The China Model Vs. Democracy

It has been argued by many that the China model cannot continue to succeed and that the country will soon turn to Western style democracy as the most effective political system. This argument also points to China's culture and history stating that there are numerous examples of democratic impulses (including cultural ideas such as Confucianism and minben) which show that China yearns for democracy. However, these beliefs are not realistic and there is little evidence within Chinese political culture that any major change is forthcoming; nor is China's culture conducive to democracy at this time.

The China model has been a success and will continue to be so. China's powerful and ever growing economy has enabled the country to solidify its power internally (as well as to expand its power globally) and to rapidly modernize and enlarge its military. The existence of a much improved (and continually growing) economy in China will also not lead to the country becoming a democracy. Within the country there exists a strong sense of nationalism which the ruling communist party effectively uses as a tool to prop itself up in the eyes of the people.

The country has been liberalizing but this does not mean it is, or will, become democratic. As Suisheng Zhao explains, "liberalization involves reducing state control over society" but "democratization entails an institutionalization of political participation from below."[1] I use the definition of democracy provided by Andrew Nathan: "open competitive elections under universal franchise for occupants of those posts where actual policy decisions are made, together with the enjoyment of the freedoms of organization and speech needed to enable self-generated political groups to compete effectively in these elections."[2]

The term "China model" is comprised of many attributes, it is necessary to define what these are before continuing. At its most basic, the China model is a free market with an authoritarian government. The model is based on the model used by the East Asian Newly Industrialized Nations; this includes: select economic freedoms, export orientated economy, use of the developmental state approach, pragmaticism, and gradual liberalization. The China model also includes selective learning of aspects of the Western Model. With respect to the political aspects of the China model, the government has been seeking to make one party rule more efficient, open, inclusive, and legal. This has been achieved by moving away from personal authority to institutional authority, allowing more political action from the people (ex. The Cadre Accountability System), and institutionalizing the rule of law rather than the rule of man.

China has had a number of democratic experiments in the past but none of these have been successful. These experiments include: 1909 when provincial assemblies were elected; the May Fourth Movement era; 1947-48 when the national government held elections; 1954 with the implementation of the People's Congress system; 1978 with the Beijing Democracy Wall Movement. As Nathan explains, China's democratic experiments were "few in number, short in duration, and limited in their democratic characteristics. They were not robust on the electoral dimension after 1918, nor on the liberalism dimension after 1937."[3] The main problem was that none of these democratic efforts were ever institutionalized into the governmental system. These democratic experiments, combined with the change in political trends in the world system, created a strong sense of disillusionment about democracy within many Chinese intellectuals.[4] Adding to the consistent failure of China's democratic experiments was, as Zhao explains, "Chinese political leaders' cynicism toward democracy and Chinese intellectuals' overanxiousness to get the results of economic modernization and social harmony from democracy."[5] Democracy has not proven an effective tool to allow China to modernize, however, the authoritarian system has produced results.

China is driven by strong nationalist sentiment and an intense urge to right the wrongs it feels that is has suffered in the past, for example during the Opium Wars and what China has termed the "hundred years of suffering and humiliation." China wishes to see itself as the once great nation that it was in the past when it was the hegemonic power in Asia. These emotions are felt not just by the government but also by the people. The countries that held back China were Western democracies, thus the Chinese people do not feel a strong inclination to follow their example. Nationalism has been an effective tool wielded by the CCP throughout its history. From its very beginning as an anti-imperialist nationalist movement the CCP has used nationalism many times and in many areas. From its use of nationalism in order to create the Second United Front to its campaign of patriotism after Tiananmen Square, the CCP has been very successful with the tool of nationalism. The CCP's nationalism has put the needs of the state ahead of the needs of the people and most Chinese believe that this is necessary to allow China to modernize; democracy will only slow, or even halt, modernization.

Major events occurred in the 1980s and 1990s that increased the power and standing of China's conservative nationalists and the military. This shift in power was intensified by the incapacitation of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, who had tended to exercise a pro-American and moderating influence.[6] The first of these events was the Tiananmen Square demonstrations which occurred in May and June 1989. The dangerous threat of the anti-Communist Party movement made conservatives within the government act to preserve control over the country's intellectuals and to "strike hard" (in the word of the anticrime campaign phraseology) against dissent.[7] Also, as Yijiang Ding states, "immediately after the incident, almost all of the new ideas about state and society were attacked in both the official media and academic journals. People who had advocated them were completely silenced."[8] This unrest struck fear in the hearts of many Chinese, they saw the potential destructiveness of the democracy movements and thus became much less supportive of them; this does not bode well for another emergence of a democracy movement.

