The Divine King Caesar

Little can be known about Julius Caesar's true intentions as ruler, as he died too soon, but the wealth of information on his short rule that exists leaves the impressionthat Julius Caesar understood the influence of public opinion in Roman politics¹, and had much success with instilling himself into the hearts of ordinary Romans. In this essay I am going to examine the Public Image of the icon that is Julius Caesar in first discussing the public identity he fashioned for himself, and the personality thrust upon him by those around him, both from admirers and harsh critics. I will analyze the contrast the military and social hero the Roman public honoured him as, as opposed to the self-serving menace he made himself out to be to the senate. I will look at his employment of absolute power and the questions and fears of his kingship, and whether or not such a thing would be necessary for him to adopt. I will then consider his allies within the Triumvirate and his alienation there from, and his eventual isolation and assassination. Finally, I will take into account the misguided view of his opponents and the social measures he enacted during his time, and discern out of the flurry of information that his image remains ultimately successful and enduring.

It helps, first of all, to remember that many of the primary sources of this information are inherently biased in that any description of Caesar's character is based on contrasts between the words of his supporters and of his detractors². To read into only the scathing rumours that circulated around Rome during Caesar's time, many of them perpetuated by characters such as Cicero, who had a hand in writing many of the defamatory pamphlets in order to dishonour Caesar³, or traditionalist republicans who feared the rise of a monarchy to replace their beloved political system, one would conclude that the "Perpetual Dictator"⁴ was nothing more than a vain, over-ambitious, megalomaniac that cared for nothing more than obtaining absolute power⁵.

¹Mary T. Boatwright, D.J. Gargola, and R.J.A. Talbert, The Romans: From Village to Empire. A History of Ancient Rome from Earliest Times to Constantine, (Oxford, 2004) p. 258; Donald Kagan, (ed.), Problems in Ancient History. Second edn, vol. 2. (New York, 1975) p. 273.

² Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 262; Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 254;Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, (Ithaca, 1983) p.202.

³ Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 204; Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 254^.

⁴ Christian Meier and David McLintock (trans.), Caesar, (London, 1996), p. 476; Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 254-255.

⁵ Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 198-199.

However, if one were to rely on Caesar's Commentaries¹, or perhaps look at only his reputation for mercy to fallen enemies (known as Caesar's clementia and humanitas)², then one might see him as a clear-minded, upright, dignified and innovative reformer. He was rather generous with reward, as his soldiers were given great monetary boosts³. As dictator, he even gave them the extra land they had for so long wanted, but were denied by the senate⁴. His resolve and victory in battle brought him fame and glory⁵, but what would count most was how he handled it. To different audiences, Caesar played up a different image. To those closest to him in the political arena, to the senators, he gave off an impression that wavered between condescending scorn and cold indifference⁶. Such actions as refusing to rise when a senatorial committee came to greet him at the foot of the temple of Venus Genetrix, blaming it on diarrhoea, and then walking home, exemplify his attitude towards his coworkers⁷. Naturally, this obvious air of superiority festered within his colleagues a sense that perhaps he would undo their beloved political system, where no man rose above the senatorial clique that ran Rome⁸.

Traditionalist senators, as a result of his cold shoulder, of his ignoring them by the time of his dictatorship and of his manipulation of constitutional law in order to achieve his position of absolute power, therefore viewed him as a menace that threatened to install an autocracy⁹. Before taking his unpopularity amongst his colleagues into account, it first helps to remember that it was these very colleagues who awarded him the power to keep a consulship while maintaining his army as a governor, and who gave him the power to nominate men to certain offices as a dictator.¹⁰

¹ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 274

²Christian Meier, Caesar, p. 329; Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 198-199.

³ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 272.

⁴ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 272, Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 256.

⁵ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p.259,261; Christian Meier, David McLintock, Caesar, p. 334-335.

⁶ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 272; Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 265^.

⁷Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 258.

⁸ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 263.

⁹ Christian Meier, David McLintock, Caesar, p. 481; Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History; p. 270, Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 188.

¹⁰ Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 264; Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 272.

Perhaps this was in part due to his own machinations, as Caesar knew to align himself with popular, wealthy and well-respected statesmen such as Curio who would often speak on his behalf¹. As well, when it was useful to him to rise to a consulship, he sought wealthy, popular and powerful men like Pompey, until of course Caesar proved himself victorious against Pompey in the ensuing Civil War². It may have been fear of this strength that inspired the senate to cast upon Caesar so many honours³.

He took on the role of Perpetual Dictator on February 14^th, 44, only a few weeks before his death⁴, although he never took up an official kingship⁵. One account describes him riding in the ceremonial procession of the Latin festival: Caesar met an adoring crowd with the word "Rex" or "king" bellowing in their lungs⁶. But Caesar knew how to play up a crowd that was already cultivating a reputation to fit the man, and it would seem it is from this particular demographic that Caesar desired popularity. He replied to them "My name is not Rex but Caesar." There can be no doubt that Caesar understood the implication of being called "king" to a people who prided themselves on being independent of a monarchy⁸. Perhaps it is for this reason that Caesar roundly rejected taking on an official royal title in Rome. On another well-recorded occasion, at the Lupercalia, Marc Antony approached Caesar with a laurel and asked him to wear it as king, which Caesar refused. Caesar then had the laurel placed on a statue of Jupiter, stating that the god was Rome's only true king⁹. This might also recall Caesar's days as Pontifex Maximus, thus inspiring a sense of his religious adherence and humility¹⁰.

