Sons of Thunder

American Privateering in New England During the American Revolution, 1775-1776

Mike A, Yahoo! Contributor Network
Feb 10, 2008 "Share your voice on Yahoo! websites. Start Here."

"Our Heroes they're not daunted when Canhon Balls do fly, For we're refolved to conquer, or bravely we will die. Then roufe all you New England Oakes, give MANLY now a Cheer, Likewise thofe Sons of Thunder who go in Privateers."[1]

Americans went head-to-head with the traditional standing military and navy of the British Empire, while America lacked any traditional fighting force besides militia units on land, and privateering vessels at sea. The important step of evolving a traditional fighting force while at war with a professional, seasoned army was a terrifying experience for colonials. Thus, in defense of themselves, Americans reacted in 1775 with what their traditional means of warfare were up to that point-privateering and militia duty.

This paper will focus on the initiation and success of American privateering during the Revolution. Early privateering efforts reflected the continuity of a European tradition of privateering. Privateers proved their value as long as they remained strategically within their natural role as an individualistic unit. They were so successful, that their efforts at the beginning of the war provided a morale boost for not only the public, but for figures and acquaintances of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. Privateering was limited, however, as a sort of floating militia for the Atlantic coastal network, while the Penobscott Assault proved that upon stepping out of their natural roles, privateers were out of place and failure was immanent. The resemblance is like militia in joint campaign abroad with the Continental Army-it was not their nature to leave their local posts and often proved miserable service.

To back the argument, the paper will bring to light the successes, yet point out limitations, of privateering efforts. Only a professional navy, by tradition, could successfully engage in military operations far away from home, with the gaining of ground as the only strategic motivation. Privateers traditionally required material motivation-which did not align with most military pursuits involving the tackling of huge fortifications with almost suicidal odds, or, the engagement of multiple British men-of-war for the mere purpose of striking enemy vessels. Privateers would rather hit weak enemy logistical units, such as merchant ships, while usually avoiding men-of-war. Their motivation was booty-prizes included hard currencies, the ship itself, naval stores, slaves, powder, ammunition, rifles, and strategic documents, such as enemy strategy and dates of movements, etc. Thus, when Massachusetts threw together in joint action the Continental Navy and a few local privateers in order to lay siege to Fort George in the Penobscot Bay (1779), the joint effort was a failure, because privateers never before undertook an amphibious assault of that magnitude, and would never do so again, due to their traditional role as primarily local units.

This paper looks mostly at 1775 to 1776, because these beginning years of the war mark a period of colonists scrambling to defend themselves by implementing familiar practices, such as militia and privateer duty. No formally recognized American Navy fought in the ocean while the battles of Lexington and Concord ensued. The colonists were a bit reluctant to declare independence from their home land, and so they saw no need for any organized naval existence because that would be extreme defiance, expensive, and a declaration of independence in itself. Soon, as history has noted, that would change, and both a standing navy and army would confront the British along with privateer and militia units.

To add weight to sources cited from the beginning of the war, the paper includes the Penobscot Expedition of 1779 as an attempt to prove that the two differing schools of naval warfare did not work well together. This was the trial and error joint effort between privateers and the American Navy which failed, because as the beginning of the paper will prove, privateers were part of a colonial tradition in support of a larger organized force (formerly the Royal Navy,) and not to be a major supplement of that force. This was much like the usual disappointments Washington faced when militia accompanied the Continental Army abroad.

Since the successes and failures of the American professional navy can be found in any encyclopedia, this paper does not need to delve further into its importance. None would argue that a traditional navy was not important during 18^th century conflicts. However, the activities of many privateering vessels exist in only a few naval surveys, while minor individual activity is hard to find. Christopher Hawkins and George Robert Twelves Hewes have been given semi-heroic identities in the past. Both were privateers at some point, and both were of the lower classes. Many privateers were funded by the rich, and manned by the poor. Robert Morris was among many who backed private ventures from land. But the possibility of striking huge profits at random drew all ranks of society to privateering duty, while a standing navy both paid very little and was very unattractive by tradition and reality.

What about the South? The ship Defence served as American protection in the Chesapeake Bay. "She will cruise in the Bay, and as Occasion may require, proceed up Potowmack and the Captain shall have Orders to contribute every Thing in his Power to the common Defence on all Occasions." However, everything in 'his' power was very limited, because, "Our inexperience in naval Preparations prevents us at present from either approving or disapproving your Plan of...Protection." Along with that, powder was in a very short supply, with the meager local navy standing in line after the state militia waiting for re-supply.[2]

Legal Pirates were a Tradition of Sea Warfare

While being a part of imperial warfare at home and abroad, many American colonials and British set sail under the officially licensed and romanticized job as privateer. These merchants and adventurers left their land legs at home, and joined the ranks of seamen to not only skim from the top of the French Empire's fortune, but also to agitate enemy commerce as well. Their livelihood from then on was as unstable as the sea, with its moments of peaceful, gentle rocking interrupted by the violent hand of crashing waves, which during a storm tried each man and decided who could remain alive, and who would be cast into the hungry blue sea. The fear of certain judgment kept the men working under the whistle of the boatswain, because nobody knew when disease would strike, or when hunting French patrols would find and kill every last one of them. Unity on board the vessel adhered to whatever codes the captain had for them. Privateering vessels, then, were organized locally, and sought any enemy ship-regardless of strategic value-that they could catch. What the future held for each man was mysterious, and anything could go wrong, as with any military unit. Their fears, however, could be put to rest when the Royal Navy was on patrol. This traditional organization protected colonial assets and could survive any standoff with the French fleet. Privateers, then, were used to inflict major damages alongside the British Navy, but have been given light historical credit for their part in the wars of 1739-1748 and the French and Indian War.[3] After this period, privateer duty slowed down, until once again, the waters of the Atlantic boiled for blood.

