The 20th Century: The Rise of Scottish Nationalism to Devolution

The history of modern Scotland is inseparable from that of England; it has been an legal part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland since the Union of 1707. However, because Scotland has its own identity, a movement developed to establish some sort of home rule. Therefore, it is necessary to review the economic, social and political issues affecting Scotland during the 20^th century to understand why the development of a separatist nationalism occurred.

The Scottish identity is an important starting point for explaining the causes of its nationalist movement. Several scholars and their theories will be utilized to aid in the understanding Scottish nationalism. The events that occurred in the early 20^th century are instrumental in creating specific conditions for contemporary nationalism. Further, Scottish nationalism has occurred in three waves. First, it began following the rise of post-materialist values in Europe until the economic crisis of the 1970s. Second, it arose in the late 1970s after the discovery of oil deposits in the North Sea off the shores of Scotland. Third, it finally culminated with successful devolution in 1997.

Since the Union of 1707, Scotland has belonged to Great Britain; however, it "has its own long and rich history in which it developed many traditions" (Steiner 1986, p. 50). Only recently have the Scottish begun to rediscover their roots. Partly due to an increase in tourism, many Scottish citizens have been reminded of just how different they are from the English. In response, there has been a "rebirth" of Scottish pride, through traditional songs and increased study of their history and culture (Steiner 1986, p. 50). Using the same logic, if a Scottish citizen were move to an English city they would begin to identify more with their Scottish heritage. This awareness is evident both in the older generations and among the young, educated citizens. Traditionally, Scottish activists are employed in cultural, educational or governmental sectors; they are not found in the larger firms where less identification with the nation takes place (Kellas 1998). Larger firms are more self-interested and find their motivation from the national and international economies.

The major catalyst to a conscious Scottish nationalism is the British state; it has created a "legal, political and administrative distinction between Scotland and England" (Kellas 1998, p. 20). Regional policies, such as government development agencies, pursued by the state to relieve some of the nationalist tendencies only served to increase the expectations and identity of Scots. This led to a dual identity, one where Scots feel a connection to their ethnic background in addition to the state. In a study performed by L. Moreno, the following partial table (Table 1) reflects the empirical evidence of this statement. A second study was completed during the national elections in Britain during 1997. J. Kellas, along with A. Heath compiled data in the same matter (Table 2). Together these tables illustrate decisively the dual nationality that characterizes the Scottish identity.

Although Scots seem to be divided on how Scottish they feel, they did not want to create an ethnic nation, only a separate government or state for themselves. Scottish nationalism is considered a 'social nationalism,' where the nationalism of a national defines itself by social and cultural ties rather than by common descent. Therefore, anyone can adopt the social and cultural characteristics of the nation and be accepted as a member (Kellas 1998). The non-aggression trait of Scots towards the English core is attributed to the shared common language and through Anglicization, which occurred due to the Church of England. This liberal and democratic type of nationalism is common of 'western' nationalism, which is considered inclusive and based on the 'social nation' (Kellas 1998).

European nationalism, on the whole, is a strange phenomena, as it generally occurs in what are believed to be established and stable states. As explained by Inglehart, the political culture of Europe is explained by the post-materialist values that it developed in the 1960s (in Kellas 1998). He believes that affluence contributes greatly to the conscious views of difference between groups. This nationalist sentiment is visible in the economic, social and political spheres in relation to the central government and core population.

Michael Hechter asserted that although in some cases 'diffusion theory,' from interaction will come commonality, is likely in some cases, its negation is true of Scottish Nationalism (1975, p. 7). Regional inequalities can in cases cause ethnic conflict; in the United Kingdom, England is the dominant core region while the other regions are given an inferior status. These inequalities are not only cultural, but along lines of wealth as well. This 'cultural division of labor' as defined by Hechter also contributes to the understanding of the rise of Scottish nationalism.

Anthony Mughan's theory of de jure (of political inequalities) and de facto (of economic and social inequalities) power adds another explanation to Scottish nationalism. He believes that "when these two types of power resources do not correspond for any one ethnic group that conflict occurs" (in Kellas 1998, p. 79). The discovery of oil in the North Sea off of Scotland gave rise to this separatist nationalism. Later during the 1970s, when the economics of Europe were in decline, this nationalism subsided shortly until the boom of the early 80s.