The fall of the Soviet Union also strengthened the resolve of China to not let itself collapse, especially after seeing what happened to overthrown leaders such as the Ceausescus' (who were executed).[9] The Soviet's attempt at reform was used as an example of why China should not reform or else it would collapse like the Soviet Union. The fall of the Soviet Union also greatly increased China's power in Asia. The first Iraq war was another event that caused great change within China; it motivated rapid and costly modernization of China's armed forces, including such actions as further nuclear testing and long-range-missile development.[10] These events have hardened China's foreign and domestic policy and allowed the conservative element to take a much more prominent position within the current government.

While a democratic China would indeed be less threatening, there is no reason to believe that the country will be changing radically in the near future; nor does China's three-thousand year history hold any glimpses of a rule of the majority or notions of consent by the governed that optimists can point to in order to show that China has a democratic background from which to build upon. China has developed a powerful economy which is fueling the rapid expansion of its military. The great importance that the Chinese government has placed upon the reunification of Taiwan (even though lately the rhetoric has been decreased) means that the threat of war is just over the horizon. As one Chinese foreign affairs specialist in Beijing reported, "Historically, Chinese leaders have believed in force. Force worked in Tiananmen. It intimidated the intellectuals, and that paved the way for economic growth and political stability. It is realpolitik. And in the Chinese value system, sovereignty, national unification, and preserving the regime have always been higher than peace."[11] This is true for all people in China, not just the government.

A distinct rise in nationalism within China has been an important factor in allowing the government to remain in power and restraining democracy. As faith in Communism faltered, nationalism became a tool for the government to regain legitimacy. Nationalism had been used in the past, including during Mao's era, but became particularly important in 1989. With the Tiananmen Square debacle and the resulting crackdown by the government, the state launched a massive propaganda campaign with the goal of creating strong patriotism within the people. As Zhao explains, "the core of the patriotic education campaign was the so-called guoqing jiaoyu (education in national condition), which unambiguously held that China's guoqing (national condition) was unique and not ready for adopting a Western-style democracy."[12] This education would help the people understand that economic development and the other desires that they had could not be achieved except through continued political stability. Ding states that the "Tiananmen crackdown was followed by a campaign of criticism, which targeted key concepts such as the state-society dualism, marketization, the return of power to society, economic freedom, individual freedom, social pluralism, etc."[13] The patriotic education program was largely successful and has quelled calls for democracy; as long as China's economic development continues there seems to be little reason to think the situation will change.

Zhao states that "although the rise of nationalism is not necessarily in contradiction to democratization and may even reinforce the development of democratic institutions in a liberal society, it may also become a competing value system, particularly when nationalism is associated with authoritarianism."[14] Thus authoritarian nationalism, with its demand that individuals subordinate their interests to those of the state, will likely pose a major barrier to the rise of any type of democracy.

Since the Chinese democratic movement of the 1980's was strongly influenced by Western liberal ideas it was easy for the Chinese government to create a nationalist movement that was also anti-Western. Chinese intellectuals also came to the same idea of nationalism as the government due to their fears that China faced a crisis of national disintegration. The government seized on this growing popular nationalism and used it as a tool to block Western influences and to regain its legitimacy in the post-Tiananmen era.[15] A factor that helped the government regain legitimacy was that many Chinese intellectuals believed that the West was using issues, such as human rights and democracy, in order to impede and holdup China's modernization process.[16] This led some intellectuals to reject liberal democracy because they believed that "democracies can ... prevent rapid economic development."[17]

Due to China's quickly growing economy, arising from a series of reforms, many intellectuals, in particular the young, started to develop a new sense of self-confidence and national pride.[18] Chinese intellectuals and the government thus became united in their struggle to hold the country together as it attempted to find its way forward. As Zhao explains "Chinese nationalism is thus a result of a volatile mix of rising pride and lingering insecurity in response to profound domestic crises."[19] The government's nationalism has been very successful in creating a feeling of unity among the different groups within China, and has thus helped to quiet calls for democracy. Importantly, by getting them to identify with the nation, nationalism also allowed for the participation of Chinese intellectuals in the modernization process of the country.[20] Zhao states that "this type of Chinese nationalism raises a serious question about how Chinese nationalism could be compatible with the worldwide trend of democratization."[21]