¹ Christian Meier, David McLintock, Caesar, p. 336-338.

² Christian Meier, David McLintock, Caesar, p. 340.

³ Christian Meier, David McLintock, Caesar, p. 341-342, 433.

⁴ Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, 254.

⁵Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 259.

⁶ Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 198.

⁷ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p 258.

⁸ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 259; Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 189.

⁹ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p 258-259; Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 200

¹⁰ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 260

Caesar had no need for the semantics of his title, as he already possessed more unchecked power than anyone else within the government¹. In the same vein, his social measures helped to distance him from any reputation of being a ruthless autocratic leader. He took steps to rebuilding the city after wartime, freed up land for the poor to reduce unemployment, made way in raising the city's birthrate, as well as expanding the size of the senate to include peoples of subject lands². These social steps could equally be seen as Caesar's vision for Rome, as his vision for a positive reign during his dictatorship in Rome. Thus, he must have known better than to toy with the loyalty of a people who feared the word "kingship", and still hold onto power.

This does not, however, suggest that he never toyed with the term at all. In his empire, he decreed that all Italian states outside of Rome would call him king, and as king he could intervene in their internal affairs, and any Greek subject lands identified him as a god³. As well, statues of Caesar were built in the temple of Quirinus, naming Caesar as a divine presence⁴. It was this fear of Caesar's absolute power that prompted a group of senators, headed by the two famous politicians Brutus and Cassius, to stab Caesar to death in public⁵. This, they thought, would put an end to his tyranny, although these men miscalculated the people's adoration of Caesar, thinking the poor rumours of him to reflect public opinion; but it was his ambition, his disregard for his colleagues and his complacency regarding his own stand above the senate that ultimately led to his downfall⁶. It must be brought into question the allies which helped him on the climb to such a level of power from which to fall. Caesar, despite his popularity, lacked two things that would secure him a consulship. The first is money and influence, which he would acquire through the wealthy, well-connected Crassus and the second, was the force of Pompey, who had his veterans on his side⁷. This was the Triumvirate, and was made concrete with Caesar's giving of his daughter Julia to Pompey in marriage. However, Crassus was killed in battle, Julia died in 54⁸ thus severing the strained relationship between the other two members of the Triumvirate, and disputes over policy and power between Caesar and Pompey led to a Civil War in which Caesar defeated Pompey in 49⁹. It was said, and felt by the Optimates, that both men vied for the same power, and they were not willing to share¹⁰. Pompey had, however, joined the side of the traditionalists, the Optimates against whom Caesar stood. Amongst these Optimates was his fiercest opponent, Cato. Cato, a praetor, stood for the Roman Republic, which to him meant he stood for the possession of land and power in the hands of the people, which of course meant the people of noble birth¹¹. As far as he was concerned, after the death of Pompey in the Civil War¹², the possession and power had fallen into the hands of one man (Caesar), and so he stabbed himself. But coldness and fear Cato felt towards Caesar, and vice versa, is merely a microcosm of Caesar's opposition to the senate and their traditional value system. Cato would not be the last that saw Caesar's rise as a monarchical threat to the republic, and his visceral anger would be revisited in his vengeful nephew Brutus, and the soldier Cassius¹³. Thus it was by alienating himself by those closest to him and by growing hungry the more he fed on power and esteem, that Caesar fell so hard at the foot of Pompey's statue¹⁴. However, his honour remained intact with the people, who stormed after his death, going so far as stoning to death the praetor Cornelius Cinna, who called Caesar a tyrant¹⁵.
¹ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 260.

² Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 263.

³ Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, 255-256; Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 211-212.

⁴ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 259; Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 201.² Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 271.

⁵ Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 192.

⁶ Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 192.

⁷ Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 233.

⁸ Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 243.

⁹ Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 246.

¹⁰ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 266; Christian Meier, David McLintock, Caesar, p. 388.

¹¹ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 268-269.

¹² Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 267-268.

¹³ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 268.

¹⁴ Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 265.

¹⁵ Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 192.

Looking at the vague and wavering information that I have, the closest I can come to making a clear conclusion on Caesar's aim is simply to say that he wanted the favour of the people, and he wanted it for two reasons. Firstly, he wanted to give himself a stamp of permanence, to live in absolute power not just in Roman politics but in the Roman and Italian consciousness. Maybe he did miscalculate how much he could disregard the traditionalists of the upper class. Quite in fact it was a fatal error. But perhaps, even without getting to savour a longer reign as "Perpetual Dictator", he may have gotten what he wanted. He literally had his name placed onto the Roman sesterces while still living, which no other Roman had ever accomplished. The building projects he began would all bear his name¹. And after all, he left enough of an impression in history for his name and legacy to exist even in our cultural stream. Whether his power was called Rex or Dictator or otherwise, it remained in his power. The second reason he pursued the people's favour is because it was the people that mattered to him. Not that I'm arguing he was an upstanding patriot, but I do believe, looking at all the ameliorative measures Caesar took above and beyond mere reconstruction of Rome after wartime, that he wanted the city not just to appear great, but to be the best among cities in all respects². He wanted to amplify his city, perhaps for his own ego within the duration of his reign, perhaps because his pride for Rome itself shone through³. Neither theory can really be verified conclusively. What is known is that Julius Caesar won more fame than he could live to see, and in that sense he was and remains a popular success.
¹Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 261.

²Boatwright, Gargola and Talbert, The Romans, p. 261.

³ Donald Kagan, Problems in Ancient History, p. 272-273. Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, p. 211-213.