Upon the opening of the American Revolution, volunteers once again applied for privateer licenses from their state council. This practice was nothing new for this period of time in European history, but the Americans, by the time of Revolution, were culturally splitting from Europe. One European element that Americans did not have was a traditional standing navy. State councils and the Continental Congress licensed privateers. These Americans who set sail for the romantic and dangerous life of a pirate were alone on the sea. They had no other protection unless aided by the shot of a nearby port fortification. In turn, these vessels antagonized the British with pride and the desire for profit.

Advantages of a Traditional Role

On both July 4^th and 5^th of 1775, after passing on news regarding the burning of "Charleston," Thomas Jefferson told Francis Eppes (Grandson) and George Gilmer both that New England was beginning to fit out privateering vessels to attack "every thing below ships of war."[4] Rumors must have been spreading throughout the war hungry colonies that the British were obviously being confronted on land, but also that an effort would meet them at sea. Jefferson was giving sound information. A rage for privateering thus went far beyond New England ports. William Gordan, writing from Jamaica in October of 1775, pleaded with John Adams that privateers had proven themselves in the past, and to "let the Congress give out letters of m[5]

Almost anyone could participate in the rage, despite economic deficiencies. Elbridge Gerry, writing to John Adams in 1775, wrote that,

"The late Act and Resolve for fitting out armed Vessels in this Colony, I apprehend will have a good Effect, having already animated the Inhabitants of the Seaports who were unable to command much property, to unite in Companies of twenty or thirty Men and go out in Boats of 8 or 10 Tons Burthen which they call "Spider Catchers". One of these last Week bro[ugh]t in two prizes, the last of which was a Vessell of 100 Tons burthen from Nova Scotia loaded with potatoes and 8 or 10 head of Cattle."[6]

Immediately by 1775, the successes of American privateers were being made public. Patriot Boston Gazette identified Captain Manley's local privateering adventures and his sort of reign of terror imposed upon British supply movements across the Atlantic heading toward British forces in Boston. A contemporary reader of the article learned that this American took four British ships of different weights, all consisting of food stores, ammo, powder, and various supplies. Two captured ships named were the Lee and Nancy. The article makes sure to mention the fact that the captured Lee was used against her original owners in the capturing of the Nancy! Prisoners of war were interned, and cannons were captured, along with various other important prizes. Beyond that, the public was seeing British munitions and supplies being used instantly against the Empire by seeing a former Royal ship serve the American cause. A slap in the face to the British, and a morale boost to any patriot reader, it must be imagined.

Also, the article identified Beverly, Cape Anne, and Salem as popular prize ports right within the Massachusetts area. More significantly, the usually confidant British Navy was identified here as "equipping Men of war Schooners with Hay, wood &c. on their Decks, to Decoy our [7] The next day, the Pennsylvania Evening Post reported an exact enumeration of the articles taken from the Nancy. It is amazing to see such a variety of stores, supplies, and military articles taken from the British and supplied to the Revolutionaries. Two-thousand "Muskets, bayonets, scabbards, cartouch boxes, and tanned leather slings" are but a small portion of the prize. "Flints, Forge bellows, Wheel barrows...camp kettles...shot [various kinds both cannon and musket]...and much more.[8] George Washington, upon learning of the successful ventures around Massachusetts and especially of Captain Manely's taking of the Lee and the Nancy, asked Congress in November, 1775 for,

"A more summary way of proceeding, to determine the property and mode of condemnation of such prizes... Should not a court be established...to take cognizance of the Prizes made by the Continental Vessels? ...The inhabitants of Plymouth have taken a Sloop laden with Provision &ca. from Halifax bound to Boston, and the Inhabitants of Beverly have under cover of one of the Armed Schooners taken a Vessel from Ireland laden with Beef, Pork, Butter &ca..."[9]

By the end of December that year, the Continental Congress acted on Washington's advice-sort of. The meeting decided that the colonies needed a naval armament committee. One man was to be selected from each colony to hold office. Two members were Samuel Adams and Robert Morris. The meeting next discussed obvious limitations imposed upon the transportation of supplies from American port to port. Merely, they were to acquire authentic documents by "two Merchants of known character and reputation, residing in the same port; and that on executing such bond, the said chairman sign a permit to the said petitioner, allowing him to export the said cargo." The resolution required that no ships may take supplies to British colonies or Britain herself. That may be considered a kind of preventive measure making mercenary privateering explicitly illegal, despite that being obvious treason.[10]

When a prize of considerable value entered Great-Egg Harbour, the same above question offered by Washington was posed to the Continental Congress. How should they divvy up the loot? The powder was to be sent to Congress to be best dispersed throughout the military. The resolution decided "that the Commander in chief have one twentieth part of the allotted prize-money, taken by any ship or ships, armed vessels or vessels, under his order and command." Also,

"That the captain of any single ship or armed vessel, have two twentieth parts for his share...Lieutenants of the ships...share together...three twentieth parts divided among them equally...surgeons, chaplains, pursers, boatswains, gunners, carpenters, the masters' mates...have [their parts] equally distributed..."

