Socrates and The Apology

He is world renown. He is known as the greatest philosophical thinker, ever. His method of teaching is still used by the most advanced professors in our colleges and universities. The result of his trial, told by Plato, seems like the worst wrong committed against humanity and knowledge. But how does Socrates stand up to the Athens legal system? Does he refute Meletus' charges, or just talk around them? Peter J. Steinberger gives his opinion in Was Socrates Guilty as Charged? and will be critiqued in the following pages.

Much literature has been written on Socrates trial in The Apology on various philosophical and cultural implications concerning his sentence of death. Steinberger chooses to put these issues aside and concentrate on Socrates legal guilt. Did he refute Meletus' charges in a way that would have proved him innocent? Or instead was his sentence just considering the way he defended himself in front of the jury in Athens? Steinberger analyzes works by three other authors in defending his case: Reeve's Socrates in the 'Apology' and Brickhouse and Smith's Socrates on Trial and Plato's Socrates. The purpose of this article is "to consider whether, and to what extent, we should be persuaded by their arguments" (Steinberger, p. 13).

The questions that Steinberger asks in this article are 1.) with what crime was Socrates charged? 2.) did he satisfactorily refute his indictment? He answers these specifically in regards to Meletus' interrogation. Reeve and Brickhouse/Smith answer the second question as yes, Socrates did refute his formal charges, but Steinberger moves to prove them wrong.

In the first question Steinberger presents, he has three sub-questions that must be answered to answer the overall question: a.) what was the precise nature of the indictment against Socrates? b.) does Socrates trap Meletus into accusing Socrates of atheism rather than heterodoxy? and c.) if Socrates was guilty of heterodoxy, was he therefore guilty of a crime? (Steinberger, p. 14). The first question and its sub-questions all point to a charge of impiety. If Socrates is charged with heterodoxy, then he does not defend against this charge, but instead defends himself against being an atheist. Reeve and Brickhouse/Smith disagree with this conclusion, saying that Socrates defended himself against both heterodoxy and atheism.

Next the issue of Meletus' role of prosecutor comes up in the search to answer the entrapment question. Reeve and Brickhouse/Smith denote that Meletus was more like a witness and this is why Socrates was allowed to attack him during his defense. Along with this, Reeve says "if this is entrapment, everyone who has ever been cross-examined on a witness stand has been entrapped" (Steinberger, p. 20). Also according to their conclusions, if Meletus said heterodoxy was the charge instead of atheism, then that is the final say. Steinberger agrees with this; however he does not believe that the "witness" Meletus was the deciding factor in Socrates' case. He suggests instead that it was up to the jury to decide if Socrates refuted whatever charge Meletus meant/said. Even the charge of impiety is so broad, that the jury must have taken in consideration everything that could have been thought of as the crime. Since he was found guilty, this idea agrees with Steinberger's claim that Socrates did not formally refute his indictment. Reeve disagrees with this sort of due process of the law.

Believing that Socrates did refute his charges, Reeve and Brickhouse/Smith are concrete in their belief that Meletus' charge was of atheism and not heterodoxy. Steinberger examines how easy Socrates refutes the charge of atheism and how hard this must be for Brickhouse/Smith to explain since they must know that such an absurd charge could not have passed through King Archon's watch. Nor would Meletus risk a heavy fine presenting such an absurd charge in court. The jury must know from this information that heterodoxy is the real charge and they examine Socrates' defense against it. To put it in plain perspective, Steinberger says that the jury must have saw Meletus' charge for what it was, but had to decide if Socrates was guilty of impiety in some other way. Thus the burden was on him to defend himself against the broadest interpretation of his indictment, but instead he defended himself against the narrowest, least conceivable interpretation.

Finally, the answer to the last sub-question: Was Socrates guilty of a crime if he was guilty of heterodoxy? is yes. Steinberger lists several activities that would have been considered impious and heterodoxy falls into the category "denial of the deities of the State, introduction of new divinities ..." (Steinberger, p. 23). This contradicts what Reeve and Brickhouse/Smith state, that Socrates refuted his charges. He was found guilty because his heterodoxy was impious and he did not refute that at all. However, even if heterodoxy was a punishable crime, it was not seen to be punished often in ancient Athens. Socrates' case was extraordinary, in that everyone in the State knew how he taught his students, and what his religious beliefs were. This was a deciding factor in trying him for being impious and corrupting the youth.

