Susan Wolf's Moral Sainthood

Susan Wolf's piece, "Moral Saints," attempts to show that there are more important things than morality. She argues that the idea of a perfect model of morality - a "moral saint" as defined by a Kantian or Utilitarian view − would not be ideal. A moral saint is charitable, hospitable, amiable, and selfless. Yet he is undesirable. In fact, we do not even want to try to be like him. A moral saint is incapable of enjoying "non-moral" things such as a great movie, a gourmet meal, or a harmonious piano concerto because he is consumed by his motivation to be moral. I agree with Susan Wolf's argument. The nature of moral sainthood impedes upon "non-moral" things of which we place much value.

What makes someone a moral saint? A moral saint derives happiness from being moral. Wolf defines a moral saint as one who "pays little or no attention to his own happiness in light of the overriding importance he gives to the wider concerns of morality" (564).[1] In other words, a moral saint prioritizes the happiness of others over his own. He selflessly sacrifices himself to better the lives of others. There are two types of moral saints according to Wolf. Wolf refers to one type as a "loving saint" and the other type as a "rational saint." The distinction Wolf draws between them is that the former derives happiness from the happiness of others while the latter sacrifices his own happiness for the happiness of others. In other words, a loving saint is incapable of anything but ameliorating the lives of others while a rational saint is tempted to act in non-moral ways but forces himself to act otherwise. This distinction accounts for the differences in Kantian and Utilitarian ideology: a loving saint is the best model for Utilitarianism while the rational saint is the best model for Kantianism.

What then is the problem with moral sainthood? The problem with moral sainthood is it constricts one to an unfulfilling life dominated by moral pursuits. A moral saint is motivated by morality all of the time. She is entirely consumed by her passion for morality that she does not or cannot see the value of reading a great novel or playing baseball or participating in other enriching "non-moral" things. For a loving saint, non-moral activities do not pose a problem; the loving saint is essentially unable to find happiness in such activities so he does not think twice about not going to the amusement park. Another objection one could raise is the problem of free will. If a loving saint is entirely motivated by morality, he is essentially a robot. He is "programmed" for one purpose: promoting morality at all costs. This suggests the loving saint lacks free will. The loving saint cannot choose between reading a book or working a soup kitchen because he has no free will; the former is not even an available option - the moral strings are always pulling him towards morality. A rational saint, however, can find these activities enjoyable; he simply suppresses his desire for these activities for the sake of moral duty. A rational saint will force herself to work at a soup kitchen instead of going to the amusement park, even though she feels the latter would be equally pleasurable. This seems to suggest that the rational saint is a self-loathing, ostentatious perfectionist - she abides by her moral duty because she loathes her non-moral desires and wishes to portray herself as outwardly perfect.

Personality also poses a problem for moral sainthood. That which we see valuable in one's personality - a sense of humor, a flair for gourmet cuisine, or a proclivity for fine arts, for instance - are entirely absent qualities in a moral saint. The reason why moral saints cannot possess these qualities is they require an outlook on life unabashed by moral virtue. A sense of humor requires "an attitude of resignation and pessimism toward the flaws and vices in the world" (566). A flair for gourmet cuisine or fine arts requires one to derive pleasure in grandeur, luxury, excess, and impracticality.

The biggest problem with moral sainthood, as Wolf suggests, is that it seems to refute our ideas of icons or heroes. We idolize Michael Jordan for his slam-dunks and three-pointers. We admire his almost selfish desire to make himself the best basketball player of all time. Similarly, we admire Beethoven for his relentless pursuit of musical perfection. We commemorate Madame Curie for her scientific exploits. Yet we do not value these people morally. We may consider Mother Teresa, or Pope John Paul II, or Mohandas Gandhi to be examples of moral saints. However, more often than not, we overlook their selfless deeds for non-moral ones such as seeing Babe Ruth hit a home run or listening to a seventeen-minute guitar solo. There is a contradiction between moral sainthood and our innate value system. Though we appreciate and praise moral saints like Gandhi, we do not necessarily idolize them. We are more apt to idolize a John Elway or an Albert Einstein because they are more interesting people - they appeal to our non-moral values.

