Southern States Show Differences in Line-Item Veto Usage with Budget Variation

Use of the line-item veto varies from state to state and the non-use of the line-item veto is linked with budgets, appropriations, party control of legislative and executive branches, and gubernatorial terms. The Line-Item Veto in Practice in Ten Southern States by Catherine Reese states these conclusions soundly backed by prior research on line-item veto usage. Reese uses five variables (biennial budgets, less itemized appropriations, large numbers of appropriation bills, same-party control of the legislative and executive branches, and limited gubernatorial terms in office) to determine what political aspect is linked with line-item veto usage in the ten southern states she studied.

Use of the line-item veto varies from each of the 10 southern states studied in this article. They change according to appropriations processes and political environments. Factors that could cause variations in state appropriations include (1) whether budgetary periods are annual or biennial, (2) whether budget formats are amenable to line-item vetoes or not, (3) whether numbers of appropriations bills are small or large, and (4) whether executive budget preparation and presentation powers are strong or weak (Reese 1997, 512). Reese concluded that weak executive budget states are more likely to use the line-item veto for policy reasons (versus fiscal or language).

Factors used to determine the effect of line-item veto in state political environments include (1) whether states have interbranch party differences and (2) whether or not gubernatorial terms in office are limited (Reese 1997, 514). Conclusions are that whether or not a governor has a limited term in office does not affect whether he/she is likely to be overridden.

Reese defines item veto power as the power to delete an item in an appropriations bill without rejecting the entire bill. Survey method involves the use of a mail survey of state budget officers. Bob-tails are sections of nongermane language and usually added by legislators to the second or permanent law sections of appropriations bills. A turkey watch report is a publication that has detailed information, for the public, on any pork-barrel projects or "turkeys" not eliminated from the state budget by line-item veto.Regular governor's terms in office are four-year terms and permit electoral succession. A limited term is one that is less than four years and does not permit electoral succession.

Most research about line-item vetoes explores their power as a fiscal restraint in government. Reese's article is different in that it examines the line-item veto as a federal and current tool-as a general tool of power, not just of fiscal restraint. The significance of Reese's work is that no prior research has examined the actual (not reported) use of the line-item veto in a multistate setting.

Reese uses a case study approach and analyzes data collected for each state for the twenty year study period. She finds from Gosling (1986) in Wisconsin and Thompson and Boyd (1994) in Texas that the line-item veto is used frequently. However Lauth and Reese (1993) in Georgia have the opposite conclusion. The information from these researchers is set up in easy-to-read tables. To analyze state budgetary processes in the early 1990s, Reese looks at statistics from the Joint Legislative Budget committees (1990), in Mississippi and Fusco (1993) and Shealy (1993) in South Carolina. She finds information on weak executive budgets from Grizzle (1990) in Florida, Leath (1993) in Arkansas, Sumarall (1993) and Graham and Moore (1994) in Mississippi and South Carolina. The power of a governor based on his term limit was studied in Carson (1993), Hackbart (1993), and Hintze (1993). Bellamy (1989) says that the federal budget should not be greatly affected by the federal use of the line-item veto.

The use of so many variables, in developing her thesis, made Reese's article somewhat difficult to determine what factor was linked with the line-item veto in ten southern states. For example, in the first major section of her article under the heading Description of the Line-Item Veto in Practice, Reese admits that several hypotheses and ideas are suggested regarding the actual use of the line-item veto. The great number of charts was somewhat confusing also. Six tables are difficult to keep clear-with the ten states and number of variables. Two or three would have been more helpful and would be easy to refer back to in one's mind while reading.

The author's conclusions are true to her supporting arguments. She uses outside literature and statistics to prove her point, and the conclusion refreshes the reader's memory on the subject content. For example, Reese concludes that states with biennial budget periods, nonitemized budget formats, large numbers of appropriations bills, low interbranch partisan conflict, and limited gubernatorial terms in office are more likely to (1) use the line-item more frequently, (2) have low dollar effects associated with the use of the power, and (3) use the line-item veto primarily for policy rather than fiscal reasons. Reese's supporting paragraphs conclude this information with Tables 4-6 and statistics from outside research in the sections: Appropriations Processes and Political Environment.

The author does provide sufficient explanation for key terms. They are not dictionary definitions; they are common enough for the non-political scientists to comprehend. As a political scientist, I even learned new terms from this article such as "bob-tails."

This article contributes to the body of literature on state and local politics by examining the use of line-item veto in a region. Now that Reese has paved the way, someday a researcher might study the implications of line-item vetoes in New England, or the West Coast, or the Mid-West. Researchers can look back on her methods, hypotheses, and variables to complete their study.

The Line-Item Veto in Practice in Ten Southern States examines the implications of political environments and appropriations processes on the use of the line-item veto in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Reese finds among other things, that weak executive budgets are more likely to use the line-item veto for fiscal reasons. She uses tables and outside literature to come to her conclusions and does it in a way that a common reader could understand.

The implications of Reese's research include the statement that whether a state has interbranch party differences is a main variable to explain a high frequency of the line-item veto. Governors in states with biennial budget periods and weak executive budgets may be more likely to be overridden than their counterparts (1997, 515). Reese's work partially agrees with Abney and Lauth (1985) in saying that partisan differences are linked with frequency of the line-item veto, meaning that Republican governors in these ten southern states use the line-item veto more often but not with any greater fiscal effects than Democratic governors. The line-item veto would not be useful at the federal level for fiscal purposes (since it has not been useful at this at the state level). The line-item veto is "not as important as balanced budget requirements or interbranch agreement on revenue estimates in controlling the average level of state expenditures, and it is less likely to be used when the level of legislative-executive cooperation is high" (Reese 1997, 515-516).

Further research on line-item vetoes should analyze the relationship of appropriations process characteristics (not just environment characteristics) according to the actions of legislatures and governors. They should examine such factors as budget period, level of budget itemization, and number of appropriations bills passed each year in addition to political partisan (Reese 1997, 515). Reese's article is only a step on the path to new research on line-item vetoes; researchers in the future can add much more.