If involuntary versus voluntary action had anything to do with the jury's decision, they could have only listened to what Socrates asked Meletus concerning the youth of Athens to make their decision. Instead of asking him who doesn't corrupt the youth, he asks who makes them better, and the jury looks past Meletus' bad answer to see yet another lack of refutation by Socrates. He knowingly teaches the youth his morals, values, etc. and does not refute that in front of Meletus. That is why his proposed punishment of being taken aside by the court and instructed of his wrong-doing is preposterous! He knows what he is doing, educating him on why it is wrong will do no good, and he tells the court this. He is an old dog who cannot learn tricks, and the jury decides his punishment.

Steinberger comes to the conclusion that most literature on Socrates' defense against Meletus' charge is correct, but for the wrong reasons. He says that Socrates' defense is "indeed, unpersuasive; but this becomes clear only when judged explicitly in the light of revisionist arguments to the contrary" (Steinberger, p. 28). He also admits that nothing he has explained in the article is significant enough to prove that Socrates was guilty as charged, but instead shows that the jury in his trial was rational and just.

The literature that Steinberger uses to prove his point is expansive in region, date, and area of study. He uses law books, philosophy books, religion books, and books on Athens' culture. What is most interesting is that he uses a work of one of his colleagues, David Reeve, for 50% of the comparison in his article. This must have been easier since he could have found out every aspect of Reeve's opinion and how to break that down and prove that Socrates did not refute Meletus' charges. Steinberger's choice of Reeve's work, Socrates in the 'Apology', and the two books by Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates on Trial and Plato's Socrates, are a good choice since they are "recent, influential, and highly revisionist works" (Steinberger, p. 1). Steinberger differs from these works in that he criticizes those who have gone before him. It is not knowledgeable that any of the works he references to are written to refute any other works on Socrates' trial. This may be because they focus on philosophical and cultural implications of his trial instead of directly on Meletus' interrogation. All in all, Steinberger's wide variety of sources is to be applauded as they make the article well-rounded and factual about all issues of the trial.

In critique of Steinberger's work, one must first address his questions and how well he answered them. For every question's sub-question, Reeve and Brickhouse/Smith are right there to back up Steinberger in proving his point. He does not slack off in this aspect in any way. There is no speculation to this article. There is only factual information taken from a scholarly wealth of knowledge of Athens and its legal system.

His answers to his questions are very clear and easy to follow. He uses a visual numeric system to make sure the reader doesn't miss a point. His conclusions summarize his supporting arguments, and the reader has the feeling that she has read this before because it is such a good summary. One could basically read the conclusion paragraphs and know exactly what was in the supportive paragraphs for each question.

Steinberger does provide adequate resources for his arguments, and is humble in the statement before he starts the body of his article, "in rejecting their (Reeve and Brickhouse/Smith conclusions, I am not denying the importance and usefulness of their work" (Steinberger, p. 14). Two sentences don't go by without a citation from some work, or a quote from one of the two highest used sources: Reeve or Brickhouse/Smith. This makes Steinberger's work credible in that the reader can comprehensively compare his work to other works and see which one has better evidence.

Overall, Steinberger's article is about Socrates' defense against Meletus. Did he refute the charges, or did he use fancy words to entrap Meletus? With references to Reeve and Brickhouse/Smith, Steinberger shows that Socrates did not formally refute the chargest brought against him and that the Athenian jury was neither irrational or unjust in their sentencing of death. Steinberger's use of questions and sub-questions makes his article very easy to read and easy to get his point across. His use of various academic resources makes the article credible and not a piece of speculation. It is a clear article and even though his ending statement suggests that he doesn't believe he proved whether Socrates was, in fact, guilty as charged, he does what he came here to do. He proved that the jury in Socrates trial did their job. Socrates did not refute the charges brought against him of impiety and he received the punishment for that.