Taking into account non-moral values seems to discredit the well-established deontological beliefs of Kantians and Utilitarians alike. A perfect Kantian moral agent - a rational saint - acts out of the good will all of the time. He abides by Kant's idea of moral law. Moreover, Kant himself would not object to a rational saint universalizing the maxim by which he lives, that is promulgating and promoting morality, and willing it to be moral law. However, there is a problem. Kant would not want the maxim by which a moral saint lives to be "promoting morality at all costs." Universalizing this maxim would mean people must be completely moral at the expense of their own happiness. This line of thinking would revert back to the original problem of morality dominating one's life. Wolf suggests that Kant's theory include a set of "side constraints" that allow a person to enjoy a few non-moral activities as long as it does not interfere with the person's overriding pursuit of moral perfection.

In the case of the Utilitarian saint - the loving saint - therein also lays a problem. Utilitarian thought emphasizes maximizing happiness. Thus, a loving saint with her charitable and virtuous deeds maximizes the happiness of countless people. However, utilitarianism also takes into account the happiness one derives from non-moral exploits. Thus, according to Wolf, the happiness in a world populated by loving saints is less than that of a world where people engage in a fair balance of moral and non-moral activities. This seems to suggest that if a loving saint were to truly maximize happiness at all costs, he would have to "encourage...happiness-producing goals that are more attractive and more within a normal person's reach" (570). The objection then to this idea is that if a loving saint had to encourage non-moral activities, he would contradict himself; he is promoting or conceding to "non-morality," coinciding with his own goals of absolute moral perfection. The objections Wolf raises to the Kantian and Utilitarian models are numerous, yet I do not believe they entirely refute such theories.

I agree with Wolf insofar as moral sainthood is not something for which we ought to strive. Wolf goes a step further when she suggests Utilitarianism forces the loving moral saint to encourage non-moral deeds for the sake of overall happiness. The problem with this suggestion is that Wolf underestimates the happiness that the loving saint produces. I will call my objection to Wolf the "greater good" argument. The Utilitarian saint has a choice between promoting the general good and the greater good. For instance, he can either play baseball with his friends - a non-moral activity - for the general good or read to blind children at a hospital for the greater good. The Utilitarian saint will automatically choose to read to the blind children because it produces more happiness. The guilt the Utilitarian saint feels by playing baseball, though it makes his friends happy, will decrease the overall happiness. He knows that the happiness of his friends playing baseball is incomparable to the happiness of a blind child in a hospital. Thus, Wolf's suggestion that a Utilitarian saint would have to encourage non-moral activities to promote the general happiness is false. The Utilitarian saint knows that there is always a greater good which promotes more happiness. However, the Kantian model does not successfully account for moral sainthood. Wolf's argument about side-constraints is essential for a Kantian. Universalizing the maxim that one ought to strive for moral perfection while indulging in a non-moral activity now and again is plausible. This would counteract the rational saint's self-hatred and ultimately create more happiness while still abiding by the moral law. Kantianism and Utilitarianism are still valid.

The problem with moral sainthood lies in the fact that it fails to take into account the value of non-moral things such as a great book. Moral sainthood forces us to be uninteresting "moral fanatics." The loving saint and rational saint never experience the joy of a great song or a funny movie. These things are inherently valuable. We value Michael Jordans more than Mother Teresas because our values include non-moral and moral acts. I believe the flaws in moral sainthood prove that there are times when we must read a great book or watch T.V. We cannot be moral all of the time. This poses a problem for moral philosophy: if being moral is always good when can we indulge in non-moral acts?

[1] Wolf, Susan. "Moral Saints." Moral Philosophy. p. 564.