The list goes on, as men were to receive their respective share in a somewhat equal, egalitarian fashion-yet a strict government hierarchy did indeed govern the sharing practice on the larger ships, obviously.[11] These and other limitations provided for a very confusing and probably anger ridden state of affairs upon capturing a vessel, unlike a pirate or traditional privateering vessel.

No matter who volunteered for American Privateer duty, they had to act under the restrictions of two Congressional bonds, and were not simply permitted to be piratical in manner, or acting totally for their own personal gains. A prospective merchant that desired the romantic and profitable role of privateer, in any state, had to first gain permission, in traditional European fashion, from the government. Sidney G. Morse has stated that the proper protocol for requesting permission to legally patrol the Atlantic Seaboard and European waters for British vessels was that a petition was first submitted to the state council. This petition was a written statement, which not only displayed information about the ship, but also, the "purposes of the owners."[12]

On December 11^th, 1775, the Massachusetts council supplied an important commission to Captain Peter Roberts, of the sloop Gamecock. A portion of the crew and owners of the ship supplied the captains' name to the council with a petition for a license, and it is assumed that Captain Roberts received this appointment as if he was democratically selected by his crew at Newburyport for his skill. The captain is given permission to assault any ships of the enemy and any ships accused of supplying the enemy, as well as, "for the Defence of America." However, the captain is sternly warned to adhere to prize court and American naval restrictions limiting his targets to enemies of the Revolutionaries. The council was making sure that Roberts was in sworn allegiance to the strict rules governing privateers, while being sort of a police vessel for the ports of New England.[13] Thus, commissions limited the 'purpose' of privateers, so they were more than mere legalized pirates, but considered a patrolling watchdog and defensive militia for the coast.

Imagine being on board a pirate vessel during the 17^th and 18^th century, and having the opportunity to ask the captain what his or her 'purpose' was at sea. Depending upon the state of inebriation or education of the captain, the answer one would receive would be the same as if one were to ask the ruler of any self-sufficient country. Basically, a pirate crew operated for itself, and not any external state ideologies. Marcus Rediker says that pirate crews operated "beyond the reach of traditional authority."[14] A privateer vessel, in European fashion, was nothing more than a pirate ship that plundered and pillaged in the name of the state that outfitted and sponsored her. The crew sailed under the colors of the country of origin, but the vast oceans of the world are not owned by any country, and thus, piracy was piracy, no matter whose country a vessel hailed from.[15]

American Privateers were more than pirates, because they did not exist for the sole purpose of self-fulfillment for themselves or a patron country. Even if the only reason some sailors and adventurers volunteered for privateer duty was for the profit, they all had to adhere to two kinds of bonds: The 'general conduct bond' and the 'special conduct bond.' The general conduct bond implied that privateers would adhere to the "laws and regulations governing privateers." Massachusetts began the commissioning of privateers under this state bond on November 1, 1775. In April 1776, however, Congress passed resolves (the special bond) that required privateer commanders to "perform certain acts desirable for the public good, and refrain from doing other undesirable acts...and hence not covered by the general bond."[16] Cape Ann, on January 1^st, 1776, had a number of rules for privateers to follow that were to serve as orderly protocol toward British vessels. Instead of being able to assault and pirate any suspicious ship in their path, the captain of the rebel privateer must first demand identification papers before plundering. Only if the vessel in question could produce official documents proving that the ship did not represent the King of England, would the jaws of the privateer be held back from whatever supplies or fortunes lay in the ships' hold. Christopher Hawkins' shipmates revealed the tensions hungry seamen must have felt toward these "papers," as shown later.

Upon arrival at a rebel port such as Cape Ann, the captain was to have a complete inventory of the prizes' cargo before the plunder even hit the wharf. The sailors of the prize were to end up prisoners, and, by law, were to be treated with "humanity and tenderness." As far as the hull itself, it became the property of the rebels, and could only be used as directed by further notice from headquarters.[17] The above restrictive orders, which made sure all seamen fitted for privateer duty were aligned against Britain, were discovered by the British upon their own taking of an American vessel, which contained some of the above restrictions in writing. Hugh Pullizer, writing to Lord Sandwich, remarked that in January, 1776, a captured American ship contained documents "proving the rebels are at sea...limited against ships and vessels employed in the service of the [British] fleet and army in America."[18] These units were more than mere privateers. They should be considered Naval Militia because of their explicit contractual limitations, and their popularity through success.

As more prizes entered New England during the early part of the war, ports like Beverly, Massachusetts became primary targets for harassment from British naval vessels. According to a petition to George Washington from the Beverly Committee of Correspondence, geography multiplied Beverly's burden by being a town stretched along the Atlantic and thus easy prey for the British. Civilians apparently built the necessary fortifications, but they were without enough cannon, powder, and ammunition to defend valuable prizes.[19] A larger presence was needed to ward off the feared British Navy, but none would answer until discipline and organization could supply powder, canon, and a disinterested presence in the water-not looking for prizes, but for British blood.

