The God Delusion: A Source Criticism

Earlier this year I read The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins, and it has made a skeptic of me. Specifically, I'm skeptical that such an uneven, self-contradictory book could really be the product of one person. In fact, I've detected two separate sources within the text, each with its own distinct purpose and theology. (Or should that be atheology?) The first source is opposed to what he or she calls the "God Hypothesis." For this reason, I will label this source "H". This hypothesis is stated by H to be:

"There exists a superhuman, supernatural intelligence who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it, including us." (p. 31)

The second source is opposed to the very idea of a deity:

"I am not attacking any particular version of God or gods. I am attacking God, all gods, anything and everything supernatural, wherever and whenever they have been or will be invented." (p. 36)

I will label this source "A" because he or she is opposed to all gods. These sources were brought together sometime in the early 21st century by a redactor "R", possibly Richard Dawkins himself, although the existence of "Richard Dawkins" is not universally accepted. R's intent is this:

"I suspect -- well, I am sure -- that there are lots of people out there who have been brought up in some religion or other, are unhappy in it, don't believe it, or are worried about the evils that are done in its name; people who feel vague yearnings to leave their parents' religion and wish they could, but just don't realize that leaving is an option. If you are one of them, this book is for you." (p. 1)

R's task is extremely difficult: He (or possibly she, if R is not actually Richard Dawkins) must blend the thoughtful, tolerant, often conciliatory H source with the venomous, factually-challenged A source. R seems to recognize that most of the best material is found in H, but R's sympathies clearly lie with A. In places, as I will show later, R embeds A-like lines into H material. To see the tension between the two sources, take a look at these two passages from chapter 3, found within a discussion of religious scientists in history. The first quote is from H:

"We have no reason to doubt Michael Faraday's sincerity as a Christian even after the time when he must have known of Darwin's work. He was a member of the Sandemanian sect, which believed (past tense because they are now virtually extinct) in a literal interpretation of the Bible, ritually washed the feet of newly inducted members and drew lots to determine God's will. Faraday became an Elder in 1860, the year after The Origin of the Species was published, and he died a Sandemanian in 1867." (p.98)

Contrast that with A's dismissal of the faith of Gregor Mendel:

"Mendel, of course, was a religious man, an Augustinian monk; but that was in the nineteenth century, when becoming a monk was the easiest way for the young Mendel to pursue science. For him, it was the equivalent of a research grant." (p. 99)

This is misleading. Mendel may have come from a poor family that could not afford to send him to University, but like Faraday, Mendel took his faith seriously. He was promoted to Abbot in 1868, only two years after publishing his paper on genetics. As Abbot, his responsibilities to the monastery were a priority. He gave up his research because he felt called to serve God, and not merely to feed his intellect. Unfortunately, the A source cannot give people the benefit of the doubt as H can. H, in fact, can even praise scientists who hold onto their faith:

"The point is well put by Kenneth Miller of Brown University, for my money the most persuasive nemesis of 'intelligent design', not least because he is a devout Christian. I frequently recommend Miller's book, Finding Darwin's God, to religious people who write to me bamboozled by [Michael] Behe." (p. 131)
It's not just scientists who receive approval from H:

"Searching for particular examples of irreducible complexity is a fundamentally unscientific way to proceed: a special case of arguing from present ignorance. It appeals to the same faulty logic as 'the God of the Gaps' strategy condemned by the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Creationists eagerly seek a gap in present-day knowledge of understanding. If an apparent gap is found, it is assumed that God, by default, must fill it. What worries thoughtful theologians such as Bonhoeffer is that gaps shrink as science advances, and God is threatened with eventually having nothing to do and nowhere to hide." (p. 125)

That last phrase, "and nowhere to hide," is R's addition to the text. It contradicts the tone of the entire preceding paragraph, and stands as an example of R's attempt to harmonize the vast differences between the two sources. A, on the other hand, cannot even imagine a "thoughtful theologian." Discussing the late paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould's NOMA (Non-Overlapping Magisteria) principle, which essentially states that science can answer questions about the natural world and religion can answer questions about morality, A states:

"Similarly, we can all agree that science's entitlement to advise us on moral values is problematic, to say the least. But does Gould really want to cede to religion the right to tell us what is good and what is bad? The fact that it has contributed nothing else to human wisdom is no reason to hand religion a free licence to tell us what to do." (p. 57)

R's monumental task of weaving these two very different sources together produces, as I said, mixed results. R again struggles valiantly to reconcile the two sources as they define the nature of God. A, after rejecting Aquinas's "first cause" proof for existence of God, adds: Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing of such human attributes as listening to prayers, forgiving sins and reading innermost thoughts. (p. 77) H, on the other hand, before discussing the problem of evil, notes:

"Goodness is no part of the definition of the God hypothesis, merely a desirable add-on." (p. 108)

H then expands on the problem of evil. But R, trying to reconcile this with A, interpolates freely. I will first quote the entire passage.

"But, for a more sophisticated believer in some kind of supernatural intelligence, it is childishly easy to overcome the problem of evil. Simply postulate a nasty god -- such as the one who stalks every page of the Old Testament. Or, if you don't like that, invent a separate evil god, call him Satan, and blame his cosmic battle against the good god for the evil in the world. Or -- a more sophisticated solution -- postulate a god with grander things to do than fuss about human distress. Or a god who is not indifferent to suffering but regards it as the price that has to be paid for free will in an orderly, lawful cosmos. Theologians can be found buying into all these rationalizations." (p. 108)

Knowing, though, that H is generally conciliatory toward religion, we can make a good guess at just which parts R has added. I will now quote the passage again, putting R's interpolations in {braces}.

"But, for a more sophisticated believer in some kind of supernatural intelligence, it is {childishly} easy to overcome the problem of evil. Simply postulate a nasty god {-- such as the one who stalks every page of the Old Testament}. Or, {if you don't like that, invent} a separate evil god, {call him Satan}, and blame his cosmic battle against the good god for the evil in the world. Or {-- a more sophisticated solution --} postulate a god with grander things to do than fuss about human distress. Or a god who is not indifferent to suffering but regards it as the price that has to be paid for free will in an orderly, lawful cosmos. {Theologians can be found buying into all these rationalizations.}"

Removing these, we discover H's original text:

"But, for a more sophisticated believer in some kind of supernatural intelligence, it is easy to overcome the problem of evil. Simply postulate a nasty god. Or a separate evil god, and blame his cosmic battle against the good god for the evil in the world. Or postulate a god with grander things to do than fuss about human distress. Or a god who is not indifferent to suffering but regards it as the price that has to be paid for free will in an orderly, lawful cosmos."

It's possible, too, that the two sentences, "Simply postulate a nasty god," and "Or postulate a god with grander things to do than fuss about human distress," are both R's interpolations as well. The word "postulate" does not appear in any of the other H texts we've examined.

As you can see, although R has been very clever in weaving these two very different sources into one narrative, he or she cannot quite bridge the large gap between them. Nevertheless, I've only scratched the surface of Dawkins source criticism. Much further research is needed before we can fully separate the H and A sources, and hear each of their truly distinct voices for the first time.