Shiloh: The North's Dilemma

Nearing the end of the first year of the war, there was very little to indicate that a decisive battle was at hand. The Northern armies, despite greater material and manpower resources, seemed unable, to make an appreciable dent in the Southern forces, and could not, as had once been hoped, give them a decisive blow that may make them reconsider their rebellion.

Northern President Lincoln, a railroad lawyer from Illinois who was unfamiliar with the requirements of war or even of the presidency, accepted military advice from all sides and acted on some. His armies had showed themselves to be a mediocre lot, his generals well-meaning but mostly incapable of handling large forces. The first major ground action of the war at Bull Run had been a qualified disaster for the Army of Virginia (an embarrassing spectacle watched by hundreds of Washington civilians). Though triumphant, the Confederates had been unable or unwilling to follow-up on their victory at Manassas and enter the Federal capital. This simple fact was one that few seized on at the time, and which showed that the Rebel forces were perhaps not the indomitable host that they made themselves out to be.

Since then a number of battles in Missouri and Arkansas had at least kept the rebels from seizing those strategic states entirely, and Kentucky had been persuaded to declare neutrality.

Lincoln and other savvy Northern planners knew that Kentucky and Missouri were the keys to the entire western half of the country. Kentucky's northern border was the Ohio and Cumberland Rivers, and who controlled them controlled access to the coal pits of Virginia and Pennsylvania, not to mention access to the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers.

And who controlled Kentucky held the gateway to Missouri, which comprised the whole western flank of Illinois, the southern border of Iowa, much of the banks of the upper Mississippi, and the clear path to not just to Kansas and Nebraska, but also to the gold fields of California and the silver mines of Nevada that provided specie to the cash-starved eastern seaboard. Fighting in Missouri and Kansas had been going on for nearly a decade over slavery questions alone, but now the issues were larger even than that. Fighting in Kentucky had been sporadic, but the South didn't seem strong enough to occupy more than a few spots, notably the heights of Columbus overlooking the junction of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.

While the strategic situation for the Union was a jumble of exaggerated "needs" from governors and generals alike, Lincoln's armies did not seem to be losing any ground nor appreciable numbers of troops (though the death toll from disease was appalling) or amounts of material. The current losses would easily be made up because at the moment men seemed to be tumbling from the sky to volunteer, and Northern industries started delivering on the numerous contracts for weapons and equipment.

But what the North needed was a general in command of an army that could win, and win consistently, without having to stop to catch its breath after victory or to demand massive reinforcements after a setback. Some of what Lincoln saw was encouraging.

George B. McClellan of Ohio had managed to maneuver a small Confederate force out of northwestern Virginia that had been commanded by prewar Army star Robert E. Lee who had resigned to serve with his native Virginia. Ambrose E. Burnside of Indiana had managed to put a force ashore on the Barrier Islands off the Carolinas, helping to secure the Hatteras Inlet and the water gateway to Washington. William T. Sherman of Ohio and George H. Thomas of Virginia had managed to hold onto the Cumberland Gap despite whisperings of the unfitness of the former and the suspect loyalty of the latter.

Finally, Ulysses S. Grant of Illinois had had some spectacular successes in Tennessee, despite an early setback at Belmont, MO. He had secured the northern Tennessee and Cumberland rivers by seizing two fortresses in two weeks, in company with Andrew Foote's gunboats, using surprise, economy of force and, gratefully, a lack of complaining or pleas for more resources. This had forced the Rebels out of their strongpoint at Columbus without firing a shot, forced the Confederate evacuation of Nashville, bagged over 7,000 prisoners, and secured most of middle Tennessee and the Mississippi as far south as Island Number 10, all achieved using green troops.

While Congress and the Northern public had Grant's name on their lips (changed by an eager press to Unconditional Surrender Grant), Henry Wager Halleck, Grant's boss and commander of the western theater, who was known in the prewar army as "Old Brains," knew that Grant's reputation for drink counted heavily against him, wasn't certain if he should be trusted, and disliked him in any event.

Other army officers in blue had mixed opinions of Grant, ranging from absolute loyalty to open loathing; unfortunately for Grant among the loathing officers were some of his immediate peers and superiors. However, success on the battlefield can make up for many sins, and Grant's signal victory at Fort Donelson at least quieted the most vocal critics.

But if Halleck disliked Grant, Don Carlos Buell, who commanded the Army of the Ohio in the spring of '62, distrusted Halleck and hated Grant, even though Grant knew Buell not at all and Buell knew Grant only by reputation. William T. Sherman, who had commanded a brigade with great credit at Bull Run and who was regarded by some as insane, respected Grant's ability and cool nerve, and became a division commander under Grant.

Grant looked up the Tennessee River (to the south, since the Tennessee flows from south to north) to the railroad junctions of northern Alabama, and the unique east/west rail line junctions at Corinth, Mississippi. Capturing them would effectively isolate the Trans-Mississippi theater, but getting there would be no simple task. Riverine transport was the only way to supply a mid-19th century army in western North America, but it had never been used on such a large scale with a large volunteer force.

Grant's army was a mixture of veterans of the Henry and Donelson campaigns, their volunteer officers and politically-appointed generals, and green recruits, some of whom had not yet even been issued ammunition. Only Sherman of his division commanders was a professional soldier, and even he had been 10 years out of uniform before Ft. Sumter.

Moving up the Tennessee in mid-March, Grant established his base at Savannah, some 30 miles from the Confederate base and rail junction at Corinth and a little more from the junction at Decatur, Alabama. While not asking for any particular assistance or reinforcements, Grant was told that Buell and his slightly smaller Army of the Ohio was marching to meet him for a combined campaign in northern Alabama and Mississippi. Grant was Buell's senior in rank so whatever Buell's feelings were about Grant they weren't supposed to matter. Two unarmored US Navy gunboats, Lexington and Tyler, steamed up and down the Tennessee on Grant's left flank, occasionally lobbing shells at Confederate cavalry patrols.

Through the latter half of March, there were several alerts and alarms from small groups of Confederate scouts and patrols. Grant's army grew in fits and starts, headquartering at Savannah but with most of its strength farther south at Pittsburg Landing. It was thought at the time that any Rebel attack would fall on Savannah first where, by accident of geography, the camping areas were too small for Grant's whole army.

Grant thought he would advance towards Florence and Corinth and the rail lines, but Buell's idea was more easterly along the Tennessee to Bridgeport, Alabama. The two ideas were not opposed and the two commanders had adequate forces to do either one or both, but their instructions had been to join and act in concert. Unless they could reach some agreement there might be two separate campaigns.

In the spring of 1862 some planners knew that control of the Tennessee River was crucial to the entire western theater. One of them was Grant. Another was Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, the Confederate hero of Bull Run who was second in command of the Confederate forces in the western theater. He had another plan.