Privateers proved an important piece of the American defense effort by being the guardians of the colonial port, but also, by inflicting substantial damage on the already crippled economy of Britain. Major General William Howe predicted, in 1775, that rebel naval possibilities would hinder the British presence in America when he stated to Lord Dartmouth;

"I could wish a distinction to be made between prisoners taken on shore and on sea, which last mode of war will hurt us more effectually than anything they can do by land during our stay at this place."[20]

The Atlantic Ocean provided the road to profit for Great Britain for years. Mercantilism had, by this time, built and destroyed nations, and made gentlemen out of commoners. The water was the key. Sea commerce was the backbone of the mercantilist system, so vessels for centuries raced the deep, blue sea with riches from port to port. With all of a nations' pride floating almost helplessly on the sometimes-treacherous sea, Britain, like Spain, France, Portugal, and every other European nation involved in this system, traditionally developed a strong sense of protection for their ports and other assets. The American colonies had been assets under the protection of Britain since Jamestown was established. All of this history was well known to state councilmen and Congress alike, and thus, they knew that they stood no chance in water that was stained with British pride and blood over hundreds of years. Viscount Barington, Secretary at War, wrote (around 1774-1775) to the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary for the Colonies, that the British army would not be able to hurt the rebellious colonists as much as the presence of the British navy would.[21]

A decision as to what to do about the awesome presence of the British navy was needed, and the Massachusetts state council moved (faster than Congress) to mobilize a local defense of the port from the powerful British navy. The ability of Massachusetts to quickly pass the November 1, 1775 defensive law was admired by John Adams as "one of the most important documents in the history of the Revolution."[22] John Adams, along with most colonists in port communities, probably feared the British navy, and they had every right to. But those that did must have forgotten that American colonial ships had fought in the Atlantic alongside the British in past wars.

J. Franklin Jameson has written that

"The Americans were old hands at privateering. In the War of the Spanish Succession, in the Spanish war of 1739, the French war of 1744, and especially in the French and Indian War, the business had attained prodigious proportions...In one cruise, in 1759 and 1760, Abraham Whipple of Rhode Island captured twenty-three prizes, valued at a million dollars." Jameson goes on about how American privateering efforts were extremely successful throughout the war, as more and more prizes were brought into port towns. As these ships, money, and prisoners arrived at random, privateering looked like the profession of choice for the "bold sailor." Jameson says that possibly ninety thousand men enlisted as privateers from the states.[23] Port towns in New England reacted to the standing British Navy, then, by spewing forth with hungry, angry sailors.

The thousands of American sailors trolling around the Atlantic were ready to storm the decks of any unlucky British merchant ship that came into their view. American raids caused commerce within the Empire to plummet. Insurance on exported goods from the West Indies reached "twenty-eight percent of the value of the ship and goods." This increase might have something to do with the fact that roughly 250 men had been captured from the West Indies. These factors help explain the 1,800,000 pounds sterling that reportedly were missing from the English treasury that year (1776.) As the English treasury began to lose weight, Americans like Robert Morris, who invested in privateering expeditions, made roughly 300,000 to 400,000 pounds sterling on raids.[24] The British came into the Revolution in a horrid economic state, and thus, the constant gouging by American seamen poked larger holes in the dwindling moneybag of the British Empire. The Naval Militia, then, attacked where it hurt the most, which shook victory further away from Parliament's grasp with every ship brought as a prize back to an American harbor.

Privateers could only do so much in regards of defense. Their defensive role was more like a side-effect of heavy patrolling for prizes. Much like their landed state militia counterparts, the privateers were often dangerous to neutrals and allies as well as the enemy, due to restlessness and the monotony of the sea, probably. Christopher Hawkins, upon writing about his personal experiences as a sailor on board the privateer Eagle, (under Captain Mowry Potter,) claimed that during an interaction with a French vessel "laden with flour," the men were quick to "pronounce her a British vessel," and were angry that Captain Mowry did not allow them to take the ship. Hawkins says the men made up stories that the French on that ship were not even French at all, but British in disguise.[25] Another example of these Naval Militia poking and prodding seafarers as if curious cats was described to Adams by Elbridge Gerry. Apparently a British decoy ship fooled a "Continental Commander" near the port, causing the American frigate to chase the fake. A Spider Catcher nearby decided to chase the American frigate just leaving! Soon enough, "One of the Spider Catchers like a brave fellow gave likewise Chase to the Frigate, and by the Time they had got within Reach of her Guns the found their Mistake and were obliged to make Use of their Heels Whilst the Ship with a Cloud of Sail pursued and pelted them; They Ran with great Dexterity and like Heroes escaped."[26]

"Spider Catchers" and men on board the Eagle were probably interested primarily in the economic gain from taking the French ship as a prize, but these hungry men, who probably wanted to bother almost every ship that crossed their paths, actually inadvertently created a kind of defensive guard between the ports of New England and Britain. So what if they sometimes ended up badgering allies-the overprotection drained British assets and forged an informal American naval presence where there had previously been none at all.

