The Categorical Imperative and Lying

The understanding of duty as it relates to our moral reflections as imposed by the Categorical Imperative can be illustrated through the application of a subjective maxim permitting lying. From here, I can demonstrate (through all three formulations of the Categorical Imperative) the way in which our maxims must conform to duty not by virtue of their content, which is determined by inclination and desires, but rather on their form (universality). In order to do this, I will apply the aforementioned subjective maxim and assess its conflict within itself exhibited through the application of the moral law (Categorical Imperative) as it relates to the imposition of duties. Secondly, I will reflect on Kant's "rigorism" and its potential invalidation of his moral philosophy.

Maxims, as principles of action, are subjective. This subjectivity exists because they are our own (subjective in form) and not necessitated by reason (but on inclination and content). Subjective maxims become objective laws when they satisfy the three formulations of the Categorical Imperative - "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law (74)"; "act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (80); "act only so that the will could regard itself as at the same time giving universal law through his maxims as a legislator in a community of the kingdom of ends" (83-5). The fitness of maxims that may satisfy the moral law separates those laws which are given to the will through objects outside of reason itself, namely the sensible world as it relates to the being - resulting in heteronomy (contrary to autonomy) which does not recognize any object of volition as a determinate factor of the will; separating the moral law from those maxims for which could be universalized and would subjectively necessitate hypothetical imperatives based on inclinations or volition, and thus have no necessitation through duty. Thus, duty is derived dependently through the moral law as it objectively necessitates a rational being (75).

The illustration of the Categorical Imperative's imposition of duty on moral reflections can be done with an example of a maxim permitting the use of lying. Such a subjective maxim may be stated in the following way: "it is permissible to lie when one is in dire need." This maxim is subjective in its form and is content-based in a subjective end - the desirability of satisfying one's own inclinations in times of need. Philosophers and others have exhausted numerous more particular examples regarding this, but specifics are not necessary for what I have set out to do nor do we need to imagine a real life scenario in which such a maxim could be reflected upon. The next step then is to examine this subjective maxim through the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative.

The first formulation of the Categorical Imperative necessitates moral actions as determined by the will without any external inclinations through the universalization of the form of the subjective maxim. Thus, we need not consider content of any such maxim when deciphering whether or not it can necessitate duty in accordance to the moral law, but rather merely its form. So when the application of our subjective maxim is put before the Categorical Imperative there can only exist a duty in accordance to the necessitation by the moral law on our rational wills if in fact we could will such a maxim to be a universal law. It follows then that perfect duties - ones with which no exceptions can be made -- exist through the determination of the moral law on our own rational will not to act on those maxims for which could not be willed a universal law applicable to all, rather than a mere exception for oneself. For a maxim to be necessitated as moral law, we must be "able to will our action become a universal law" (75). Thus, when applying the maxim permitting lying to the first formulation, the will clearly contradicts itself as follows. The contradiction lies in that if the will were able to universalize such a maxim, then it would undermine the very principle for which the agent acted upon. Lying presupposes some value in the truthfulness of a promise, and the individual responsible for telling the lie must expect the recipient to hold some value in his promise, otherwise his lie would be impossible in a world where such a maxim determined by self-love were universally true. What is really going on here, Kant says, is the maxim itself could never be willed universal in its form, but rather done so as an exception for ourselves to satisfy our own inclinations (76). So it follows that the will could not possibly universalize such a maxim on account of its impossibility to sustain itself if it were universal, and furthermore, no rational agent would hold that it should be universal either, as such a maxim determined by self-love would be contradictory to the inclination which spawned it.

The subjective maxim permitting lying, which could not be willed as universal law, also encounters problems when faced with the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative: "act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means." Reason necessitates that our maxims hold universally only when they conform to the treatment of rational beings in general as not merely means, but ends in themselves. This idea of rational nature being an end in itself is not derived from our sense impressions or experiences, but due to its own universality (for which no experience could dictate) and is derived a priori from our pure reason in conformity with the universality of humanity as an end in itself, and not the subject of our ends as rational beings. This is understood as the ground for all practical lawgiving in that it conforms to our willing of maxims to be universal law and from this it follows that no such maxim could be willed universally under the moral law nor necessitated without the condition of humanity of rational beings (by their nature) as existing as an end in itself. This is an objective principle because it holds for all rational beings, and must serve as a universal practical law (80).

