The Amoral Explanation of Morality

It should be noted that by amorality I mean something completely distinct from "immorality." The former is simply the denial of moral paradigms as having any meaning or any possible objective existence; while the latter refers to conduct in rejection of some accepted moral code. The amoralist then does not look to moral codes as normative claims for how one ought to behave, nor looks to them as objective explanations for practical action. Rather, the amoralist looks to other explanations for the phenomena of human behavior as we experience it.

This distinction is important for a few different reasons. First and foremost the amoralist does not simply prescribe to the view that they ought to treat people in disrespectful or harmful manners - but rather, that there is no objective principle of conduct for not doing so. We can think of many different reasons for why we ought to treat people a particular way. Is it really necessary to rely on moral principles to justify our behavior? It seems not, and it is always possible for finding an explanation of phenomenal determination for other phenomena.

Rejecting moral explanations is a fundamental aspect of amorality. The objective moral outlook would seek to explain certain phenomena with a moral basis - one that is neither justified nor based within empirical foundations. Taking an amoralist perspective on events, individuals, institutions, groups, or anything enables one to look beyond paradigms of "good vs. evil" and avoid the inescapable problems of making descriptive claims from normative beliefs. This keystone of amoral outlooks and perspectives is a fundamental difference that must be taken into consideration when making the distinction between someone who is amoral versus someone who is immoral.

Before we continue, we should examine the implications of the word "immoral." To be "immoral" means that one does not abide by certain standards of conduct for which some form of moral claims are upheld by a given judge. The problem with this is that we cannot possibly know the meaning of these moral truths without relying on some fundamental epistemic assumptions. In other words - on what justifiable basis may we assume that our moral standards are the appropriate means for judging one to be behaving "morally" versus "immorally"? The pre-philosophic answer is about as helpful as the complex philosophical one.

This answer is undeterminable through theoretical means. The objective nature of morality is problematic in almost every sense of the word - the best it can argue for itself is that its ontological pretext is simply not impossible. This hardly seems a justifiable reason to adopt something at all (for, we can reasonably assume that this course of action could justify even the most contradictory of moral standards in relation to our own, and hence we have moved nowhere in relation to discovering that which we sought in the first place - an objective moral truth!).

So why then is the amoralist correct? Well, to be certain, we cannot say he is correct at all. Rather we can say that he is not positioning himself to rely on that which is unknowable or that which cannot be demonstrated or explained within reasonable grounds experientially. Rejecting objective moral explanations is perhaps the best way to remove the blinders of social conditioning to find at least what could possibly be the best (inductive) explanation for phenomena. Take for instance something that is highly viewed as a moral and social issue - American slavery.

Some philosophers have tried to explain the inherent injustice and immorality of slavery as the partial cause (if not the most significant cause) for its downfall. The argument follows that the injustice and immorality of slavery created contradictions within the moral framework that the United States were built upon, and the foundation for the political, social, and cultural institutions that it allegedly upheld. This "contradiction of morals" creates inherent pressure for the unjust system (slavery in this case), pressure that is both antagonistic to its own existence and maintenance (contradiction). When the political body recognizes this contradiction - and takes the effort to dismantle it - the system crumbles within itself and is no longer seen as viable; and thus a synthesis of morality has occurred. This synthesis is the overthrow of the immoral institution of slavery for at least a more relatively just system (capitalism).

Now, intuitively we may accept this proposition, but it does not follow that this is an accurate nor plausible one. We have to regard intuition for what it is, and how it may be limited. Here we also experience something that would nominate another weakness in the objective moral explanation theory (for it would then rely on the manifold of objective intuition - which can only be (analytically) subjective). However, I do not wish to explain this here nor does it relate to the topic at hand.

Thus, the amoralist does not reference moral explanations for anything and may recognize the faults with any such attempt. Now, the more important question for amorality rather than explanations is conduct or behavior. Do we have reasonable expectations to believe that if we deny the universality of form for morality that people would behave differently? I think not.

If morality is not something objectively true independent of how we may experience it (or anything) then what explanation for its existence could be possible? Well, the amoralist examines the ontological question of morality from an amoral perspective. These explanations may vary from a completely instrumental explanation for morality to empirically-based scientific/psychological one. Detailing these arguments can be very complex, but perfectly accessible to anyone, regardless of experience, culture, history, etc. -- something that cannot be said for the objective moral truth. Hence, we should make use of that which is knowable beyond mere experientially dependent towards the objective reality of experience itself - the admission that the physical world as we experience it and may observe it is the best way to inductively explain how we ought to act.

How ought we to act? Well, experience can tell us a great deal of information regarding this -- for which we may use inductive reason to come to some sort of concept we may use to dictate how we ought to behave towards ourselves and one another. This is readily accessible and possible for anybody in any given society at any point in time. With this perspective, much of the work has already been "given" to us through our own experience. We need not think too hardly on the more extreme cases of how we ought to act - society imparts this upon us in great detail through many years of socialization, indoctrination, and cultivation. Take for example the extreme case of murder. While we may intuitively say we objectively recognize that murder is wrong -- this is not a very good explanation for why we do not commit ourselves to taking the life of another for some non-essential cause (not in self-defense). It can only be said to be an assumption about, non-verifiable. We can look to social conditioning though, as a perfectly legitimate explanation for why we do not arbitrarily take the life of another. Coercive institutions and the prospect of sacrificing a great deal as a consequent for our actions is a reasonably justified explanation. Intuitively speaking, it may sound cold and highly consequentialist and selfish; however, that is not the point. How something makes you feel matters little (if at all) when dealing with such issues as to whether or not something should be adopted as an explanation for how things occurred or how one ought to act.

I will now demonstrate how this process works through a conditional proposition. Let (x) represent the experience of being held accountable for committing a crime, and let (y) represent that i have learned this behavior indirectly through my sense impressions as a reasonable outcome for myself if I were to commit action (z):

"If I believe (z) will result as a reasonably certain outcome for (x), then through (y) i may conclude that i ought not to do (z)."

Through this indirect experience (for i have never committed (z)), I can reasonably predict my own behavior unless contingent inclinations alter the circumstances for which (x) no longer serves as proper motivation against committing (z). This empirical account of morality then serves as the basis for explaining my moral experiences solely on grounds for which I can reasonably generate something similar to "knowledge" about how humans behave. It should be noted that the importance of this view only inductively allows us to generate some varying degree of certainty in regards to explaining behavior or predicting future behavior (if it were deductive we could generalize that it is indeed a fact that is necessarily true, but we cannot move that far ahead legitimately -for experience accounts for observable explanations of phenomena).

It is on this basis alone that we cannot legitimately believe that the rejection of objective morality and the adoption of an amoral outlook towards life will lead to immorality on behalf of individuals. In fact, I believe this is what we do already. More often then not, we have trouble distinguishing moral relevant cases in our own lives (when they are not extreme) and really only convince ourselves of making moral decisions when morality is being discussed in a political or social context. In conclusion, we should not fear the denial of morality and the slippery slope that may follow. Rather, we should look more closely at our own limited scope of moral knowledge and come to the conclusion that at its very heart - it really doesn't have a leg to stand on.