Unfortunately, for the Naval Militia, their identity was equal to that of illegal pirates and could be treated so if captured by England, because America had no established flag (colors) that could be recognized as an official military vessel.[27] Hugh F. Rankin states that privateer vessels flew either colors that they had created themselves, or provincial colors. This wide array of unknown flags caused a tense situation, because seamen knew that if caught, that might seal their fate as pirates at the gallows and not as prisoners of war. Rankin continues to say that "This diversity of designs was a decided disadvantage in the strike-and-run tactics of the privateers. The use of so many different flags was in direct violation of the law of the sea; neither England nor any other nation would recognize the validity of a flag designed and flown by a privateer captain on his own initiative. It was simply to save their own necks that these sea rovers gradually adopted the Grand Union flag... by September, 1776."[28]

The British Navy, like every other European Navy, had specific flags that denoted each vessel a formal military vessel. Britain was a powerful and thus well known force in the Atlantic and abroad, and from a distance, any competent seaman could understand which vessels were British and which were French, for example. Imagine, now, that what looks to be an innocent merchant ship is swaying gently toward a British Naval vessel. English sailors on board might focus intently on the mast of the ship, in hopes to make out exactly to whom the oncoming ship belonged. This way, the captain knows whether to mobilize his men to attack, or, if a friendly ship, ignore it or make some sort of friendly contact.

Upon scanning the horizon from the privateer Eagle, Christopher Hawkins noticed "...something in appearance resembling a very small bush without leaves. I mentioned this to the crew, many of them tried to discover it without success." It was eventually found that this "small bush without leaves" must have been a vessel that they had recently given chase too, but they had lost her. Sailing avidly closer and excited that they possibly may take her as a prize, "she now discovered us, and in turn made sail for us...by this time our spirits became damped, and our course immediately shifted from a chase to a runaway." Hawkins' mates had encountered unknowingly the H.M.S. Sphinx, of 21 guns. This man-o-war captured them, as his story continues.[29] It was important that the Americans find a flag not only for their safety, but also, for international recognition as a formal fighting force. There were a multitude of designs and colors used. South Carolina privateers rose a "red and blue stripped flag, with a rattlesnake undulating across its folds above the warning 'Don't Tread On Me.'" Massachusetts, on April 29, 1776, decided their naval flag should be a "white flag, with a green pine tree, and the inscription: 'Appeal to Heaven.'"[30] Hugh Pulizer wrote, "Captain Meadows has brought the American vessels' colours, it is a white field with a green pine tree in the middle: the motto, Appeal to Heaven. ...Wish that it might be sent to Admiral Montagu, as it was taken by his son."[31] If the flag of the ship was totally unrecognizable or cheaply made, it could possibly be assumed by hostile navies that the oncoming ship was either an outlaw (mutineers, maybe) or a pirate ship. Both groups were traditionally treated harshly. To consider American privateers as common pirates or outlawed vessels was to discredit their standing and importance as protectors of their homes-much like the land militia was.

Massachusetts privateers quickly took to sail almost immediately after Lexington and Concord. A couple patriotic men fitted out a vessel and took the Falcon, a British sloop of war, which was floating near Martha's Vineyard. Another group of rebels, sailing out of Machias, Maine, took the King's sloop Margaretta. The Massachusetts Naval militia preferred sailing home waters, and they prospered heavily at the cost of the British. Prize court records of 1779 show roughly 184 captures. On May 16, 1779, an estimate given on the number of British prisoners being held was around 1000. One can hardly question the success of these roaming patriots and profiteers. The Naval Militia was not restricted to the coasts, however. An example of success abroad can be found

in the Spring of 1777, [when] the Tyrannicide, Captain Jonathan Haraden, Massachusetts, Captain John Fisk, and Freedom, Captain John Clouston, cruised eastward as far as France and Spain, capturing some twenty-five prizes,... This was a most fortunate venture, for all told one can not now count more than seventy prizes captured by the Massachusetts Navy.[32]

The Penobscot Assault

The Penobscot Expedition, while being the largest strategic naval assault of the American Revolution, was a total disaster because the whole plan required the trained units of a European Navy, when the American Privateers (who assisted the strike) were nothing like their European counterparts. Maine (Massachusetts territory) was a strong source of timber for the port towns of New England. No ships could be built without proper timber supplies, and Britain knew the value of this wooded area well. The Begaduce Peninsula off of the Pennobscott bay also provided not only a port of anti-privateering operations for the British, but also served as a place for loyalists to hide from the Patriots of New England. As soon as the Massachusetts State Council heard of this base, plans were thrown together for a quick assault on the fortification.[33] Privateer and other vessels floating in the harbor were pressed into service (18,) and patriotism possibly explains why other private ship owners joined the task force.

By June, the Massachusetts House of Representatives moved to raise 1200 men from the counties of Cumberland and Lincoln for two-month terms. Food, ammo, and other supply ratios were determined here and in further council meetings asking for more men.[34] Some Continental, merchant, and privateer vessels were already floating near the coast. Continental frigates adhered to Congressional acts and not state movements. Knowing this, the council wrote to the Navy Board on June 30, 1779, declaring the British installation in Maine at Majorbagwayduce (Begaduce) an important target and capable of capitulation under a unified Continental and state flotilla.[35] On July 2nd, the Council promised a joint action between the land and sea forces upon assault, with command of the entire expedition now bestowed upon the higher-ranking commander on board the Warren (Continental Frigate). By July 9^th, the Navy Board replied with hopes of cooperation and a statement that Dudley Saltonstall was officially in command of the Warren. Plans for rendezvous were included and a plan to synchronize their sail was stated.[36]

