Strawson Versus Hume: Arguments Concerning Induction

In "The Problem of Induction" David Hume argues that induction is not a satisfactory way to justify a belief. According to The American Heritage Dictionary, induction is coming to a conclusion by "deriving general principles from particular facts or instances." Hume identifies "matters of fact" as the second object of human reason, and argues that these matters, unlike "relations of ideas" are not "ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing [relations of ideas]" (434). For every matter of fact possible, the contrary is equally possible. Hume uses the examples of "the sun will not rise tomorrow" and "the sun will rise tomorrow." Although humans are accustomed to the sun rising every morning, there is nothing to give a justified proof that it will always rise each morning. He uses this example to argue that one cannot predict the future by looking at the past - it is not valid to believe that such events will always recur.

Hume also criticizes the process of induction as being a sort of circular process. Hume suggests that in establishing induction as a principle, people rely on inductive experience, meaning that, in validating this process, they are relying on the very process they are trying to validate - the way a circular argument would rely on the very point that is in question. At the end of his article Hume admits that it is difficult not to draw inferences from our experiences - humans have the habit of doing so - but he claims that such inference is not the same as the process of reasoning.

In objection to arguments, like Hume's, against induction, Peter Strawson claims that induction is a necessary component of any reliable process in "Dissolving the Problem of Induction." Strawson argues that humans are correct to use inference, but it is their faulty logic that makes them reach a wrong conclusion (456). In opposition to Hume, who would argue that a truly reliable process (which may not even exist) would overcome the faults of humans, Strawson identifies human characteristics as the reason that their beliefs may be false. If a faulty person uses a reliable process, according to Strawson, then it would stand to reason that such a faulty person has the ability (or lack thereof) to misinterpret the conclusions of logical inductive reasoning.

Although Hume does make some good points, Strawson, also, lays out a valid argument. He uses the example of a kettle that has been on the fire for ten minutes, and the deduction that the water will be boiling by now (457). It is true that the water is probably boiling, and it seems reasonable to believe, without a doubt, that it is. However, Hume may object by stating that the water did not take exactly ten minutes to boil. It may have taken seven minutes, or, it could be that the water has yet to come to a boil. It will not take the same amount of time every time unless one has exactly the same amount of water in the kettle, and the kettle is exposed to exactly the same temperature. While this is too specific, and one can argue that at approximately ten minutes the water will boil, such an objection to this inference is a valid point when used with other examples. If one expects something to happen at a specific time, and it does not, then that person's inference was not one hundred percent accurate.

John Greco makes some statements in "Virtues in Epistemology" that put him in opposition with Hume. For instance, Greco believes that human beings are able to form justified beliefs themselves: "Thus human beings are gifted with perceptual powers or abilities; that is, dispositions to reliably form beliefs about our environment on the basis of sensory inputs of various modalities" (350) - going against Hume's principle that the past does not indicate future, and his argument against using induction in the process of proving that induction is reliable. Such a statement also contradicts what Strawson has to say about the fallibility of humans. Though Hume and Strawson do not see eye to eye, they would both argue that humans are not, in fact, equipped with such "perceptual powers" which would prompt them to come to form reliable beliefs. Hume would argue that a human would use experience of previous "sensory inputs" to make an assumption about a present input, and, according to Hume, such a use of the past to predict the future, or to explain the present, is unreliable. To Strawson, humans are too flawed to be able to produce a reliable belief from their own sensory inputs.

It is interesting that although Hume's ideas are vastly different from both Strawson's and Greco's, at least in objecting, some of their points are similar. Strawson and Hume would argue against Greco, and Strawson and Greco would argue against Hume. In the end Hume makes a better argument against induction that the other two make for the process. By criticizing proponents of induction for making a circular argument, Hume at least is able to negate the validity of their process, which helps his case become a little stronger.

Works Cited

Pojman, Louis P. The Theory of Knowledge. Third Edition. Canada: Wadsworth, 2003.