Texas A&M University Bonfire Collapse and Incident Command System

Bruce Ziebarth
Situation
Texas A&M University has a tradition, each year students build a large bonfire. The bonfire is then lit before Texas A & M University football game with University of Texas at Austin. Students had been building the wooden stack. The stack stood at fourty feet tall and contained 5,000 logs. The festivities did not go as planned. The forty-foot wooden stack collapsed.

For safety, the university required that emergency medical personnel be present anytime people were working on the stack. When the stack collapsed three people with CPR training, two EMTs, and a paramedic were present. Immediately after the collapse the paramedic began to triage the victims.

911 received the first call at 2:43 a.m. The caller reported that there had been an accident on campus. They told the operator that the bonfire stack had collapsed. The caller stated that thirty people may be trapped. The 911 operator dispatched an engine company and an additional Advanced Life Support (ALS) ambulance.

While en route the engine company officer requested that an additional ambulance and a Battalion Chief be dispatched. Upon arrival, the officer from College Station Fire Department's engine company setup command. The officer then seized up the scene. The company officer immediately worked with emergency medical personnel on the scene to establish triage and begin transporting patients.

The university police department was also dispatched. The forty-foot stack had collapsed over a large area. University police department requested that all their officers be called in to assist with securing the scene. Officers were also dispatched from the Brazos County Sheriff's Department, Cities of College Station, and Bryan.

Upon arrival, the Battalion Chief assumed the role of Incident Commander. The engine company Lieutenant was reassigned to oversee the EMS transportation sector. The company officer requested seven additional ambulances, a truck, and an engine company. The initial Incident Command Post was setup at the Battalion Chief's vehicle.

Incident Commander turned his attention to medical triage. Two salvage covers were placed for treatment of injured patients. A third triage area was setup for anyone classified as "walking wounded".

At 2:50, Mutual Aid from the nearby town of Bryan began arriving. Among this aid was Bryan's Deputy Chief. The Deputy Chief had self-activated himself. The Incident Commander assigned the Deputy Chief to oversee the Rescue Sector. Incident Commander realized that additional resources would still be necessary. He requested that a general alarm be called for the College Station Fire Department. This action resulted in the recall of all of College Station's off-duty fire personnel.

Incident Commander requested that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) be activated to aid in resource coordination. The Incident Commander also appointed a Resource Officer and Staging Officer. These activities setup a staging area and management structure for the resources that would be needed.

The Deputy Chief from Bryan was not the only person to self activate. The Texas University Campus housed Texas Task Force One an Urban Search & Rescue Team. Members of Texas Task Force One picked up the team's equipment and self-activated to the scene. The Fireman's Training School at Texas University's recruit class were also self-activated by the school.

Incident Commander did not turn away any resources. He absorbed the multiple self-activations. Texas Task Force One members were assigned to utilize their search cameras and listening equipment to find trapped victims. Structural engineers from Texas Task Force One were teamed with people from the University's Department of Civil Engineering. The engineers were assigned to evaluate the remain structure and identify safety hazards.

Once the victims requiring transport were freed and transported, rescue of trapped but uninjured victims began. It is estimated that this phase required 3200 response personnel. Incident Command had a very large obstacle. 5,000 logs had been used in the bonfire. 2,000 more logs were on scene awaiting use. Incident Command had to deal with removal of all the logs.

It was deemed that the logs would have to be removed by hand. The Urban Search & Rescue Team from Bryan had a previous Memorandum of Understanding with a local builder's supply for shoring. Bryan's USAR team activated this agreement and received the shoring. The shoring was used to replace unstable logs with sturdy shoring structures.

Incident Commander realized that additional help would be needed to move logs offsite. Incident Commander utilized student volunteers from the university's football team and ROTC cadets. Incident Commander also requested that several cranes and other heavy machinery be brought to the scene. When safety allowed, Incident Commander utilized the heavy machinery to make extrication faster.

The bonfire collapse attracted mass media attention. A number of television helicopters and fifty plus news vans descended on the scene. At 8:37 a.m. the Mayor held a press conference. The helicopter's caused several additional problems. A large amount of dust was created at the scene. The dust made it difficult for rescuers on the ground. At 9:14 a.m., the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) declared a no fly zone.

Incident operations would continue until the next morning. The final victim would be pulled from the rubble at 12:55 a.m. the next day. The last log would be removed at 2:45 a.m., over 24 hours from the initial 911 call. The EOC was deactivated at 2:20 a.m.

Management -
The role of Incident Commander was filled, throughout the incident, by a member of the City of College Station's Fire Department. Initially, this role was filled by an engine company Lieutenant. Incident Commander role was then assumed by City of College Station's Batallion Chief.

Over 3200 personnel assisted the Incident Commander. Firefighters responded from the University's Firefighter Training School. City of Bryan, and Texas Task Force One. Responding firefighters were assigned to a variety of medical, search, and rescue activities. Scene preservation and security went to law enforcement personnel from multiple police department's including University of Texas, Brazos County Sheriff's Department, Cities of College Station, and Bryan. Volunteers also offered support for the incident. Volunteers from the University of Texas's football team and ROTC cadets were utilized to help remove logs and remove debris.

