The Cuban Missile Crisis: Prevention of American Imperialism or the Invasion of a Capitalist Society

Many Americans who remember the Cuban Missile Crisis, that started on October 16^th, 1962, remember thirteen days of fear and anxiety along with an overwhelming since of uncertainty. This stand-off between two super powers, during the climax of the Cold War, endangered the entire existence of the human race. On the one hand, after President John F. Kennedy's speech to the nation regarding missile sites being built in Cuba by the Soviet Union, many Americans were under the impression that the Soviets were out to dominate the world with communism and the United States was the next target. On the other hand, America's imperialistic intentions toward Cuba had already been revealed during the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs; therefore, the Soviet Union saw themselves as the protector of their weaker communist siblings. The preservation of communism was as justified a reasoning for the Soviets as the preservation of capitalism was for the United States. With this being the case, the paranoia, conflicting ideologies, and the insistence of dominance of such ideologies over Central America provided the catalyst for what was known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. As the story unfolded in the 1960's, John F. Kennedy came out the uncompromising victor; while, Nikita Khrushchev was seen as the leader who cracked under the immense pressure of his adversaries. Unfortunately, a lot of this story was a convenient cover-up that was just recently (within the last 15 years) uncovered. Many factors of the actual build-ups and catalysts were true, but the facts of how the crisis ends, seems to have been watered down and confabulated in Kennedy's favor.

Communism had usurped the feudal system in the Soviet Union since the early 20^th century and although the Soviets became our allies in World War II, there were many unresolved issues between the U.S. and the Soviets subsequent to the war. These unresolved issues over peace treaties and land distribution between these two super powers became known as the Cold War. The Cold War can be simply defined as the communists (Soviet Union) versus the capitalists (United States) in a ideological stand-off, and whoever occupied and converted the most countries in order to position themselves for domination by nuclear threat, won. With this being the case, the Soviets needed Cuba as much as Cuba needed the Soviets. It was the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, however, that humiliated the U.S., raised suspicions about their imperialistic agenda, and sealed the bonds between the Soviets and Cuba.

Even before the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Fidel Castro, leader of Cuba, was convinced that the U.S. had intentions to occupy Cuba. With this in mind, Castro's ideology of communism for Cuba began to divulge itself without discrepancy after the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. In a television broadcast on December 2^nd, 1961, Castro announced his full intentions of the formation of a communist Cuba by saying,

I am a Marxist-Leninist...and I will be a Marxist-Leninist to the last day of my life...Do I have any doubts about Marxism? Do I think some interpretations are erroneous and should be revised? I have not the least doubt! Quite the contrary is true in my case...And how am I a Marxist-Leninist? Halfway? We revolutionaries do not know how to do anything halfway! We only know how to do things one hundred per cent!^[1]

This move helped Castro adhere a stronger bond with Soviet Leader, Nikita Khrushchev; which in turn, gave communism and the Soviet Union a premier location in the western hemisphere. Moreover, Castro reaped the benefits that the Soviets provided; which included: "...economic aid and military supplies from the Soviet Union,...along with other forms of support, to revolutionary forces in several places in Latin America."^[2] With complete disdain for the United States and the advantages of a pact with the Soviet Union, Castro's decision to allow the Soviets to erect nuclear weapons was an obvious one.

When Kennedy gave his presidential address on October 22^nd, 1962, he told the American public that, "...our [U.S.] history, unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II, demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people."^[3] But with the recent attempts of invasion at the Bay of Pigs, along with the Philippines and other countries that were taken over by imperialist America, who could be sure that Cuba was not next? Moreover, Kennedy could be seen as insinuating to the public that the missile sites being built in Cuba were intended for the invasion of the U.S. This was not Kennedy's only reason he came to the conclusion that the U.S. would be invaded.

