Should Public Administrators Make Value Judgments to Promote Equity when Implementing Laws?

Public administrators make value judgments to further equity as they work to implement the law. The question at hand is whether they should or not. In this article I will address some arguments supporting the view that public administrators should make these value judgments, why some observers might find this use of power undesirable, and also my personal view on the issue.

Public administrators work in a culture of change and improvement, and upholding the antidiscrimination statements of public organizations is just the beginning of their work toward social equity. Scholarly research reveals that, for the most part, the American people believe in fairness, justice, and equality and that the processes and rules of policy implementation generally support principles of social equity (Frederickson, 1990). In addition, Frederickson (1990) states that a theory of social equity was designated as the "third pillar" of public administration in 1968, given equal footing with economy and efficiency as foundational principles of public administration (Frederickson, 1990). Thus, it is logical that public administrators necessarily make value judgments in order to promote equity in the provision of public services, within the interpreted intent of the legislation. Because of the vague wording and objectives of policy legislation, public administrators must make value judgments in their interpretation of the policy, and given the culture of social equity in their bureaucracies, it is logical that those value judgments would favor social equity. This is not only expected and desired by the general public, but also supported by the culture of public administration and supported by scholarly research (Frederickson, 1990).

Some observers might find this use of administrative power undesirable because of the nature of human fallibility, a lack of belief in the equality of all humans, or a desire to see the ethic of neutrality in action in public (not just private) bureaucracies. First, some of those who object may be concerned about the personal biases and agendas of those public administrators making the value judgments and their concern that self-interest might interfere with the promotion of social equity. Lipsky (1990) notes that the average street-level bureaucrat regularly faces demands and pressures from multiple directions and often has the opportunity to substitute his or her self- interest for the public interest (Shafritz & Hyde, 2008). However, scholars find that even though these opportunities arise, public administrators and street-level bureaucrats tend to ignore these opportunities (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Instead, they often make their own jobs harder in the pursuit of promoting social equity and responding to the needs of individuals (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000).

Second, there are still some American citizens who do not find the idea of social equity desirable, instead viewing women, minorities, gays and lesbians, the disabled, and the elderly as less worthy than other people. The idea of public servants making value judgments to promote their equality and equitable access to public services is appalling to those small-minded people. In addition, many conservatives and other people do not support the distribution of welfare services to the poor, instead thinking that the poor just need to pull themselves up by their boot straps. They may view the value judgments of public administrators as preventing the poor from making it on their own, or they may feel that the poor should not receive public services they do not pay for. While it is unfortunate that some Americans still feel this way, research supports the idea that most Americans do in fact support social equity (with the exception of gays and lesbians).

Lastly, those more familiar with private bureaucracies than public bureaucracies may be offended by the lack of the ethic of neutrality when considering the scenario of public administrators making value judgments of any kind. The ethic of neutrality does not allow for the exercise of independent moral judgment in policy implementation, beyond what is needed after determining the intent of the legislators and elected officials (Shafritz & Hyde, 2008). However, Thompson (1985) argues "administrative neutrality itself is neither possible nor desirable" (Shafritz & Hyde, 2008, p. 456).

What is my personal view on the issue of public administrators making value judgments in order to provide social equity in the delivery of public services? It's simple. Laws are vaguely written and must be interpreted in order to be implemented. Isn't it best for that interpretation to be as equitable as possible? Woodrow Wilson argued for the "vesting of 'large powers and unhampered discretion' as the indispensable conditions of administrative responsibility" (Kettl & Fesler, 2009, p. 41). The public administrators are the interpreters of laws, the distributors of public services, in a public job with a duty to the public to be as fair and equitable as possible. I fully support the use of value judgments by public administrators when considering the socially equitable provision of public services.

References

Frederickson, H. G. (1990). "Public administration and social equity." Public Administration

Review, 50(2).

Maynard-Moody, S. & Musheno, M. (2000). "State agent or citizen agent: Two narratives of

discretion." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10: 329-358.

Shafritz, J. M. & Hyde, A. C. (2008). Classics of Public Administration. Boston: Wadsworth,

Cengage Learning.