Subterranean Subterfuge: An AC Experiment on Bioterrorism

Before anyone gets too excited, let me assure you that this article in no way is an actual bioterrorism experiment. So, you can go ahead and remove your bioweapon protective gear now. No, this article is actually an experiment meant to test the tenacity of two highly prized rights of all Americans: the right to free speech vs. the right to safety and security. What does all of this have to do with bioterrorism? It all begins, as many things do, in the New York City subway system.

At yet another desperate press conference at City Hall in November 2001, America waited to hear the results of swab tests taken along the Bronx/Manhattan No. 6 subway. The fear was that the subway system had been infected with anthrax bacteria based on the fatal case of inhalation anthrax contracted by Kathy Nguyen. The source of Ms. Nguyen's exposure to anthrax remained a mystery, however, as the preliminary swab test results revealed no growth suspicious of anthrax.

New York Health Commissioner Dr. Neil Cohen then delivered probably the least shocking news anyone had heard in the past two months. "We know the subway system is not a sterile environment. So there is a lot of biomass, or a lot of other things are growing."¹

Everyone, including the mayor, laughed at the obviousness of his statement. The New York City subway system, ripe with the remnants of a century's worth of huddled masses, would surely not be characterized as sterile by even the most oblivious observer. Ironically, perhaps the most insidious substance they might have expected to find amongst the everyday muck would have been the remnants of Bacillus subtilis variant Niger, an anthrax stimulant released during secret bioweapon tests conducted during 1966 in the subway tunnels by our own government. Author Leonard Cole quotes from declassified government documents.

"The several trials were conducted as completely independent operations without the knowledge or cooperation of the New York City Transit Authority or Police Department. Dissemination of agent and collection of air samples attracted no attention, and the tests were carried out without incident. Agent was disseminated without challenge or apparent detection. Air sampling was conducted more or less openly; it elicited few inquiries and no suspicion. Test personnel were given letters identifying them as members of an industrial research organization as a cover in case they were questioned. They were not used, except by one person who smoked in a station. He used his letter to prove non-residency to a police officer. Following this, he completed sample collection without further questioning." ²

Unfortunately, it turns out that Bacillus subtilis is not a harmless stimulant and may have posed a health risk to those with weakened immune systems³.

The image of clandestine agents conducting bioweapons experiments with live bacteria on the unsuspecting public certainly paints an unflattering picture. The nastiness of the portrait is unmitigated by the revelation that the bacteria was not so harmless after all. As unethical as all this may seem, there is another ethical dilemma which surrounds this type of activity. Should the details of such an experiment be published?

Thomas Johnson, Associate Professor of Respiratory Care and Health Sciences at the School of Health Professions, wonders if the accounting of this incident in Cole's Clouds of Secrecy was read by members of cult Aum Shinrikyo as they prepared their plan to release sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway⁴.

Advocates of censorship might argue that disseminating this information poses the danger of providing terrorists with a method for their madness. Advocates against censoring the story might point out that the efficacy of a subway environment for bioweapon delivery might not have been a hypothesis unique to 1960's American scientists. Therefore, withholding the story does not necessarily prevent terrorists from arriving at the idea on their own. Further, publishing details of this type of experiment creates an opportunity for many scientists and engineers to learn of it and perhaps think of new and inventive ways to abate the danger.

The government publication Cole originally reported from is declassified. So why not write about it? The information was already available to those who would seek it anyway. Besides, I don't need to see the final results of the New York Health Department's swab tests to know that if I ride the subway, I might get infected with an unusual germ or two.

It's time for you to be the judge. So go ahead, don your bioweapon protective gear if you feel you need, and participate in this survey. The question is simple, should details of a bioweapons test conducted decades ago in the New York City subway system have been censored in order to protect national and international security? It's the age old question, freedom of speech vs. right to security. You decide. Weigh-in with your opinion in the comments section of this article.

REFERENCES
1. Eric Lipton. New York Times. (Late Edition (East Coast)). New York, N.Y.: Nov 18, 2001. pg. 1B.8
2. Cole, Leonard A. Clouds of Secrecy: The Army's Germ Warfare Tests over Populated Areas, by, Rowman & Littlefield, 1988 p. 67 quoting p. 22 of A Study of the Vulnerability of Subway Passengers in New York City to Covert Attack with Biological Agent, Miscellaneous Publications 25, Department of the Army, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, January 1968.
3. Biohazard News. Bioterrorism Scenarios on Anthrax: Anthrax Test in the New York City Subway System, 1966.
4. Johnson, Thomas J. A History of Biological Warfare from 300 B.C.E. to the Present. (www.aarc.org/resources/biological/history.asp)