Upon launching, the crews of the privateer vessels were undermanned, most likely because this mission was of total strategic value, and no profit was to be gained.[37] Much like state militia, however, the American Privateer did not perform well abroad and under the command of formal naval operations. Privateers commanded themselves, and were not trained in traditional naval style. Massachusetts State Council understood the deficiencies of sending privateer vessels abroad until 1779. Unfortunately, the council changed its mind for this expedition.[38] As soon as the American flotilla launched from Boston, "the expedition would continue with a divided command."[39] Miscommunication and shabby order described the onset, as the Council asked what the frigate Delaware was doing, because no one else seemed to know its plans as it headed off "on the 16^th current, and stood to the Eastward; their destination was not known."[40] By August 12^th, the Navy-Board warned Saltonstall that if the American fleet did not pursue the enemy ships immediately, British reinforcements would arrive soon and foil the entire mission.[41] From the beginning, the assault was a military disaster, and Americans would find every single ship that left Boston was destroyed or captured. Total damages to the Massachusetts state government were estimated at about 1,739,174 pounds sterling.[42] The rebels had failed to take the unfinished Fort George quickly, and Britain was able to rescue her men under siege. Captain Henry Mowat wrote that upon slowing the poor advance of the American flotilla, "...Intelligence having reached New York, that Penobscot was attacked, Sir George Collier Sailed to its relief, with the Raisonable Ship... Blonde, Virginia, Carmilla, Galatea, &c. They were perceived off Penobscot Bay by the rebel look-out vessel in the Evening. In the course of the night they embarked their troops,... In the morning early their fleet was seen under sail; but the wind failing them to get round the upper end of Long Island, they had no alternative but to run up Penobscot River." Captain Mowat described the ruined American expedition at its utter defeat as in "utmost distress," whilst some rebel vessels were burned, others were captured, and the various crewmembers turned to running home through the woods, [43] probably much like a gang of fugitives escaping the jaws of authority.

The failure of the Penobscott Expedition provided an example of just how young America was, because the Massachusetts State Council had utilized a European mindset that was out of its place when applied to American constructs, and thus, dangerous when applied to a non-professional fighting force such as the American Privateer. The planners of the Penobscot assault threw the mission together quickly and without much thought. Charles Oscar Paullin declares that the assaulted position was hardly strategic, after all. Even if the Americans had taken Fort George (on the Peninsula,) it would have mattered little to the American war effort.[44] But hindsight is always 20/20.

As stated earlier, colonial privateers were hardly given much credit when they fought alongside the Empire. When the privateers took on the role as Naval Militia in the Revolution, it was usually that basic Mercantilist interest of profit that made sailors fever for plunder. They had to adhere to strict limitations and rules governing their fiendish behavior, however. Those rules were sometimes hard to apply to the reality and monotony of the sea, but they kept intact and thus webbed the Atlantic coast. They themselves hardly understood their important role in the Revolutionary cause. By hurting British re-supply, the American Naval Militia played a more significant part in the American Revolution--more than that of greedy sailors. A letter out of British-occupied Boston in 1775 discussed the dire need for food and medicine and other stores, yet went on to say that a few ships dispatched to fulfill those needs were taken by American privateers. Some "were taken almost within sight of our Admiral's ship [45]

Their brave service on those crowded vessels against their own brethren across the sea reflected the desire for American society to push away from Britain permanently. Finally, their gradual sacrifice of their provincial flags for the adoption of the Grand Union Flag, like the Declaration of Independence, when recognized by foreign nations, signified the unity of a new, respectable nation on the rise. [46]

[1]By a Sailor. "A Favorite New Manly Song." Printed in Salem, 1776. edited by Clark, William Bell. Naval Documents of the American Revolution. Vol. 3. Washington, 1968. 47. To call the early privateersmen "Sons of Thunder" works. A contemporary patriot probably received a morale boost when reading headlines of their successes or using the stolen goods acquired from British holds. Looking back, being "Sons of Thunder" seems to take on another symbolic meaning. Being an amateur force, and often badgering allies and each other, a true Son of Thunder had thus at one time wielded his bolts on the Atlantic. Their tactic was quick yet immature and individualistic, but they did have to adhere to the laws of their father country on the rise. Also, the author has not found any female privateers.

[2]Maryland Council of Safety to the Virginia Committee of Safety. 8 February 1776. Naval Documents of the American Revolution. Vol. 3. 1179.

[3]Swanson, Carl E. "American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748." William and Mary Quarterly 42, no. 3 (Jul., 1985): 357-382. 382.

[4]Jefferson, Thomas. Letter to Francis Eppes and Letter to George Gilmer. Ed. Boyd, Julian P. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson . Vol. 1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press: 1950. 184-6

[5]Gordon, William. Letter to John Adams. 25 October 1775. Vol 3 of Papers of John Adams, ed. By Taylor, Robert J. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Belknap Press: 1979. 245-6.

[6]Gerry, Elbridge. Letter to John Adams. 4 December 1775. Vol 3 of Ibid. 349-51.

[7]Boston Gazette, 11 December 1775. Vol. 3 of Naval Documents of the American Revolution, edited by William Bell Clark, Washington: U.S. Government Press, 1968. 46-8

[8]Pennsylvania Evening Post 12 December 1775. Philadelphia. Naval Documents. Vol. 3. 69-72.

