The Euthyphro Problem and Its Consequences - Plato

Plato's Euthyphro is a famous conversation which deals with the nature of piety. Under the guise of Sophocles, Plato enters a discourse with his friend, Euthyphro, who claims to have an extensive knowledge of what it is to be pious. The argument concerning the nature and origin of piety bring forward the real question of the validity of the Divine Command Theory, which states that right acts are right if and only if they have God's (or some other divine power) approval. In order to fully understand the nature and origins of piety and righteousness, one must understand the complexities of the "Euthyphro problem" and its implications on morality.

The Divine Command Theory is a theory based solely upon the powers and capacities of the divine. According to the Divine Command Theory, only God or some other divine power has the capacity to determine what acts are right. Thus, a right act is right if and only if God approves of it. The basis of this theory is that God loves mankind and His decisions are meant to be for the benefit of mankind. The reason why right acts are right is simply a matter of God's love for mankind.

The "Euthyphro problem" is one which deals with the role of God (or a "god") in moral terms. Does God determine what acts are right and if so, are such acts are right because of His approval? Or rather are right acts right for their own sake and God chooses to recognize them? These questions and others are raised by Sophocles during his conversation with Euthyphro. Euthyphro's position on piety is analogous to the Divine Theory in that he believes "what is dear to the gods [or God] is pious, what is not is impious" (170). In other words, God or any religion-dependent divine power has the ultimate authority over what is right and what is wrong, what is pious and what is impious, etc. Sophocles sees a flaw in this argument, especially in context with the multifarious nature of the Greek gods. There are obvious differences in beliefs and attitudes among the countless Greek gods, therefore, according to Sophocles it is impossible to pinpoint "the gods" as a singular source of morality, when what is right for one god is wrong for another. By this logic, the Divine Command Theory cannot be plausible.

Euthyphro responds to this objection saying "the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, which all the gods hate, is impious" (173). However, Sophocles again scrutinizes this statement in order to assess its validity. Sophocles then raises the question, "is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" (173). In other words, is there a "list" of right acts that God accepts as right or does God declare what is right and wrong beforehand? This apparent difference in ideology presents a major problem for the Divine Command Theory. If God approves of right acts because they are right, it does not follow that God approves of right acts because he approves of them. The Divine Theory says right acts are right only if God approves of them, thus God has to "pre-approve" of right acts in order for them to be right; therefore, God most approve of the right acts which He already approved in order for them to be right. This is a complex premise which defeats the Divine Command Theory entirely. How can God approve of acts because He approves of them?

Neither Euthyphro nor Sophocles are able to reach a conclusion based on the previous question. The main issue in the "Euthyphro problem" can be addressed in opposing theories such as the Independent Standard Theory. The Independent Standard Theory states a right act is right if it conforms to an independent standard. In other words, morality inexplicably exists; man and God can only subscribe to what He thinks is right and wrong based upon a "list" of independent moral values. Moreover, it is equally true to say, according to the Independent Standard Theory, that the reason why right acts are right is a matter of chance. Thus, not committing murder is a right act for no reason other than chance. God can tell man murder is wrong only because it conforms to an independent standard based on chance. However, it seems the Independent Standard Theory is as problematic and difficult to swallow as the Divine Command Theory. Surely murder and other morally wrong deeds are wrong for other reasons. What then can be said of the Divine Command Theory? How can one solve the "Euthyphro problem"?

It seems that the Divine Command Theory is self-defeating regardless of the validity of its conclusions. The "Euthyphro problem" can be elucidated by disregarding the role of God. It is safe to say that morality is not necessarily dependent on the commands of God. Murder, for instance, is universally held as morally wrong. Is murder wrong because in Judeo-Christian beliefs, for instance, God told Moses in His Ten Commandments, "Thou shalt not kill"? It seems more plausible to think of murder as being wrong for reasons other than God's commands. A Divine Command Theorist would say murder is wrong simply because God declares it is wrong. However, murder is wrong for other reasons. Immanuel Kant would say that killing someone is wrong because one would not want to universalize murder otherwise everyone would be killing each other. Jeremy Bentham would say murder is wrong because killing someone does not maximize pleasure, even if it may bring the murderer pleasure. And so on.

Another objection to the Divine Command Theory is the Modal Argument. The Modal Argument states that if God were evil, right acts would still be right even if God approves of evil acts. Suppose God were malicious and commanded us to kill, steal, and torture. A Divine Command Theorist would have to automatically abide by such commands. But does that mean murder, theft, and torture are right? Certainly not. In raising an objection to the Divine Command Theory, one essayist writes:

One could ask "What if God had originally commanded things differently?" Herein lies the true challenge to the theory, as its arbitrary nature becomes clear. God could have just as easily forbidden love and commanded that we torture babies. If [H]is command is all that decides morality, then this is unacceptably arbitrary. A common defence is to insist that God wouldn't command evil things - yet the simple fact of God commanding something supposedly makes it good, not evil, even if that command is to torture babies. Similarly, one might argue that [H]e is "inherently good". Yet this again assumes an independent standard of goodness, one different from what the Divine Command theory defines ("God and Morality").

This line of thinking makes a lot of sense. It is difficult to defend the Divine Command Theory without ending up at a roadblock. Eventually one must appeal to some independent standard to assess God's motives. Here, the Modal Argument presents a major flaw in the Divine Command Theory.

The "Euthyphro problem" is one whose answer will never be reached. The Divine Command Theory does not work effectively as a response to the Euthyphro problem. There are major flaws in this theory that simply cannot explain why God acts the way He does. No one in Plato's time nor anyone today has fully elucidated this mystery, but perhaps it is indeed the intent of a divine being to withhold the answers to such mysteries, leaving man in an endless search for resolution.

Sources

1. Plato, "Euthyphro." Moral Philosophy. Pages 166-179.
2. "God and Morality." Available http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2005/04/god-and-morality.html> (18 Nov. 2005).