Historic sites such as the Humen Burning Opium site reminded the Chinese about the Opium Wars and the "hundred years of suffering and humiliation" that the Chinese had suffered at the hands of foreigners (mainly westerners). This also helped create a feeling of anti-Westernism which in turn continues to help the government resist any calls for reform. Suisheng Zhao points out that "in the twentieth century, all Chinese leaders - from Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin - have shared a deep bitterness resulting from China's humiliation and have determined to blot out that humiliation and restore China to its rightful place as a great power."[22]

This rise in nationalism, although unifying much of China, also has the great potential to quickly get out of the government's control. The danger of out of control nationalism has been evidenced by the government being criticized for being "too soft" towards the United States and Japan.[23] Another example is the widely read book called The China That Can Say No, whose authors claimed that China needed its own Zhirinovsky in order to "take back Taiwan by force at any cost and to assume a confrontational approach to the United States and Japan."[24] This type of nationalism is particularly dangerous, and while the Chinese government has never actually endorsed nationalism instead preferring only to talk of patriotism.[25] But this nationalism also shows the Chinese people's distrust of the West and its ideals thus making it that much more difficult for the country to ever become democratic.

The nationalism of today's China mirrors very closely the definition Hans J. Morgenthau gave for the nationalism that has arisen in the twentieth century: "[it] claims for nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standards of action upon all other nations."[26] The Chinese government has attempted at different times to repress expressions of nationalistic outrage, such as banning student demonstrations, but these actions only serve to undermine the legitimacy of the government which espouses nationalistic sentiments itself. Thus the government can not successfully control nationalism without weakening itself, so the threat of out of control nationalism will continue to exist.

In the study conducted by Dowd and his colleagues on the prospects for democratization in China they uncovered a number of important issues. Importantly, the study finds that there exists little public pressure for democracy and that democracy does not rank high on the list of what Chinese people value.[27] The study asked respondents to rank, from a list, which of values was the most important to them. It was revealed that 56% of the respondents valued "national peace and prosperity" (this was the highest ranked value) while only 5.8% valued political democracy.[28] When these responses were further broken down it became clear that there was little variation in response no matter if respondents were grouped according to age, level of education, income, gender, or type of employment; they all highly ranked "national peace and prosperity" and "political democracy" always ranked much lower.[29] The current Chinese government is largely seen as having brought "national peace and prosperity" to the country thus the people see little reason to demand democracy at this time.

With respect to China's economic development, the country's per capita gross national product has already placed it above the minimum level at which democracy has been practiced in other countries.[30] Many people have tried to argue that modernization theory predicts that China will become democratic. They point to China's rising economic conditions as a predictor of impending democracy. But in a 1995 study by Dowd et al it was found that income as a predictor of either highly valuing political democracy or individual freedom was completely irrelevant.[31] Beijing residents have a high level of economic confidence but there are no loud calls for more democracy.[32]

The CCP has used effective economic reforms to raise its own legitimacy and, at the same time, quell calls for democracy. The main reforms started with Deng Xiaoping, who, after the death of Mao, dismantled the communes, privatized agricultural production, and created the Household Contract Responsibility System. The rational of all these reforms was to link people's production efforts and their income. Deng also imposed reforms in the urban areas, these included creating a more autonomous relationship between the government and industries, movement to more regulatory control, and creation of a commercial banking system; Deng also opened China up to the international market. All these reforms proved to be very effective and China's economy surged forward to unheard of levels of growth. This economic growth improved the lives of millions of Chinese. As their lives improved, most people felt that there was little need to demand a change in the political system, especially since that might mean their newfound economic prosperity might disappear.

It is argued by many that China's increasing integration into the world economy will result in making the country more open and democratic internally. This has not been the case, China's much improved economy and its increased economic influence have allowed it to increase authoritarianism within the country, fight against or ignore international outrage at its polices and practices, and has enabled it to enlarge its prestige and power overseas.[33]