[9] Washington to the President of Congress. Cambridge, November 11, 1775. Writings of Washington. Vol. 4. Ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick, Washington, United States Government Printing Office: 1931. 81-4. Washington calls the vessles "Continental" but these were not the American Navy. He was simply calling them by his own chosen name, as he was actually too busy with his Continental Army organization. This letter contains his complaints that officers would not sign up unless they new who they would be leading them personally.

[10]Journal of the Continental Congress. December 1775. Naval Documents. Vol 3. 59-60.

[11]Journal of the Continental Congress. Naval Documents. 6 January 1776. 655-7

[12] Morse, Sidney G. "State or Continental Privateers?" The American Historical Review 52, no. 1 (Oct., 1946): 68-73. 68-9.

[13]Commission of Captain Peter Roberts to Command Massachusetts Private Sloop 'Gamecock.' 11 December 1775. Naval Documents. Vol 3. 52-3.

[14]Rediker, Marcus. Between the Devil and the DeepBlueSea. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1987. 255.

[15]Reeves, J.S. "Two Conceptions of Freedom of the Seas." The American

Historical Review 22, no. 3 (Apr. 1917): 535-543. 540-41.

[16]Morse, "State or Continental Privateers," 69-70.

[17]Instructions to Winthrop Sargent. 1 January 1776. Naval Documents. Vol. 3. 553-4.

[18]Pullizer, Hugh. Letter to Earl of Sandwich First Lord of the Admiralty. Naval Documents. Vol 1. 96-97.

[19]Beverly Committee of Correspondence. Petition to George Washington, 11 December 1775. Vol. 3 of Naval Documents of the American Revolution, edited by William Bell Clark, Washington: U.S. Government Press, 1968. 44-5

[20]Howe, Major General William. Letter to Lord Dartmouth. 1775. Naval Documents. Vol. 3. Quote derived from pre-text.

[21]Allen, Gardner W. A Naval History of the American Revolution. Vol. 1. Williamstown,

Mass.: Corner House Publishers, 1970. 18-19.

[22]Paullin, Charles Oscar. The Navy of the American Revolution. New York: Haskell House Publishers Ltd, 1971. 320-21.

[23]Jameson, Franklin J. The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement. Boston: Beacon Press, 1926. 65-6.

[24]Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement, Jameson says, "The impulse that led men into it [privateering] was...that same love of gain which also inspired commerce." 64-66.

[25]Bushnell, Charles I., ed., Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution: The Adventures of Christopher Hawkins. New York: Arno Press, 1968. 12-13. Hawkins continued to say that the men-- for 3 or 4 days-- talked about the French vessel as a British one in disguise. They had convinced each other of this false truth, and one can only imagine the anger on board. These sailors were probably restless enough without having ships slip by them because they had "papers" that the captain declared true.

[26]John Adams Papers. Vol 3. 350.

[27]A single torn piece of canvas flying high above the deck of a pirate or mutinous ship might have painted on it skull-and-crossbones with an hourglass or any number of death dealing and mortality images. Regardless, American privateers did not fly such pirate flags while assaulting the British, however, they did fly unconventional colors that could serve as home representation, as described in the paper. By traditional law of the sea, a pirate ship representing no formal entity was the enemy of every mercantilist empire. The American vessels initially lacked the recognition of a global force, and were openly plundering English shipping-an action that could be seen as mutinous piracy. Such treachery for centuries usually got one hanged at the gallows. But, captured rebels were instead detained as prisoners of war most of the time, probably because if the British quelled the rebellion, they did not want to have further stained their reputation with the lower-laboring classes of America. The merchant marine served as an important laboring class during the time, and angering them beyond that which impressments had done in the past would not have helped the British in their economic future-if they had won the war.

[28]Rankin, "The Naval Flag of the American Revolution," 340, 344.

[29] The Adventures of Christopher Hawkins. 21-2.

[30]Rankin, "The Naval Flag of the American Revolution," 343. See appendix for flag representations.

[31] Palliser, Hugh. Letter to Lord Sandwich. 6 January 1776. Vol 3. Naval Documents. 481-2.

[32]Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution, 339, 340-1, 343.

[33]Shaw, Henry I. Jr. "Penobscot Assault-1779." Military Affairs 17, no. 2 (Summer, 1953): 83-94. 83-85.

[34]State of Massachusetts-Bay In the House of Representatives, June 26, 1779. 180-81. Quoted in Goold, Nathan, ed., Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution: The Penobscot Expedition. New York: Arno Press, 1971. 44-5. General Lovell is mentioned here as being appointed to command the expedition.

[35]Ibid, 54-5. Council's Letter to the Navy-Board. June 30, 1779. 190-1.

[36]Ibid, 55-6. Council's Letter to the Hon. Meshech Weare, Esq. President of the Sate of New-Hampshire, dated July 9, 1779.191-2.

[37]Shaw, "Penobscott Assault-1779," 87-8.

[38]Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution, 347-8.

[39]Shaw, "Penobscott Assault-1779," 87.

[40]Goold, Nathan, ed., Eyewitness Accounts: The Penobscot Expedition. 59. Council's Letter to General Lovell, dated July 23, 1779.195.

[41]Goold, Nathan, ed., Eyewitness Accounts: Penobscot Expedition. 65. Navy-Board's Letter to Commodore Saltonstall, dated August 12, 1779.201.