Operations -
Among the responding agencies were fire departments, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), law enforcement, government agencies, and multiple agencies providing support services.

Fire Departments involved included University of Texas Firefighter training School, City of Bryan, Texas Task Force One, City of College Station, and Mutual Aid Fire Departments.

Emergency Medical Services (EMS) agencies included City of Bryan EMS, College Station Medical Center, St Joseph's Hospital, and Texas University Emergency Medical Services.

Law enforcement agencies included Brazos County Sheriff's Department, City of Bryant Police Department, State of Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas University Police Department, and Austin Police Department.

Government agencies included Brazos County Emergency Management, Brazos County Justice of the Peace, City of Bryant Emergency Dispatch, Risk Management, and Stress Management Team, City of College Station Administration, City Council, Development Services, Economic and Community Development, Emergency Dispatch, Emergency Management, Fiscal Services, Human Resources, OTIS/MIS, Parks and Recreation, Public Communications and Marketing, Public Utilities, and Public Works.

Support services included State of Texas Army National Guard, Department of Transportation, Division of Emergency Management, and Stress Management Teams, Texas A & M Corp of Cadets, Food Services, Physical Plant, Public Relations, Safety and Health Office, and Student Life, Texas Forest Service, local businesses, churches, and general public, Galveston GIS, R.A.C.E.S., Salvation Army, American Red Cross, Steely Lumber Company, and Texas Logging Council.

Logistics -
Incidents of this size come with many logistical challenges. First, the Incident Commander had to procure enough ambulances. Treating patients required a large amount of medical supplies including back boards, bandages, and even band aids. Utilizing students, and Fire Training School recruits required an extra amount of radios. Every log that was removed had to be replaced with shoring to ensure safe response operations.

Incident Commander had to setup a process to manage all of the resources. Incident Commander did this by establishing a Resource and Staging Officer. The county Emergency Operations Center took the role of Area Command by providing coordination of resources for the Incident Commander.

Planning & Intelligence -
Because of the consolidated incident scene, intelligence was pretty easy to obtain. Planning challenges included coordinating the large amount of responders, dealing with trained, emergency response personnel who self-activated, and spontaneous volunteers. To the Incident Commander and Incident Management Team's credit they were able to quickly identify and react to these challenges.

Finance & Administration -
An incident of this size requires a large amount of funding. Incident Commander placed a general call through the City of College Station's Fire Department. This activated all off duty firefighters. The result was a large amount of overtime. A large amount of lumber was used, cranes, and heavy equipment were also brought in. All of these procedures were necessary, however, they did produce a large price tag. Exact information about which agencies paid for what was not available. We can speculate that with FAA involvement that this incident received a federal disaster declaration. A federal declaration would bring with it federal funding.

Assessment
On-scene emergency operations were also aided by proper per-planning. Emergency Operations Plans for the city, county, and their agencies had identified that a large amount of shoring might be needed during emergency incidents. The agencies found a company to fill this void and initiated a Memorandum of Understanding. Proper pre-planning ensured that the Incident Commander could get resources quickly. While pre-planning is not specifically a function of the ICS system, without it the response would have been hindered.

Mutual Aid agreement were very important to the emergency response. A large number of personnel were required. Mutual Aid agreements allowed for a fluid process to identify and activate these resources. Although it was not specifically mentioned, the quick response from surrounding agencies indicates that these governments had worked together previously.

Self-activation was a large issue during this activation. Quick action from the Incident Commander and Incident Management Team made it possible to absorb these extra resources. Self-activation could very easily have become a large hinderance for the Incident Management Team.

Personal Opinion
This incident highlights how a streamlined ICS structure can produce an orderly emergency response. Fire department's were the first ones to use the Incident Command System. Throughout the incident an experienced fire officer was left in the role of Incident Commander. Using current knowledge, this seems totally reasonable. In 1999, ICS training was not yet mandated for all agencies. Law enforcement agencies would not start widely implementing law enforcement training till after 2001.

Given that ICS training had yet to be widely utilized. What was the reason for the success? I would argue that it was due to pre-incident planning. The After Action Report outlines the importance that had been placed on pre-incident planning. Government agencies from throughout the region and across multiple disciplines had planned, trained, and conducted exercises together. NFPA states "one individual described...there was "no need for introductions" at the incident scene" (Texas Bonfire, 1999). Planning, training, and exercising together is a key to alleviating turf battles and building trust among responders.

I chose this incident because it happened before NIMS and ICS were national mandates. Often, people point to federal mandates for success in ICS. Stating that federal mandates have caused the issue. These beliefs down play the importance of planning and knowing the people you may respond with. Incidents such as the bonfire illustrate the importance of knowing your fellow responders before the incident. It also illustrates that training alone is not always enough.

References
U.S. Fire Administration Technical Report Series: Bonfire Collapse Texas A & M University. n.d. United States Fire Administration. Retrived on December 3, 2009 from http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-133.pdf

Published by Bruce Ziebarth

I work full time in the Emergency Management fields as a planner and trainer. I also am pursuing a second career as a freelance writer.  View profile

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