In early August, a long simmering conflict arose in the South Ossetia region of Georgia, a former Soviet satellite state. South Ossetia was given de facto independence from Georgia in the early 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union, and the ethnic and political differences between Ossetians and other Georgians had been kept at a détente until 2004 when Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia after a campaign focusing on unifying the country.[i] This August, Saakashvili's government became more aggressive toward the Ossetians, and Russia, led by President Vladimir Putin, intervened on behalf of the Ossetians, originally fighting back against Georgia from within the South Ossetia region but eventually moving its military into central Georgia where it approached the capital of Tbilisi and occupied Georgian towns such as Gori.[ii]
Russia eventually withdrew from Georgia, and the tension has slackened into an uneasy peace, but conflict highlighted the growing differences between the United States and Russia. Putin, in particular, fought to present the conflict as a proxy war with the United States and suggested it was a political maneuver. "The suspicion would arise that someone in the United States created this conflict on purpose to stir up the situation and to create an advantage for one of the candidates in the competitive race for the presidency in the United States," he told CNN. "They needed a small victorious war."[iii]
McCain and Obama's initial reaction to the conflict was more or less the same in content: bromide-laced press statements that called for a cease-fire and peace in the region. "What is most critical now is to avoid further confrontation between Russian and Georgian military forces," McCain said on Aug. 8.[iv] The same day, Obama responded, "I strongly condemn the outbreak of violence in Georgia, and urge an immediate end to armed conflict."[v]
A key foreign policy difference between Obama and McCain that has received much attention throughout the campaign is their dispute over whether the president or his high-level advisers should talk to our enemies without preconditions. This is representative of their differing perceptions of what is and should be the United States' relationship with the rest of the world. As Nicholas Lemann wrote in The New Yorker, "McCain's chief focus is on great powers, and on the all-importance of maintaining American military and political primacy in the world."[vi] McCain tends to exhibit a good and evil view of foreign policy that has led some such as Newsweek editor Jon Meacham to observe that "he has a more epic sense that America can be the America of 1945. I sometimes have to really make an effort to remind myself that John McCain fought in Vietnam and not in the Second World War. I'm not being cute about his age. He just feels like a figure from World War II."[vii] His foreign policy views can often be of the realist, "maverick" quality on which he has staked his name and campaign (exhibit No. 1: his support for the undeniably effective surge in Iraq, which emphasized fighting an ineffable enemy with nontraditional tactics[viii]). But McCain's reaction to the Georgia conflict highlighted the strong moral binary component in his view of the world: more neo-conservative than realist.
McCain sees Georgia under Saakashvili as a pro-Democratic ally of the United States in a part of the world-Russia's doorstep-that badly needs pro-Democratic allies of the United States, and even through the polished rhetoric of his press statements, McCain's anger and umbrage toward Russia's part in the conflict was evident as he painted Russia as the aggressor against "small" Georgia.[ix] Talking in early August, he referenced his friendship with Saakashvili and affected the emotional tone of the victim. "My friends, today the killing goes on and aggression goes on," he said. "Yet, I know from speaking this morning to the President of Georgia, Misha Saakashvili, who I've known for many years, that he knows that the thoughts and the prayers and support of the American people are with that brave little nation as they struggle today for their freedom and independence."[x] Later that month, after Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, McCain responded, "In April, I warned that Russia was pursuing a policy of de facto annexation that threatened to undermine security and stability in the region. Today's decision, the culmination of a long effort aimed at splitting these two regions away from Georgia, represents a major step forward in that process.[xi] Throughout the conflict, McCain maintained an outlook that attributed the conflict as the aggression of Russia (bad) against Georgia (good). Russia is many times more powerful, and Putin has alienated countries in the Western world by his increased reliance on cronyism and suppression of freedoms within the country;[xii] labeling Russia's actions in purely pejorative terms will make McCain few enemies in the international community. But the effect that such strong language and actions (in 2007, before the conflict, McCain said he would try to remove "revanchist Russia" from the G8[xiii]) has on the countries and groups to which they are directed is significant. It may be the most direct and effective way of addressing the Russian menace or it may catalyze extremism and ignite more conflict, but either way the neo-conservative Good vs. Evil impulses will have ramifications that the American voter would be wise to consider.
Obama similarly displayed his foreign policy views through his initial response, which showed significantly more equipoise than did McCain's. Anthony Lake, a foreign policy adviser to Obama, succinctly described the foreign policy persona Obama attempts to cultivate: "Traditional statesmen see international relations as a game of chess, and 'post-realists' see it as more like the complicated multidirectional Japanese board game of Go-'but Obama knows you have to play both boards at the same time.'"[xiv] This may be a bit too conveniently pat (Lemann noted, "in the Obama camp, all dichotomies are false dichotomies, which the candidate transcends"[xv]), but it cuts to the heart of the takeaway lesson from Obama's approach to the conflict. His foreign policy views are an attempt to balance a belief in a type of post-modernist universal faultlessness that has made him a transfixing unifying figure with the necessity of concrete decisions and actions that face a leader who has attained real power.