[42]Shaw, "Penobscott Assault-1779," 93-4.

[43]Mowat, Captain Henry. "A Relation of the Service in which Captain Henry Mowat was Engaged in America, from 1759 to the End of the American War in 1783." Maine Historical Society. Collections. 1890. 340-1. Quoted in Goold, Nathan, ed., Eyewitness Accounts: The Penobscot Expedition. 52-3.

[44]Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution, 352.

[45] "Extract of a Letter from Boston, Dec. 13, 1775." Morning Post and Daily Advertiser, London. 17 January 1776. Naval Documents. Vol. 3. 84-6.

[46]Rankin, "The Naval Flag of the American Revolution," 344. Rankin states that The Dutch of FortOrange at St. Eustatius had saluted the Grand Union Flag in 1776. This recognition of the newly established American nation was very significant.

Bibliography

Secondary Sources

Allen, Gardner W. A Naval History of the American Revolution. Vol. 1 and 2.

Williamstown, Mass.: Corner House Publishers, 1970.

Clark, William Bell, ed., Naval Documents of the American Revolution. Vol. 3.

Washington, 1968.

Jameson, Franklin J. The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement.

Boston: Beacon Press, 1926.

Morse, Sidney G. "State or Continental Privateers?" The American Historical Review

52, no. 1 (Oct., 1946): 68-73.

Paullin, Charles Oscar. The Navy of the American Revolution. New York: Haskell

House Publishers Ltd, 1971.

Rankin, Hugh F. "The Naval Flag of the American Revolution." William and Mary

Quarterly 11, no. 3 (Jul., 1954): 339-353.

Rediker, Marcus. Between the Devil and the DeepBlueSea. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Reeves, J.S. "Two Conceptions of Freedom of the Seas." The American

Historical Review 22, no. 3 (Apr. 1917): 535-543.

Shaw, Henry I. Jr. "Penobscot Assault-Military Affairs 17, no. 2 (Summer,

1953): 83-94.

Smith, Dr. Whitney. Flags through the Ages and across the World. Maidenhead,

England: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975.

Swanson, Carl E. "American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739-William

and Mary Quarterly 42, no. 3 (Jul., 1985): 357-382.

Primary Sources

Gerry, Elbridge. Letter to John Adams. 4 December 1775. Vol 3 of Papers of John Adams, ed. By Taylor, Robert J. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Belknap

Press: 1979. 349-51.

Gordon, William. Letter to John Adams. 25 October 1775. Papers of John Adams. 245-6.

Jefferson, Thomas. Letter to Francis Eppes and Letter to George Gilmer. Ed. Boyd, Julian P. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson . Vol. 1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press: 1950. 184-6.

Following Sources derived out of

Vol. 3 of Naval Documents of the American Revolution, edited by William Bell Clark. Washington: U.S. Government Press, 1968.

Beverly Committee of Correspondence. Petition to George Washington, 11 December 1775. 44-5.

Boston Gazette, 11 December 1775. 46-8.

Bushnell, Charles I., ed., Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution: The

Adventures of Christopher Hawkins. New York: Arno Press, 1968.

Colony Bond for the Massachusettes Private Armed Vessel "Lizard", Journal of the Massachusettes House of Representatives, 8 February 1776. 1172-3.

Commission of Captain Peter Roberts to Command Massachusetts Private Sloop 'Gamecock.' 11 December 1775. 52-3.

"Extract of a Letter from Boston, Dec. 13, 1775." Morning Post and Daily Advertiser, London. 17 January 1776. 84-6.

Hichborn, Benjamin. Letter to John Adams, 10 December 1775. 32-5.

Howe, Major General William. Letter to Lord Dartmouth. 1775. Quote derived from pre-text.

Instructions to Winthrop Sargent. 1 January 1776. 553-4.

Journal of the Continental Congress. December 1775. 59-60.

Journal of the Continental Congress. 6 January 1776. 655-7.

Journal of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, 11 December 1775. 50-2.

Maryland Council of Safety to the Virginia Committee of Safety. 8 February 1776. 1179.

Massachusettes Council. Commission to Captain Peter Roberts, 11 December 1775. 52-3.

Naval Committee. Commission to Abraham Whipple, 6 January 1776. 657-8.

Pennsylvania Evening Post. 12 December 1775. Philadelphia. 69-72.

Palliser, Hugh. Letter to Earl of Sandwich First Lord of the Admiralty. Naval Documents. Vol 1.96-97.

Palliser, Hugh. Letter to Lord Sandwich. 6 January 1776. 481-2.

By a Sailor. "A Favorite New Manly Song." Printed in Salem, 1776. 47.

Warren, James. Letter to John Adams, 11 December 1775. 49-50.

Following Sources Derived out of

Goold, Nathan, ed., Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution: The Penobscot Expedition. New York: Arno Press, 1971.

Mowat, Captain Henry. "A Relation of the Service in which Captain Henry Mowat was Engaged in America, from 1759 to the End of the American War in Collections. 1890. 52-3.

State of Massachusetts-Bay In the House of Representatives, June 26, 1779. 44-5.

Washington to the President of Congress. Cambridge, November 11, 1775. Writings of Washington. Vol. 4. Ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick, Washington, United States Government Printing Office: 1931. 81-4.