The Fall Out At Home In America That Lead To Decreased Troop Morale Abroad

In March of 1965 the first official U.S. ground troops landed in Vietnam, this force of several thousand would escalate over the next several years until it reached an all time high of over half a million American military personal. This came as no surprise considering the previous few years had been plagued by an increasing American presence in Vietnam. The presence of American troops within Vietnam led to an increasing dissention among the American people at home. As the war overseas escalated and thousands of American men came home in body bags the anti war movement would grow. Vietnam became a proving ground for what public support could do for a war, or more importantly what lack of public support could do. Starting with the reign of Diem, American support for Vietnam was unfailing, yet by 1968 America was in a Quagmire of a war and had a base of support that consisted mainly of the right wing and little else.

Before examining what turned public support against the war in Vietnam, one must first look at what the reasons for entering the war actually were and what the American public was led to believe. In today's world the American public feel greatly deceived by the governments false claims of possible harm from Iraq. But in the 60's America was in a vastly different social realm. The reign of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam was seen as a sovereign government, which was given aid and advice by the U.S. Initial stages of U.S. involvement, was shown as mere diplomatic efforts to aid a non-communist nation against communist aggression. This smoke screen allowed for U.S. heads of state to increase possible involvement and flex American muscle.

In 1962 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara held various press conferences, constantly pouring out support for the Diem regime, while realistically coming to the conclusion that American military presence would have to rise up as a weakening South Vietnam faltered under communist pressure. Publicly heads of state such as McNamara showed undying support for Diem and attempted to beguile American press with reports of growing South Vietnamese troop concentrations, and diminishing NLF forces. All the while Kennedy increased American military advisors in South Vietnam from under 1,000 to over 16,000. New York times reporters were forced to ask why, why were our forces being bumped up if such progress was being made.

Meanwhile support within Vietnam for Diem was not uniform. On June 11^th 1963 a Buddhist priest "Quang Duc" burned himself alive in protest to Diem's seemingly anti-Buddhist rule. Diem himself was a catholic and even though he supported the Buddhists within South Vietnam, relations had become strained and events such as the immolation of Quang Duc only stressed differences even further. Upon arriving in Saigon in 63' U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge soon realized that the only possible solution to conflicts within South Vietnam would be the removal of Diem, even though no such opportunity for removal was currently seen.

Diem would be assassinated in 63 by a group of his own generals seeking to gain power. His inability to unite south Vietnam and in fact his ability to alienate several key groups had led to his own demise, and while historians may argue that he did not completely deserve all of the blame, he certainly did not do anything to avoid it. With the death of Kennedy came a new policy in Vietnam and as Lyndon B. Johnson took control in the Whitehouse American military involvement became heightened.

Johnson used instances such as the Gulf of Tonkin incident to increase his own power, convincing congress to approve a variable blank check to military spending and involvement in South East Asia. This allowed for an escalation of the conflict within Vietnam, this was not a war, but a conflict. As 1965 saw the beginning of the U.S. ground campaign within Vietnam, it also saw variable public support as Americans were still under the impression that Vietnam was a battle against communism. Little did America know the complexities involved in the struggle over a divided Vietnam or the ignorance with which U.S. policy makers were acting. In fact as American forces grew within Vietnam, random acts of dissent across America began to spring up. From Seattle to Washington D.C. college students, pacifists and even soldiers returning from Vietnam were attempting to sway public opinion away from Vietnam. Although these forces did not know the true reasons for U.S. involvement in Vietnam they could see clearly that the smoke screen of containment was merely a façade.

Johnson announced in July of 65 that troop numbers would be raised from 75,000 to 120,000 and asked for American support. From mainland America he received widespread support as many still held faith in his containment claims, and the belief that American involvement in Vietnam was crucial to freedom abroad. The result from the disillusioned was a varied onslaught of protests some of which came in the form of blockading military trains, sit ins, and teach ins across the nation. By the end of 1965 over a thousand Americans had been killed in action (KIA) and with such high numbers came an erosion of support. Truly in 65' America saw both an extreme escalation of the war and escalation of dissent for it.

With the expansion into full-blown ground war the U.S. took control of the scene in Saigon and while South Vietnamese forces were still widely in use and the Americans did not yet take the offensive, it soon became evident that this was now America's war. America however, no longer felt like she should be at war at all. For in 1967 as ground forces had swelled to over 400,000 there were already 500,000 Vietnam veterans. Many of which had been wounded or seen others hurt in combat and maintained little knowledge as to the reason for their sacrifice. On April 15^th of 1967 a crowd of protesters estimated to be between 100,000 and 125,000 people marched in NYC demanding the end to all U.S. military operations within Vietnam. This crowd was larger than normal but not considerably out of place. For even Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. had joined the antiwar movement and in 67' aided in uniting dissenters. Many Criticized King for his support, claiming that he was indeed confusing the antiwar movement with the goals of the civil rights movement. But for a pacifist such as King the goals could often be seen as quite similar.

Although such protests gained ground within the nation, the majority of Americans still retained faith in Johnson and U.S. policy in Vietnam. As of February 1966 slightly over 60 percent of Americans felt like the war in Vietnam was going well, and that the president was doing all he could to achieve peace. This belief stood in stark contrast to the views of many Americans. These two sides clashed and as a result Vietnam Veterans were often torn. One side they found pacifists who despised them for fighting in Vietnam and would only accept them if they turned away from all they had ever known and the country the fought for, and on the other side they found a conservative America who did not want to hear their stories of woe but rather supported the president at all cost.

Post Traumatic Stress disorder or PTSD was first established as a condition in 1980 but returning Vietnam veterans suffered from it even though it would not be officially acknowledged for another 15 years. These veterans sought treatment in the V.A. hospitals of America and found quickly that the V.A. system had become an area for aging WWII veterans, not a state of the art facility for rehabilitation. As these veterans began seeking treatment more and more Americans were going to fight in Vietnam and coming home to find less than ideal conditions. Without a place to stay or a people to love them Vietnam veterans soon rallied under the antiwar flag with the cause of bringing their brothers in arms home. Many veterans stood with college students from around the nation and turned what was a pacifist movement into a large scale movement for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam.

In March of 1967, just about a year prior to the Tet offensive, Johnson came face to face with the simple facts that the war was un-winnable. The so-called wise men of his cabinet suggested that he deescalate the war and turn down pentagon proposals for more funding and more troops. The fact of the matter was that the situation in Vietnam was more complex then they had ever thought, and while American muscle had been flexed in the early stages of the war, America was now deeply entrenched in a bitter ground campaign against a hardened enemy of it's own making. Public support had eroded and the cost of the war had been tragic. Johnson's approval ratings were still high yet he knew that his day was gone, he announced in 67 that he would not seek reelection in 68 and concentrated more over on attempting to withdraw America from Vietnam. The Tet Offensive would play a huge part in the erosion of American support, but mainly served as the straw that broke the Camel's back.

William M. Hammond, "Public Affairs: The Military and the media 1962-1968 pp. 20-21.

William M. Hammond, "Public Affairs: The Military and the media 1962-1968 pp. 59.

Wilbur J. Scott. "Vietnam Veterans Since The War: The Politics of PTSD, Agent Orange, and the National Memorial". Pp. 1.

William M. Hammond, "Public Affairs: The Military and the media 1962-1968 pp. 227.

Charles DeBenedetti. "An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era" pp. 215.