Thus, when attempting to will the maxim permitting lying it contradicts our objective principle as treating humanity as not merely a means, but as an end in itself. Lying or making false-promises to another rational being entails using them as a means for some other subjective end, and this agent becomes instrumentally valuable in the achievement of this other end. However consistent this may be with the advancement of one's own inclinations, needs, or desires, it is not consistent with the objective principle of the moral law that necessitates the will universalize those maxims that treat others (including himself) as an end and not merely a means. The rational being whom is lied to cannot consent to such action that would permit his being treated as merely a means for it is by virtue of his rational nature that makes him an end in itself, and such a maxim is not consistent with the objective necessitation of perfect duty owed towards others (as explained above) and violates the aforementioned objective principle. This formulation represents a universal practical law and must then hold for all rational beings absent their external inclinations. It would be impossible for any rational being to will as universal law any maxim that does not conform to the "humanity principle" for it would undermine his own status as a rational being with an autonomous will (81). From here, follows the third formulation of the Categorical Imperative.

The third formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which commands every rational being to "act as if he were by his maxims at all times a lawgiving members of the universal kingdom of ends" (87), rests on the third practical principle on the basis of the idea of the will of "every rational being as a will giving universal law" (81). The moral law itself, which is necessitated through reason, means the rational agent must repudiate all external inclinations and desires if any such universally objective moral law were to exist at all; and it follows then that this can only be conceived through the autonomy of the will. Thus, the will is itself the "law-giver" and can only find in its source of determination the moral law and respective duties that are necessitated from it. Duty is the condition which bridges our moral imperatives on the will to our actions in the sensible world, and the will binds us to act in conformity to laws, which under the idea of freedom require ourselves to be our own legislators of moral laws. Kant states that under any other condition there could be no possibility of a supreme ground for duty, and so we arrive at the necessary condition for the possibility of having moral experiences: an autonomous will in relation to the community of all other rational beings for whom such moral reflection occurs. The common objective laws that determine our will leads to the conclusion that rational beings are in someway connected (through objective law) in relation to others by way of a community of lawgiving rational beings in a kingdom of ends. This principle of the kingdom of ends is dependent upon the first two formulations, and such a maxim that would contradict this formulation - such as one that permits lying - would not be practically necessitated as every rational being must be considered lawgiving, otherwise it could not be thought of as an end in itself (84). The ground for the aforementioned principle lies in autonomy and morality is the condition for which anything could be thought to have an inner dignity (in a Kingdom of Ends), for which autonomy serves as the basis for the rational will obeying its own laws as only reason necessitates him, in accordance with the objective principle of rational nature as an end in itself. The subjective maxim permitting lying would devalue the freedom of the will of all rational agents in accordance to their being subjects and lawgivers within the kingdom of ends, and thus one is forbidden to act in accordance with such a maxim.

Duty is imposed on our moral reflections by way of the Categorical Imperative through the command that our maxims conform to the moral law. A subjective maxim that would permit lying is thus inconsistent with the above formulations of the one supreme moral law. Maxims that permit actions that are incapable of coexisting with the moral law are hence forbidden, and the objective necessity of an action from our obligations to obey the "ought" as it is necessitated through the moral law is hence called "duty" (88).

It is here that many have voiced there displeasure with Kantian "rigorism." It may be viewed that this rigorism perhaps invalidates Kant's moral philosophy, but this is false. For, if we accept the posits, assumptions, and detailed argument for Kant's moral rationalism, then it would only follow that this rigorism is in no way inconsistent with the necessitation of the moral law as defined by Kant. It would be rather difficult to even imagine Kant's moral philosophy as derived from reason without this rigorism. Whatever problems one might have with Kantian deontology, it must follow from one's disagreement in posits rather than pointing out invalidating inconsistencies in Kant's own argument. It seems that while we have in fact defined much of our own moral reflections on our intuitions we have in fact denied our own rationality in these experiences. For Kant, this is merely what we do when we have moral experiences, and his work is the argument for what such experiences must require in order for them to even be possible. Thus, the rigorism may seem counter-intuitive to our own moral experiences for which we improperly credit solely to intuitions without further investigation, but this is in part our own fault - not an invalidation of Kant's moral philosophy.

Sources:

Kant, Immanuel. The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. (1785). From the Cambridge Edition of Kant's Works in Practical Philosophy. Ed. Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (37-108).