The Scottish represent barely 10 percent of the entire British state, and thus have not had a large voice politically. Before the fall of the British Empire, when they were not able to achieve "positions of power" within their home state , they often attempted to create a place for themselves in Britain's colonial possessions (Kellas 1998). Following the fall of colonialism, they found that there was no longer such an opportunity. Competition in Britain had became internal, the Scots were pitted against the English for these "positions of power," as well as in the economic realm.

Although, foreign competition was becoming a serious threat, but Scotland's industrial base remained strong into the 20^th century. However, during World War I the Scottish area of Clydeside was the home to a labor movement called the 'Red Clydesiders.' Clydeside was the hub of the war effort for Scotland, and the wages of the industrial workers, left from those who had gone to war, were not enough to make a living during wartime inflation. The large number of grievances held by those industrial workers prompted the formation of the 'Red Clydesiders.' The group was comprised of "avowedly revolutionary socialists" and the numerous trials and convictions of members of the group "ensured that revolutionary radicalism became a Clydeside tradition" (Harris 2000, p. 72).

Britain, and most severely Scotland, suffered economically and bore high percentages of unemployment in the 2^nd and 3^rd decades of the 20^th century. The concentration on only a few heavy industries was catastrophic to the economy; the demand for ships dwindled while iron and coal production fell. Over a quarter of Scottish workers were jobless at the height of the Depression.

It was not until the Second World War that full employment returned. Once again, Clyde was at the heart of the war effort. Following the end of World War II, there was a general improvement in the social conditions of Scotland, but soon heavy industry declined. The Scots' attempt towards diversification was unsuccessful and became part a large-scale problem for Great Britain.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Scotland benefited from the affluences that had become the norm in the western world, even though the core industries were having a hard time matching the prices and quality of their foreign competitors. This was vastly due to the government initiatives and subsidies that played a supportive role in dissuading collapse for a notably long while. Partly because of such comfortable times, the SNP went into a period of inactivity. However, this was not the only reason; the major parties saw internal unrest and, consequently, the MPs and Deputies began to take up the more nationalist cause of the SNP. This is how the Labour Party began to support Scottish autonomy and the creation of a national assembly.

It was at this same time that many youths began to go further in school by attending college through the many welfare programs offered through Keynesian economic policy. Unsatisfied with their inadequate learning environments, students protested governments and universities for improvements. According to Urwin, student protest seemed to dissipate when their needs were met with successful government initiatives (1997). This type of nationalism almost mirrors that of Scottish nationalism as will be illustrated in the following paragraphs.

For most of the 20th century, Scottish politicians adhered to British parties of the right, left of center and hoped to carry out their programs through the Parliament at Westminster (Harris 2000, p. 154). Many Scots, however, felt that their political representation was inadequate; the vast distance from their country to Westminster led them to believe that their interests were of little priority. The Scottish National Party (SNP) formed in response and was committed to achieving independence for Scotland.

It was not until 1970 that the SNP established itself as a significant political force, before it had only been a local party (Urwin 1997, p. 197). The SNP's commitment to self-government was supported with the discovery of offshore oil reserves in the North Sea. Scotland began to show growth and the SNP argued that the country would not suffer economically if independence was sought and the Union of 1707 dissolved.

In 1974, the SNP won an unprecedented nine seats in Parliament; this landmark victory was important because it was the first of any nationalist party to gain such political success. Following the election, the SNP entered a coalition government with Labour with an understanding that Labour would look into some form of autonomy for Scotland. Labour needed their votes to form a government and accepted the prerequisite (Wegs and Ladrech, p. 311). Honoring their agreement with the SNP, the Labour government held a popular referendum in 1979. Surprisingly, the citizens of Scotland chose to continue their current relationship with Great Britain.

Following the rejection of the Labour government's proposal for regional autonomy, nationalist sentiment seemed to subside in Scotland. However, the 1979 election brought the Conservative Party to power in Britain with policies that were enormously unpopular in Scotland. Margaret Thatcher became head of the British government and many Scots believed that she was unresponsive to Scottish demands. For example, she eliminated state aid and subsidies, and sponsored free-operation of the market; this led to a time of economic distress because the Scots could not compete with the England's ability to produce manufactured goods at a lower price.

