Pittsburg Landing six miles upriver (south). The Tennessee River flows south to north at Pittsburg Landing.

Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the army, had been convinced that entrenchment was not necessary at either place. It was thought by many that it was less important to entrench than it was to train the army for the push on Corinth that would start when Don C. Buell and his 17,000 man Army of the Ohio arrived in the area. Grant was convinced that any major rebel attack, unlikely though he considered it to be, would fall on Crump's Landing, and not until 8 April at earliest. He thought that the morale of the Confederate forces at Corinth was quite low after the string of Federal victories so far that year, and any movement on their part was going to be half-hearted, at best.

Part of this attitude stemmed from Grant's prior experience in Missouri in 1861, and his stunning successes at Forts Henry and Donelson. After Missouri Grant did not much care what the enemy did or might do; an attitude unusual among Civil War generals. He further thought that a lack of entrenchments would serve to bait the enemy, that trenches could not be built in the area that would enclose the encampment, and that "digging ditches" would dull the men's fighting edge. The fact was that there were no defensive fortifications and few defensive plans made in the Pittsburg Landing area.

For days before that fateful April Sunday Grant had heard reports of skirmishing with Confederate cavalry patrols and the occasional infantry formation, but he was unperturbed. At the same time he received reports of low rebel morale, so as late as 5 April he reported no anxiety or inkling of an imminent attack to Henry Halleck, the Union theater commander. Grant was convinced that Albert S. Johnston's Army of the Mississippi was more than twenty miles away, cowering in Corinth.

East of the Methodist meeting house near the Shiloh Branch Creek, Jesse Hildebrand's 3rd Brigade of Sherman's division had pitched its tents as the left extent of Sherman's camps, and had ignored orders about facing and spacing of regimental camps. Some four hundred yards and a spring separated one of its regiments from the main body. About 650 yards separated Sherman's left-most camp from Prentiss's right-most. Ralph Buckland's 4th Brigade was just to the north of Hildebrand, with his left flank on the meeting house and his right on the Pittsburg-Corinth Road. John McDowell's 1st Brigade was camped to the north of Buckland with a frontage of almost half a mile for four regiments. Far detached from the rest of Sherman's division, David Stuart's 2nd Brigade was encamped in a marshy area near the Tennessee River.

McClernand's division was encamped to the east and north of Sherman's. Abraham Hare commanded the 1st Brigade, encamped at Jones Field just west of the Tilghman Branch Creek. Half a mile south just north of Woolf Field was the 2nd Brigade, led by C. Carroll Marsh. Leonard Ross ostensibly commanded the 3rd Brigade, but was away from the area, leaving the command to James Reardon. But Reardon was sick, and the command fell to Julius Raith. Raith was encamped almost on the Hamburg-Purdy Road.

Sherman during this time showed an uncanny ability to look in the wrong place at the right time. Despite the fact that his division was being reorganized just before the battle (on the 5th he had no cavalry of his own) there were some measures that he may have taken such as increasing picket strength or reorganizing the camps. He was reluctant to react to any alarms, he told his wife in a letter, and was frightened of being accused of being unbalanced again and losing command for good. For that reason he remained adamant that no attack was pending, despite growing evidence to the contrary.

As early as 3 April McDowell's pickets and patrols had taken rebel prisoners who claimed large forces were coming up from Corinth. On 4 April one of McDowell's regiments fought with over 200 Confederate cavalry for more than two hours, and found large infantry forces supported by artillery to the west. Though Sherman heard the fighting and alerted a force to repel a small attack, he rebuked the officers involved for forcing a battle. On the same day one of Hildebrand's regiments reported seeing a large force of enemy infantry a quarter mile from his picket lines. When it was reported to Sherman, the division commander ordered the men making the report arrested for reporting falsely. When Hildebrand confirmed the report after riding out himself, Sherman dismissed it as nothing more than a reconnoitering party, or some cavalry with artillery.

