The Logical Argument for Fatalism

Fatalism, properly speaking, is a philosophical view that denies the power of the individual will to decide its own course (or to counter in any way, shape, or form) the predestined conclusions and everything that we do must occur out of being necessarily true. Fatalism may be argued and defended in a number of ways. It is a concept not foreign to many sects of monotheistic (and pantheistic) religions, who support the omniscience of a god or gods. This depends greatly on varying definitions of freedom, but the ancient Greek philosophers also saw similar concepts in their conception of the Panthaeon. In these conceptions of the gods above, knowledge of how things were to occur were already foreseeable, and human life was simply following the necessary track that was 'fated' for it, and such that nothing could be said to be willed nor changed. Simply put, you lived according to how your life was fated and that is merely how it goes.

However, the argument put forth by Aristotle is perhaps one of the more interesting ones, as it does not defer to (nor rely upon) metaphysical necessity. Rather, Aristotle put forth an argument based on logical necessity to prove the point that from truth we move to necessity. However, it's important to understand what "necessity" really means here. Many have debated what Aristotle intends by this statement . But, through the context of the argument, it seems necessary simply means unavoidable. A good way to demonstrate this is through example, but I will make the argument as clear as can be for the casual reader, and accessible for those who have never read any Aristotle.

As always, it's important to lay out our assumptions: first, we have to say something about statements in general. Let's say that any statement that is truth-apt (for which we will call s) must either be true or false, and likewise, its negation - not-s must also be either true or false. From this presupposition it should remain uncontroversial that within such a paradigm, there remains no room for antimonies or contradictions (such that would allow both s and not-s to both be true statements) and that the content of S or not-s would render one as to having to be true or false. It follows then that s or not-s is true. This is what is known as the Law of Bivalence, or rather, that statements can be said to be either of two values in regards to truth (true or false). This is a keystone of classical logic, but remains questionable as to its applicability regarding statements about the future. For the purpose of this simple argument, we shall accept the Law of Bivalence and thus we shall posit the previous claim, that s or not-s is true.

But, S and not-S are simply empty concepts; to make more sense of this we can give them content to make them appear more relevant and accessible

Let's say a friend and I are having a conversation regarding next year's Presidential election. I make the statement that on January 20th, 2008 Hillary Clinton will be inaugurated as the next President of the United States of America. My friend makes the opposite claim, that on January 20th, 2008 Hillary Clinton will not be inaugurated as the next President of the United States of America. Assuming our presupposition that either my statement or my friend's statement is true, it is necessary (or unavoidable) that Hillary Clinton will (or will not) be inaugurated as President on January 20th, 2008.

The fact that I made a prediction (or my friend the opposite prediction) is essentially irrelevant, for if my statement was true then it was true from the point in which I made the prediction up until January 20th, 2008 when Hillary Clinton was inaugurated as President, and conversely the same applies to my friend's prediction - that it was true throughout any given point in time until the January 20th, 2008.

The interesting move from "truth" to "necessity" occurs because once the event is taking place and really happening, nothing could have been done to avoid it and my statement was true at all given points in time (even if no such prediction was made on my part). Thus, it is necessary that because my prediction was true then it follows it was always true and always necessary.

This is in fact in line with how we view the "inevitability" of past events, when looking at them with the luxury of hindsight. Take for example the events of 9/11. Many have attempted to look at the decade (or even longer) preceding the events of September 11, 2001 and tried to analyze what could've been done differently to prevent it as well as try to pin the blame on the individuals (or groups of individuals) responsible for making the errors that made such events possible in the first place. However, one could easily make the claim that event of two airplanes crashing into the Twin Towers was necessary, and was always so throughout all the preceding events and decisions since they occurred and nothing could've been prevented changing the unforeseeable events which necessitated the crashing of two airplanes into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. This seems counter-intuitive; one might reject this claim and simply say that policy could've been different -- or that someone in the preceding administration could have chosen a different policy towards terrorism that would have prevented the events of 9/11 from ever happening. Again, we should also consider that we can construct a number of ways in which history could've been different, but this changes nothing and only prevails because (as they say) hindsight is 20/20. If two planes did crash into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001 - then nothing could've avoided it from happening because it happened - and it was true that it was going to happen in 1990 just as much as it was in the early hours of September 11, 2001 before the events actually occurred.

Now, Aristotle himself made several claims later on in his work to clarify upon some points, and posit a solution to some of the problems in this argument; but this is simply an introduction to the argument itself. More information is available on this argument (as well as the other metaphysical and causal-deterministic) arguments for fatalism. Even though fatalist arguments are for the most part rejected by many of this interested in the topics of truth and the free-will and determinism, nonetheless they remain controversial as well. Perhaps we merely enjoy the feeling that we are the causes of our own fate, and that we take some comfort in feeling that we have the power to take control over our own lives. If this is so, and the argument for fatalism is indeed correct - we have only be deluding ourselves into an illusion that greatly overestimates our own abilities and existence.

Source:
The Complete Works of Aristotle. "De Interpretatione 9." Revised Oxford Translation. Ed. Jonathan Barnes, Vol.1.