An interesting example of the Chinese government refusing to become more democratic and being cheered for it internally occurred during the Clinton administration when the United States attempted to pressure China to reform by improving its human rights record. In order to achieve this, the US threatened to withhold the most-favored-nation status. The Chinese complained angrily about the fact that the United States was using economic pressure to achieve political goals and, in reaction, applied political and economic pressure on the US, as well as Europe and the United Nations. This pressure resulted in President Clinton eventually withdrawing his protest and allowing China to retain its MFN status. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro point out the irony of this particular case by explaining that when China was under Mao and it displayed this kind of ideological intensity the United States believed it to be truly dangerous when in fact it was a "paper tiger."[34] Now in post-Mao China the country has moved onto a pragmatic course of economic development and global trade, it is viewed by many as less threatening but in reality it is acquiring the ability to support its global ambitions and interests with real power.[35] Nevertheless, internally the winning of the MFN status by the CCP was seen as a success by the people and increased their legitimacy while at the same time weakening the legitimacy of the West which was seen as holding back China's development. Again the case for democracy was weakened in China.

In today's world there has been a concerted movement by the majority of the countries towards the creation of international norms such as political liberalization, increased human rights, democratization, the peaceful resolution of disputes, the free flow of information, respect for international law, etc. On the alternate side, ideas such as authoritarianism, use of force to settle disputes, nationalism, etc. have been on decline; yet China is one of the last holdouts of these ideas. Yet it is these very ideas that seem to be increasing the CCP's legitimacy within the country. China has shown its lack of respect for international norms through its dreadful human rights record and its refusal to accept multilateral discussions on such issues as the country's claims in the South China Sea. Gerald Segal asserts that "today's China has the least commitment to the status quo of any important power."[36] Internally the Chinese government is seen by many as successfully standing up to the Western powers and many see any movement towards democracy as an admission of defeat by the West.

Another factor that stands in the way of China's democratization is the country's strong Confucian culture and history. Shaohua Hu explains that "as an essential part of Chinese culture, Confucianism has shaped, and will continue to shape, Chinese attitudes toward both authority and law."[37] Some theorists, such as Thomas Metzger, tend to argue that Confucianism encourages the flourishing of democracy, but this is a false belief. Unlike Western democracy which places a premium on individualism, Confucianism stresses the importance of families and filial piety. This respect for elders also translates to society at large and its respect and obedience to the government. This tendency is reinforced by Confucianism's tendency to accept and beautify hierarchy (unlike democracy's pursuit of equality).[38] Another factor restraining democracy, as Hu explains, is that "unlike democracy, which is characterized by the rule of law, Confucianism prefers ethics to law to such an extent that it obviates the need of law in society."[39] Until the need for rule of law is universally recognized in China there will be very little movement towards any form of democracy. Yet another problem that Confucianism poses is that it does not provide any ideas or guidance on how to select leaders nor does it offer an effective way to check despotism.[40]

It is argued by some that China's history of disobedience (ex. rebellions) shows that the country has a history of democratic movements which in turn means that the country will soon turn to democracy. But disobedience is not enough to amount to a democratic movement; there must be institutionalization of popular sovereignty and individual liberties.[41] Also, some argue that since Chinese rulers were subject to a number of constraints in their power that this amounts to a democratic tradition. But none of these constraints were institutionalized and institutionalization is a requirement for democracy.[42] Theorists, such as Bertrand Russell, have argued that since the Chinese people seemed to enjoy a fair amount of socioeconomic freedom and equality there existed a certain level of democracy in China. But as Hu explains, "democracy demands equality in political and legal terms and gives preference to formal equality rather than substantial equality."[43] It is also argued that China's history of allowing local autonomy is another democratic element, but this is incorrect, it simply shows the limits of China's political system.[44]

Confucianism has actually contributed to Chinese authoritarian government in a number of ways. Confucianism puts a premium on obedience and loyalty to the rulers; this can obviously be taken advantage of. Also Chinese bureaucracy, which is related to Confucianism, helped to prop up authoritarian regimes.[45] In addition, as Hu explains, "Confucianism as an orthodoxy created a conservative mentality, which fit authoritarianism."[46]

Another ancient Chinese political value that some have argued can be identified with, and foreshadows the emergence of, democracy is minben. Minben is a concept that consists of the idea that the people are of primary importance in the political order. But Minben does not represent a democratic impulse on China's part. Wang and Titunik state that "while the concept of minben promotes accountable government, it does not necessarily point to a democratic system as the solution to achieving accountability and the public welfare."[47] In fact, minben, with its idea of the good of the people, may actually support authoritarianism; this is due to the government dealing with the juxtaposition between the common good and the threat of chaos.[48]