Another report of large enemy forces in the area on 5 April was similarly dismissed. Buckland's troops had participated in the picket actions of the 4th and 5th, losing three officers and fifteen men on the 5th. Ironically, Sherman seemed more concerned for his isolated 2nd Brigade as the Lick Creek to Stuart's south dropped three feet. A quick reconnaissance on 5 April found no signs of rebel activity, satisfying Sherman for the moment. Ironic because Stuart was to be one of the least engaged units in the battle.

Grant, who made his headquarters nine miles downriver at Savannah, inspected the camps every day and commuted back to a well-built mansion every night. After days of torrential spring rains and a fall from his horse on 4 April, he was in no mood to violate his chief's (Halleck's) orders not to bring about any engagement before Buell arrived. On 5 April he welcomed the arrival of Jacob Ammen and his brigade of Buell's army at Savannah. Ammen had been a friend of Grant since childhood, and his arrival meant that the weeks of relative inactivity would soon end and the offensive against Corinth could begin.

Just after sunrise (0610) on 6 April a detachment from one of Hildebrand's regiments returned to camp on the eastern edge of the Rhea Field with disturbing news. They had seen an enemy scouting patrol and had heard heavy firing about a quarter-mile to the left. They were convinced that large enemy forces were approaching. Minutes later a wounded Missouri solder, from the patrol from Prentiss's division that had been fighting since 0330, ran into camp shouting that the rebels were approaching.

Hildebrand passed the information to Sherman, who was still not convinced of an attack, but alerted the brigade anyway. Almost as soon as they had assembled the Rebels broke the woodline on the west edge of the field, on the right flank of the freshly-formed brigade. The Federals fell back as the sick, teamsters, cooks and a few others ran to the rear. At about the same time Buckland's pickets had been driven back under fire, and a regiment was sent forward to reinforce the line.

At about 0700 Sherman, seeing long gray ranks of advancing Confederates at Rhea Field, exclaimed, "By God, we are attacked!" Moments later he was wounded in the hand by a Confederate volley. He sent a message to McClernand asking for support on his left, between Hildebrand and Prentiss. Just after this he took his staff into the Rhea Field in front of Hildebrand's brigade and was fired on by Confederate pickets just then crossing the Shiloh Branch Creek. Most of the Confederates that he could see were passing off to his left, towards the rather large gap between his left and Prentiss. For the time being he remained at his headquarters near the Shiloh Church.

Meanwhile McClernand was the only division commander who suspected a major attack as soon as he heard the shooting at about 0710. He sent a rider off to find Sherman to get information. Shortly Sherman's messenger stated that he was under attack and in need of support. Badly positioned for quick, effective movement in any direction he sent his 3rd Brigade to help Sherman's center on the north edge of Rhea Field. Raith was completely surprised not only by the attack (the brigade he was to command had started receiving fire between 0730 and 0745) but by his orders to move and command the brigade.

At about the same time, Grant and his staff at Savanna heard the dark boom of artillery and began to move to the Landing. While preparing he sent messages to Lew Wallace at Crump's and to Buell on the march. The message to Lew Wallace was cause controversy later, but the one to Buell urged him to get his troops to Pittsburg Landing as soon as possible.

By 0730 Hildebrand's brigade, joined by Alan Waterhouse's Illinois light artillery battery, had reformed and was slamming the advancing greyclad lines with volley after volley. Waterhouse's battery had received their horses only ten days before and had drilled with them exactly three times. They had never fired a single round from their guns before 6 April. Waterhouse was joined by Samuel Barrett's battery of Illinois light artillery, who brought his guns to bear on the Confederate guns that had been firing on the meetinghouse area. No one flinched when a rebel shell blew up a caisson.