There was also the cunning nonchalance Khrushchev used while deceitfully denying any missile sites being erected in Cuba. At first, Khrushchev told President Kennedy that the Soviets had no intentions of arming Cuba with nuclear weapons. Subsequent to the U-2 intelligence confirming the erection of nuclear facilities in Cuba, the Soviets then claimed that they were building the missile sites for defensive purposes. On October 20^th, 1962, during a meeting with President Kennedy, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told Kennedy that Cuba needed help defending themselves from the United States. Gromyko said, "The question comes to the following: either they [Cuba] will stay unprepared to repulse new attempts at invasion or they must undertake steps to ensure their country from attack, take care of their defense."^[4] Within the midst of heated negotiations and accusations of fabrications, the security of the entire world hung in the balance. The Soviets claimed no agenda other than the welfare and defense of Cuba; whereas, the U.S. felt that the spread of communism was the only agenda of the Soviets; therefore, the building of missile sites within eighty miles off the U.S. coast would not be tolerated.

Although Khrushchev and Castro claimed the U.S. was planning an invasion of Cuba, President Kennedy reiterated the fact, on more than one occasion, that the United States had no intentions of invading Cuba. During the previously mentioned speech on October 22^nd, Kennedy announced to the general Cuban population, "But this country [The US] has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny you freedom."^[5] It was imperative at this juncture to dispose of any plans to invade Cuba, if there were any.

Also, within a letter Khrushchev sent to President Kennedy, he said,

You have been worried over our assisting Cuba with Arms designed to strengthen its defensive potential -- precisely defensive potential -- because Cuba, no matter what weapons it had, could not compare with you since these are different dimensions, the more so given up-to-date means of extermination.^[6]

With this remark, Khrushchev not only claims Soviet defense of Cuba, but also tries to convince Kennedy that because the United States is such a super power and has possession of very powerful nuclear weapons, for that reason, Cuba should not be seen as a threat.

The security of the U.S., regardless of their alleged plans to invade Cuba, would be compromised tremendously if they allowed the Soviet missile sites to be erected in Cuba. President Kennedy had no option but to demand that the construction of the missile sites cease immediately. He had plenty of reason to suspect a planned attack on the U.S. He knew the socialist ideology that the Soviet Union believed in called for a battle between the two factions. On September 16^th, 1959, during his visit to the U.S., Khrushchev told a reporter,

Capitalism fights against communism. I am convinced that the winner will be communism, a social system which creates better conditions for the development of a country's productive forces, enables every individual to prove his worth and guarantees complete freedom for society, for every member of society...Live on under capitalism, and we will build communism. The new and progressive will win; and the old and moribund will die.^[7]

This answer Khrushchev gives could seemingly be seen as threatening considering he was referring to communism as being "new and progressive"^[8] and capitalism as "old and moribund."^[9]

As the negotiations continued, tensions heightened throughout the world. Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, became the neutral mediator between the Soviets and the United States. On behalf of the U.N., Mr. Thant helped to defer, what seemed to be, imminent naval battles between the Soviet's fleet and the U.S. blockade around Cuba. He was able to accomplish this feat through diplomatically urgent correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Mr. Thant urged Khrushchev to,

...instruct the Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba to stay away from the interception area for a limited time only, in order to permit discussions of the modalities of a possible agreement which could settle the problem peacefully in line with the Charter of the United Nations.^[10]

While at the same time, Mr. Thant urged President Kennedy, "...that instructions may be issued to United States vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident."^[11] With these efforts, Mr. Thant got both parties to agree to cease any aggressive naval actions toward each other for a short time; therefore, he could also be recognized as one of the people responsible for the peaceful outcome of the entire crisis.

On October 26^th, a strange turn of events happened during correspondence between President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev sent two inconsistent and conflicting letters to Washington. The first letter was written in a personal tone, agreed to remove the nuclear installations as long as the U.S. agreed not to invade Cuba, and could have been written without the knowledge of his Presidium.^[12] What is more, this letter was not released to the public at the time. Kennedy had the letter, "...filed among the most secret state papers. The reason given out later sounds strange: Khrushchev's note, it was hinted, betrayed a desperation unworthy of a head of state, and out of deference for a peer, Kennedy withheld the embarrassing document from the public."^[13] In other words, Kennedy felt that this letter would make Khrushchev look weak to the Soviets and out of sympathy for a fellow leader, he decided to save Khrushchev the humiliation.