Lucien Pye argues that China's political culture "embodies an intolerance of conflict, a yearning for authority, and a stress on personal loyalty that leads to factionalism, which in turn destroys the functioning of democratic institutions."[49] Therefore, China's political culture is inhospitable to democracy. Nathan states that this view is also widely held among Chinese democrats themselves.[50]

China's government relies on its continuing legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, and for the moment this legitimacy looks to be stable. But a major incident, such as the collapse of the world financial system, could destroy the authority of the government due to its heavy reliance on economic growth as an indicator of its success. If such an incident occurred there is no telling what road China's political system may take, but democracy would seem no more likely than another form of dictatorship arising. China may simply not be an ideal place for democracy to flourish. As Lloyd Eastman said, "in a profound sense, Anglo-American democracy was not suited to China ... In China, an authoritarian system of rule is perhaps better able to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number."[51]

[1] Suisheng, Zhao, "Introduction: China's Democratization Reconsidered," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 12.

[2] Andrew, Nathan, "Chinese Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 21.

[3] Andrew, Nathan, "Chinese Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 23.

[4] Suisheng, Zhao, "A Tragedy of History," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 40.

[5] Suisheng, Zhao, "A Tragedy of History," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 48.

[6] Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997).

[7] Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997).

[8] Yijiang, Ding, "The Conceptual Evolution of Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 121.

[9] Yasheng Huang. "Why China Will Not Collapse." Foreign Policy Issue 99 (1995): 57.

[10] Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997).

[11] Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997).

[12] Suisheng Zhao. "Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatic Foreign Policy Behavior." In Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004): 66.

[13] Yijiang, Ding, "The Conceptual Evolution of Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 123-124.

[14] Suisheng, Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 253.

[15] Suisheng, Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 253.

[16] Suisheng, Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 266.

[17] Kisbore, Mahbubani, "The Pacific Way," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1 (1995): 103.

[18] Suisheng, Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 254.

[19] Suisheng, Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 254.

[20] Suisheng, Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 266.

[21] Suisheng, Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Authoritarianism in the 1990s," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 267.

[22] Suisheng Zhao. "Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatic Foreign Policy Behavior." In Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004): 70.

[23] Suisheng Zhao. "Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatic Foreign Policy Behavior." In Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004): 77.

[24] Suisheng Zhao. "Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatic Foreign Policy Behavior." In Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004): 77.

[25] Suisheng Zhao. "Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatic Foreign Policy Behavior." In Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004): 79.

[26] Suisheng Zhao. "Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatic Foreign Policy Behavior." In Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004): 79.

[27] Daniel Dowd, Allen Carlson, and Mingming Shen, "The Prospects for Democratization in China," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 189.

[28] Daniel Dowd, Allen Carlson, and Mingming Shen, "The Prospects for Democratization in China," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 194.

[29] Daniel Dowd, Allen Carlson, and Mingming Shen, "The Prospects for Democratization in China," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 194-198.

[30] Andrew, Nathan, "Chinese Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 28.

[31] Daniel Dowd, Allen Carlson, and Mingming Shen, "The Prospects for Democratization in China," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 203.

[32] Daniel Dowd, Allen Carlson, and Mingming Shen, "The Prospects for Democratization in China," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 204.

[33] Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997).

[34] Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997).

[35] Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997).

[36] Denis Roy, "The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments," Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No.8 (August 1996): 761.

[37] Shaohua, Hu, "Confucianism and Western Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 67.

[38] Shaohua, Hu, "Confucianism and Western Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 60-61.

[39] Shaohua, Hu, "Confucianism and Western Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 61.

[40] Shaohua, Hu, "Confucianism and Western Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 61.

[41] Shaohua, Hu, "Confucianism and Western Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 62.

[42] Shaohua, Hu, "Confucianism and Western Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 63.

[43] Shaohua, Hu, "Confucianism and Western Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 63.

[44] Shaohua, Hu, "Confucianism and Western Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 63.

[45] Shaohua, Hu, "Confucianism and Western Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 65.

[46] Shaohua, Hu, "Confucianism and Western Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 65.

[47] Enbao, Wang and Regina, Titunik, "Democracy in China," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 85.

[48] Enbao, Wang and Regina, Titunik, "Democracy in China," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 85.

[49] Lucien, Pye, "The Dynamics of Chinese Politics," (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1981).

[50] Andrew, Nathan, "Chinese Democracy," in Suisheng, Zhao, China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000): 26.

[51] Lloyd, Eastman, "The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937," (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974): 179-180.