At 0745 two Mississippi regiments attacked Hildebrand's line without support, and in a few minutes one of the Confederate units had suffered 71% casualties. A few moments later one of Hildebrand's regiments was ordered to retreat by its commander. Another fell back a few moments after that. Between them they had lost 11 men. Soon Hildebrand's rear was in chaos, and Sherman's left was held by one regiment, a scattering of two others, and two green artillery batteries being commanded by a sixty-two year old former stage coach driver and militia general (Hildebrand).

By 0800 Sherman was finally satisfied that the Confederates were making a determined attack on his positions, but he was also satisfied for the moment that he was in good shape because Raith's brigade was arriving on his left. McClernand was moving to his satisfaction by filling the gap between Sherman's left and Prentiss' right, and the lines appeared to be holding.

As soon as the rebel forces started to capture the Federal camps, hungry southerners began to forage for food. Some of Johnston's men had not eaten in three days, others longer. Indiscriminate, unaimed firing by the raw troops may have expended a great deal of ammunition ineffectively, causing some Confederate regiments to seek ammunition as early as 0800. This attrition in the rebel ranks helped the Federal forces when it was needed most, reducing Confederate firepower and numbers at the critical moment when the psychological effects of the surprise attack were the greatest.

Near 0800 Buckland's brigade in Sherman's center advanced towards the Shiloh Creek, and encountered a Confederate brigade struggling in the marshlands on both sides of the creek. In perfect enfilade Buckand's men cut loose at ranges as short as thirty yards, reducing one greyclad regiment by a third in a few moments. The rebels pushed forward but again ran into Barrett's well-sited battery and George Nispel's Illinois light guns in the center of Buckland's line. For the moment the Confederate surge was checked by four regiments and two batteries, but it was not to last. A rebel grand battery was building south of the creek, and by 0800 six Confederate guns were concentrating on Nispel's battery, knocking out one gun.

At about 0830 Grant's headquarters steamer pushed off from Crump's Landing, and soon Grant received a message from WHL Wallace. It stated that that the center and right flanks of the camps had been pushed back. Grant replied that when he arrived they would surround the enemy. By the time he arrived at Pittsburg Landing by 0900 there were about 3,000 stragglers and non-combatant refugees huddled under the bluff.Ibid. By the end of the day as much as a quarter of Grant's army would be there.

At about 0900 Sherman realized by the sound of the fighting that Prentiss was falling back. At the same time two of Hildebrand's already shaky regiments disintegrated, and Sherman's left was open as far back as Waterhouse's battery and Raith's regiments, about a quarter mile to the rear. Soon Raith fell wounded and his brigade fell back, exposing Waterhouse's guns. By 0930 Sherman's left was turned and was streaming to the rear, the rebels had captured half of Waterhouse's guns (although they were so damaged they could not be repaired), and Johnston appeared to be on his way to victory.

As this was happening McClernand started to move his other two brigades to support Sherman's left. In the deteriorating situation he thought better of it, and instead took up a strong defensive position on a ridge overlooking Review Field, north of the east-west Corinth Road, about a half mile northeast of Sherman's headquarters. This decision, based on equal parts of luck, skill and timidity, likely saved Sherman's forces and the whole of the Federal right by providing an anchor on which to rally when Sherman's whole line broke an hour later.

At 0930 the Confederates put forth a concentrated effort, joined by the last of Johnston's fresh troops, that finally dislodged Hildebrand's remnants and Buckland's stalwarts just as Frederick Behr's all-German Indiana artillery battery arrived from McDowell's brigade to replace Barrett's exhausted gunners. Behr was killed almost instantly and his battery fled, abandoning five of their six guns.

But now it was McDowell's turn. He had sent one regiment forward to support Buckland (who was now retreating) and had only two regiments left. Only lightly engaged until just before 1000, he knew that with Buckland's retreat there was nothing for him to do but pull back northeast to the Crescent Field and the Hamburg-Purdy Road. Of all of Grant's army on the front lines only McDowell's brigade retreated in good order, owing to a great deal to confusion in the Rebel ranks. By 1000 Sherman's entire division except Stuart was in retreat, but they had held up four rebel brigades for some four hours. The fight for the control of the Rhea and Howell fields had seen seven Confederate attacks ranging in size from a single regiment to two brigades repulsed with great loss. Through it all Sherman had remained cool and collected.