The second letter, that was completely contradictory to the first, made a higher demand of the U.S. This letter (which was published in the Soviet Union before it was sent to Washington) demanded the removal of missiles in Turkey and Italy before any weapons would be removed from Cuba. The two conflicting letters confused those in Washington, which could have been Khrushchev's intention all along.

The idea of dismantling the bases in Turkey did not seem very beneficial to the Soviets, considering the removal of the installations in Turkey was not up to the U.S., but was up to NATO. Robert Kennedy, brother of John and also Attorney General at the time, replied to Khrushchev's negotiations in his book by saying,

...there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangements made under this kind of threat or pressure, and that in the last analysis this was a decision that would have to be made by NATO. However, I said, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove those missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long period of time. He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgment that, within a short time after this crisis was over, those missiles would be gone.^[14]

Although Robert Kennedy's words sound concrete and confirming, there is other evidence eluding to the fact that this missile trading actually took place as part of the deal of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Boastful statements from Washington might cause Khrushchev to break his vow of silence and to reveal the fact that the President had made a bargain under pressure at the expense of a NATO ally, a trade of Cuban for Turkish missiles, without consulting either Turkey or NATO, a bargain so embarrassing that he concealed it from the American people and made secrecy about it a condition for an agreement.^[15]

Moreover, after a few revised versions of a response to Khrushchev's letter, Kennedy finally replied to somewhat of an agreement with Khrushchev by saying that his terms from his second letter "would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding 'other armaments,' as proposed in your second letter which you made public."^[16] This is a not-so-well disguised agreement that Robert Kennedy vehemently denied ever happening. Also, if Robert Kennedy's words proved true in that they were going to rid Turkey of its armaments anyway, then what was there to gain from Khrushchev demanding it? Well, it is Henry Pachter who explains that in hindsight, it was the symbolism within the demand to guarantee the Soviets receive something for their perseverance of peace that was the reasoning for the demand.^[17] The Soviet's acceptance of Khrushchev as a communist leader was at stake and the removal of weapons from Cuba without something concrete (not just an agreement not to invade Cuba) in return could mean the expulsion of Nikita Khrushchev.

On October 28^th, Khrushchev finally agreed to take down the armaments inside Cuba. This capitulation from Khrushchev marked the end of the imminent nuclear scare, which was once considered quite the victory for Kennedy and his administration. The terms that were supposedly agreed upon, helped to show Kennedy as a firm negotiator with no chance of compromise. It was believed that an agreement was made that if the Soviet Union disarmed Cuba, then the United States agreed not to invade. But now that certain records have been revealed, it is astonishing to conclude that in actuality Kennedy was not as firm a negotiator, nor was he firm enough in his stance not to compromise. Also along the same lines, Khrushchev was seen as the one who surrendered to Kennedy, when in all actuality, the two merely came to a common consensus; a missiles for missiles trade-off that inherently under minded not only Cuba, but also Turkey and NATO.

Endnotes

^[1] James Monahan and Kenneth Gilmore, The Great Deception: The Inside Story of How the Kremlin Took Over Cuba (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1963), 184.

^[2] Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 493.

^[3]Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Incorporated, 1969), 166.

^[4] The Cold War International History Project, "Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 18 October 1962 meeting with President Kennedy (excerpts)" http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E6E3-96B6-175C-9A4DE0258A216AEF&sort=Collection&item=Cuban%20Missile%20Crisis (accessed February 28, 2006).

^[5]Ibid, 170.

^[6] Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Incorporated, 1969), 197.

^[7]Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev in America (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960), 32.

^[8]Ibid, 32.

^[9]Ibid, 32.

^[10] Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Incorporated, 1969), 190.

^[11]Ibid, 187.

^[12] Henry Pachter, Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 50-51.

^[13]Ibid, 50-51.

^[14] Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Incorporated, 1969), 108-109.

^[15] Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 545.

^[16]Ibid, 539.

^[17] Henry Pachter, Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 52.