The situation grew worse when "Scotland seemed to be effectively disenfranchised since its votes counted for nothing in the formation of British governments or their politics for Scotland." Concurrently, the Scottish economy began to improve at an accelerated rate and a rapid cultural revitalization took place as well. This caused "a disjunction between economic, political and cultural power ... which contributed to a rise in nationalism" (Kellas 1998, p. 80). This corresponds well with Stein Rokkan's theory of regionalism as a result of an "incongruity between cultural, economic and political roles" (Rokkan and Urwin 1983, p. 192).

In the mid-1980s, Conservatism collapsed in Scotland, and the SNP was able to accept its place as the alternative to Labour (Urwin 1997, p. 199). The continued growth in support for the SNP in the 1990s culminated in the general election of May 1997, in which the party won 22 percent of the vote and six parliamentary seats by campaigning on discontent with the way the Conservatives handled Scottish affairs in the British Parliament in London. The election, which saw the Conservative party lose all of its Scottish seats, brought Tony Blair of the Labour party to the post of prime minister. Through the years, Labour had remained committed to devolution and when it returned to power Blair made the campaign for Scottish home rule one of the priorities of his new administration. In response to Conservatives who expressed fear that the creation of a Scottish Parliament would eventually lead to the dissolution of the United Kingdom, Blair insisted that his administration was committed to a unified Britain and argued that devolving power would boost the overall efficiency of the British government and a proposal for a devolved Scottish Parliament was consequently presented.

A breakthrough occurred in 1998 when the Scotland Act passed at Westminster, devolving a range of powers to the new Scottish Parliament. The powers bestowed upon the new parliament included all matters of health, education, agriculture and justice. Whatever the future might hold, most Scots were proud and pleased when, in May 1999, members of the new Parliament in Edinburgh were sworn in, and what had been described in 1707 as " 'the end of an auld song' proved to be merely a lengthy interruption" (Harris 2000, p. 155).

The vote, however, stopped short of severing Scotland's ties with Britain, as the proposal called for the queen of England to remain head of state and the British prime minister to remain head of government. Moreover, the national Parliament would maintain control over such national and international issues as foreign affairs, defense, employment legislation, and social security. According to Jack McConnell, the First Minister of Scotland, "devolution allows Scotland to deliver distinct solutions to its own problems while remaining an integral part of the United Kingdom - the best of both worlds" (2003). Nevertheless, Scotland's place in Britain for the time being is secured as a functional devolved parliament, but the question now is will that serve to fuel even further separation from the British state?

Perhaps it was the mix of affluence and discrimination experienced during the post WWII era, which led to the active petition for a separatist nationalism. The young and educated citizens of Europe were becoming more radical and prone to protest, it was not unlikely that an identification with one's roots could occur. As was common of the time, the bureaucratic state was far from accepting the demands of this social group. They may have began reinforcing their heritage to gain a firmer foundation, because as long as a person is alive they are tied to their ethnicity and that link could easily be employed for political reasons. Another possible reason to turn to nationalism, could have been by seeing it as an alternative to identifying with the bureaucratic nation-state (Steiner 1986, p. 55).

Works Consulted

Harris, N. (2000). Heritage of Scotland: A Cultural History of Scotland & Its People. Octopus Publishing Group Limited.

Hechter, M. (1975). Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Kellas, J.G. (1998). The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. Second Ed. New York: St Martin's Press Ltd.

McConnell, Jack. (2003). Factsheets: Devolution. Introduction.

Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D. W. (1983). Economy, Territory and Identity. Politics of West European Peripheries. London: SAGE Publication.

(2003). Factsheets: Devolution. Scottish Government.

Steiner, J. (1986). European Democracies. New York: Longman Group.

Urwin, D. W. (1997). A political history of Western Europe since 1945. 5^th Ed. London: Longman Group.

Wegs and Ladrech. (1996). Europe Since 1945: A Concise History. Bedford: St. Martin's.