Raith's exhausted brigade fell in on the right of McClernand's line by 0930. At about 1000 Sherman met Grant for the first time that day, on Jones Field, about a mile northeast of the Shiloh Church. By 1030 Raith's brigade, linked with the rest of the division only visually because of the Water Oaks Pond to its left, wavered and fell apart. Carroll Marsh's brigade was next on the right of the division line. Edward McAllister's Illinois battery of 24-pounder howitzers, at the center of the brigade line, was overrun by a bold rush that also felled a colonel of one of Marsh's regiments, which then fell apart in confusion. Marsh's regiments peeled off the line one by one after that, losing ten of sixteen officers in one regiment alone and allowing the surging rebels to capture two more batteries in succession.

A rebel charge across the Review Field was met with heavy fire from Hare's brigade. Before the gray line reached the woods on the north edge of the field Hare's brigade had fled, their flanks open and completely without support. As they ran away they encountered James Veach's brigade of Hurlbut's division. Veach had marched in behind Marsh at about 1000, but the sudden breakup of Marsh's brigade caused one of his three regiments to fall apart in confusion, and gradually Veach's command broke for the rear. By 1020 the Confederates were in compete possession of the Pittsburg-Corinth Road and McClernand's division was no more than a group of refugees being pursued by a disorganized but jubilant Confederate force.

By 1130 Sherman and McClernand had managed to organize a line north of the Pittsburg-Corinth Road with whatever troops they could reach. A grand battery of nine guns, consisting of the remnants of Sherman's artillery commanded by Ezra Taylor, moved to a ridge at the south of Jones Field. While the Confederates became preoccupied with these guns, Sherman and McClernand gathered up more bits and pieces of their commands, in all members of fourteen regiments, to move up to the guns in a counterattack. The artillery survivors dueled with Confederate guns for half an hour, withdrawing eight guns when their ammunition was expended.

At about noon Grant returned and told Sherman to hold on as long as he could. The Federal counterattack threw the Confederates into some confusion, capturing a Georgia battery. McDowell's brigade got the worst of the Confederate fire, and was reduced by a third. Two fresh Iowa regiments, having just received their first issues of ammunition, joined the attack. Gradually the counterattack slowed and reversed, so that by 1300 the Federals had returned to their starting positions.

By then the Confederates had shifted their attention to the Federal left and the position that would later gain fame as the Hornet's Nest. Altogether 3/5 of the Confederate Army would spend half the day reducing this position. Of the remainder, only half continued to press the attack on Sherman and McClernand's exhausted commands.

By 1500 the two remaining Federal divisions on the right had fallen back under steady if indifferent pressure until Buckland's brigade reached Perry Field, a mile northeast of the Shiloh Church and a mile and a half due west of the Pittsburgh Landing. At 1530 they were joined by Edward Bouton's Illinois battery and soon by Andrew Hickenlooper's battery, a refugee from the nightmare in the Hornet's Nest. The main object of the Federals on the right had been to keep the rebels west of the Tilghman Branch Creek so that Lew Wallace's division, rumored to be arriving any minute, would be able to come down the Hamburg-Savanna Road and the Snake Creek Bridge to the battle. This position, held by whatever troops Sherman could get into line, served as the right anchor for what was called Grant's Last Line defending Pittsburgh Landing (which was in sight), the means of either retreat or reinforcement for the hard-pressed Federals.

To the east of Sherman's weary regiments McClernand's battered veterans faced south and west, parallel to the Pittsburgh-Corinth Road, intermixed with survivors of the Hornet's Nest including Jacob Lauman's brigade. To McClernand's front and left were the substantial artillery reserves of the army and every gun that Grant's staff could muster, including monstrous siege rifles. McClernand's brigades were in their last positions by 1700. This final position contained somewhere in the vicinity of 18,000 men, after Lew Wallace and his wandering command finally arrived.