He grappled with this in his careful initial phrasing of his responses to the South Ossetia conflict. In his first public statement since the start of the conflict on Aug. 8, he said, "Now is the time for Georgia and Russia to show restraint, and to avoid an escalation to full scale war. Georgia's territorial integrity must be respected. All sides should enter into direct talks on behalf of stability in Georgia, and the United States, the United Nations Security Council, and the international community should fully support a peaceful resolution to this crisis."[xvi] Even if he thought that Russia was predominantly to blame, he concluded that by requesting both sides to deescalate the situation he could avoid giving Russia the impression that the United States was taking sides.
Obama plays the chess game of American interests, but, when he has the choice, he avoids labeling enemies as good or bad and he minimizes conflict. He felt political pressure to step up his rhetoric after the initial statement and said, "What is clear is that Russia has invaded Georgia's sovereign-has encroached on Georgia's sovereignty, and it is very important for us to resolve this issue as quickly as possible."[xvii] It is interesting how Obama starts to say that Russia "invaded" Georgia's sovereignty-a not extreme view at that time-but self-censors and substitutes the word, "encroached." This is a window into Obama's way of looking at the conflict. His foreign policy is political in nature; he says what he has to in order to assert his authority, but he does not try to provoke fights.
As the conflict developed and Russia agreed to a cease-fire and (originally) did not actually cease firing, Obama's (and McCain's) rhetoric sharpened. "I condemn Russia's decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and call upon all countries of the world not to accord any legitimacy to this action," Obama said in late August.[xviii] A neutral approach was no longer tenable, but he continued his conflict-minimizing strategy when he continued, "the United States should call for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to condemn Russia's decision in coordination with our European allies. The U.S. should lead within the UN and other international forums to cast a clear and unrelenting light on the decision."[xix] Obama views the world as multifaceted and without easy answers, and he favors advancing American interests through a consensus-building approach because that minimizes conflict. He sees minimizing conflict not as an end in itself-he is not a pacifist-but as the best way to advance U.S. interests.
Obama and McCain are both acutely aware of the danger that the current direction of Russia poses to the United States' interests. Russia is a powerful economic force to speak nothing of a military one. Obama and McCain would approach the country differently-Obama more strategically and carefully, McCain more forcefully and confrontationally. Perhaps the clearest way to state the difference comes down to the adjective each candidate has chosen to describe the nation. McCain has repeatedly referred to Russia as "revanchist Russia," which, conservative language maven William Safire argues, "uses a favorite communist derogation to call Moscow's autocrats to account for their bullying of independent Ukraine and Georgia, former Soviet vassal states now hopeful of joining NATO."[xx] The negatively connotative term contrasts with the modifier Obama employs on the issues portion of his Web site: "resurgent Russia."[xxi] Resurgent implies the possible menace of a stronger Russia, but it stops short at offending Russia's self of itself and leaves the summoning of Cold War imagery to inference.
[i] Schwirtz, Michael, Anne Barnard and C.J. Chivers. "Russia and Georgia Clash Over Separatist Region." The New York Times. August 8, 2008.
[ii] Levy, Clifford J. and C.J. Chivers. "Kremlin Signs Truce but Resists Quick Pullout" New York Times. August 16, 2008.
[iii] Levy, Clifford J. "Putin Suggests U.S. Provocation in Georgia Clash." New York Times. August 28, 2008.
[iv] Shear, Michael. "McCain calls for Russia to pull out of Georgia." The Washington Post. August 8, 2008.
[v] Statement from Barack Obama on the Grave Situation in Georgia. "Obama News & Speeches." Retrieved from http://www.barackobama.com/2008/08/08/statement_from_barack_obama_on.php. Accessed November 1, 2008.
[vi] Lemann, Nicholas. "Worlds Apart: Obama, McCain, and the future of Foreign Policy." The New Yorker. October 13, 2008.
[vii] "How Vietnam Shaped John McCain's Worldviews." Morning Edition. NPR. Oct. 30, 2008.
[viii] Coll, Steve. "The General's Dilemma." The New Yorker. September 8, 2008.
[ix] "John McCain Addresses The Crisis In Georgia." McCain-Palin. Retrieved http://www.johnmccain.com/informing/news/pressreleases/d9a75eb9-3987-47fc-afc7-175e9589e099.htm. Accessed November 1, 2008.
[x] "John McCain Addresses The Crisis In Georgia," op. cit.
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] Levy, Clifford J. and C.J. Chivers. "Kremlin Signs Truce but Resists Quick Pullout" New York Times. August 16, 2008.
[xiii] Holland, Steve. "McCain would exclude Russia from G8 Nations." Reuters. October 15, 2007)
[xiv] Lemann, op. cit.
[xv] Ibid.
[xvi] "Statement from Barack Obama on the Grave Situation in Georgia," op. cit.
[xvii] Bumiller, Elizabeth and Michael Falcone. "Candidates' Reactions to Georgia Conflict Offer Hints at Style on Foreign Affairs." New York Times. August 9, 2008.
[xviii] "Statement from Senator Obama on Russia's Decision to Recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Independent States." Obama News and Speeches. August 26, 2008. Retrieved from http://www.barackobama.com/2008/08/26/statement_from_senator_obama_o_4.php. Accessed November 1, 2008.
[xix] Ibid.
[xx] Safire, William. "Revanche is Sweet." New York Times Magazine. April 13, 2008.
[xxi] "Foreign Policy." Barack Obama for President. Retrieved from http://www.barackobama.com/issues/foreign_policy/index.php#onrussia. Accessed November 1, 2008.
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