The Confederate commander, Albert S. Johnston, had died about 1430, leaving a brief command vacuum in the rebel ranks and causing a momentary lull in the fighting. By 1600 the battle renewed its fury, mostly directed against the Hornet's Nest, but also against Sherman's positions north of the Mulberry Field, which was also covered by one of McAllister's 24-pounders. 41 percent of a Louisiana regiment was killed in a single attack. Another battalion minutes later lost 90 of 150. These were sacrificial attacks were intended to allow greater Confederate concentration on the Hornet's Nest. But McClernand's and Sherman's frazzled men were content with repulsing the Confederates at great loss. Time was on their side, and they seemed to know it.

As the Hornet's Nest collapsed, starting at about 1600, the refugees lucky enough to be able to get out of the cauldron ran north, some into Sherman's lines. There was little hope of stopping them, and no hope of organizing them at the time. McClernand's men reacted slightly differently: Some of his regiments broke up, but were repositioned along the road by 1700. At about that time Jacob Ammen's brigade arrived opposite Pittsburg Landing, meaning that Buell's army had arrived. The Confederates were at least as spent as the Federals, and Lew Wallace's scouts were in sight of Sherman. The crisis of the first day at Shiloh was over: Sunset came at 1810 and the Confederate attacks sputtered to a halt. There were more than 16,000 casualties on the field.

Not since Bull Run had two more pathetically untrained armies been committed to combat. Though the ultimate responsibility for training and dispositions belonged to Grant, it was Sherman who had tactical responsibility for the initial defense. As the only professionally-trained division commander in the Federal army his actions before the battle can be seen as somewhere between simple negligence and outright incompetence. Though he would overcome his early errors with his cool demeanor and brilliant command for the rest of the battle, his disdain for volunteer officers and disbelief of any information that did not suit his purposes would remain throughout the war. His physical courage in rallying the Federal right flank after sustaining two minor wounds and having three horses shot out from under him was indeed exemplary.

McClernand was a different story altogether. As senior officer at the Landing he was technically in command in Grant's absence, but Grant relied instead on Sherman, a military professional. McClernand's actions on that fateful Sunday, while somewhat less well known than Sherman's, were nonetheless at least as creditable as the other divisions commanders, even if his veteran troops acted more like recruits early in the battle.

The officers and men of Grant's army showed a great deal more cooperation than may have been imaginable before the battle, despite their differences and lack of training, to face the crisis at hand. Simply marching to the sound of the guns was not enough by 1862, and was certainly not adequate in the chaos of the fields, woods and creeks around Pittsburg Landing. Being caught in the camps was one thing, but being unable to coordinate with adjacent commands would be fatal later in this conflict. Grant concluded that he, his army, and his generals had a great deal to learn.

The green Union solders themselves performed better than anyone could have initially hoped for, surprised in many cases at their Sunday breakfast (none but the sick were in their tents as some press reports had it). They fell into formation when the threat became clear, mostly obeying orders regardless of who gave them, sought defensive terrain, fell back in good order in most cases, and even participated in a successful counterattack that forced the retreat of forces twice their size. As one officer said after the war, green troops will either run away at once or not at all.

The US Army tradition of fighting withdrawal under arduous conditions was born at Shiloh in April of 1862. For more than eleven hours and army built of new citizen-soldiers fought like veterans, ran away like green troops, recovered themselves like soldiers, and fought again like veterans, ignoring the dangerous odds against them. Though the Federal right at Shiloh has often been overshadowed by incredible courage and stamina of Prentiss, W.H.L. Wallace and Hurlbut around the Hornet's Nest, it nonetheless stands on its own as being in the forefront of US Army defensive actions under fire against determined attacks.