The Man Who Never Was

In May of 1943 Hitler declared to his Generals a new fear: the loss of the Balkans. The Balkan States (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and the European portion of Turkey) were all either countries occupied by the Nazis or Allies of the Axis. Hitler felt that the countries could provide long-lasting raw materials for Germany: copper, bauxite, chrome and most importantly Romanian oil. But he may have also had a fear that the Western Allies might try the same World War I strategy of a decisive attack through the Balkan Peninsula.

Western Allied intelligence was aware of Hitler's concerns. However, by May of 1943, the next step had been decided: an attack through Italy. On June 11, 1943 the Allies captured the small island of Pantelleria. It would seem at this point that the Germans would conclude that Italy would be attacked and the Balkans were safe.

The London Controlling Section (LCS - responsible for devising deceptive schemes) prepared to mislead Hitler into believing an attack on Sicily was too obvious. He would need to be led to think that the Allies would invade both Greece, for a thrust into the Balkans, and Sardinia as a stepping stone to the south of France. The deception was devised. It was code named "Trojan Horse."

Though "Trojan Horse" was an appropriate name, the operation would eventually take on the more famous title of "The Man Who Never Was," and be recognized as one of history's greatest pieces of deceptive espionage.

The idea was old: place false papers in the hands of the enemy in hopes they would believe the information true and act on it. It was a strategy that had been used effectively for centuries, especially for Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen and Brigadier Archibald Wavel during the British campaign against the Turks and Germany in World War I. Their success inspired Churchill and was principle in his creation of the LCS.

The original idea for "The Man Who Never Was" came from Lt. Cmdr. Ewen Montagu, a member of a British naval intelligence department responsible for liaison between other deception agencies. He proposed that a body be disguised as a staff officer and have him carry high-level papers that would show the Allies' intention of attacking somewhere other than Sicily. The proposal was presented to the MI5 organization responsible for double agents - the XX-Committee.

After the plan was discussed it was approved by Churchill and Eisenhower. A corpse would be set adrift from a submarine near Huelva in Spain where it was known that a German intelligence agent had good connections with the Spanish. The corpse would have a brief case attached to it. The papers in the case would contain information that would lead the Germans to believe that the Allies were to attack Sardinia and Greece, not Sicily.

To carry out the ruse, authenticity was of paramount importance. If an autopsy were performed on the body of the victim, it must appear that the person died of drowning. So the corpse of a man who had died of pneumonia was sought and found. The body was that of a man in his early thirties who had been physically fit until his death. The parents of the dead man were approached and told the body was needed for medical purposes. The parents agreed but made a condition that the identity of the body never be made public.

The XX-Committee gave the body a new identity: Captain (acting Major) William Martin, 09560, Royal Marines, a staff officer at Combined Operations Headquarters. To make Capt. Martin as real as possible his brief case carried personal papers: an overdraft from his bank, a bill for the recent purchase of an engagement ring and letters from his fiance (a real woman secretary on Montagu's staff).

The deception would be carried out by documents that showed the Allies would invade Sicily only as a deceptive maneuver to conceal the more important invasions of Sardinia and Greece. One of the documents was a personal letter from General Archibald Nye, the Vide Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to General Sir Harold Alexander, the commander who would lead the Sicilian invasion code named Husky.

To remove any possible doubts the Germans might have about an acting major carrying such important papers, Martin was given a letter from Lord Louis Mountbatten to Mediterranean Commander in Chief, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham. Mountbatten wrote that Martin was an expert in the employment of landing craft and had been "more accurate than some of us about the probable run of events at Dieppe and he has been well in on the experiments with the latest barges and equipment which took place up in Scotland. Let me have him back, please as soon as the assault is over."

April 19, 1943, Martin was placed on the submarine HMS Seraph. On April 30, the Seraph surfaced off the coast of Spain near the fishing village of Huelva. The brief case of papers was chained to Martin's wrist and the body was set in the water along with a capsized rubber boat. As Martin floated toward the shore the Seraph slipped into the sea and disappeared.

The next day the body was found by a fisherman who took the corpse into the port. The Spanish Armada took custody of the body and contacted the British vice-consul who had not been told anything about the MI6 plot. The vice-consul called the British attache at Madrid, Capt. J.H. Hillgarth, who knew of the plot. Hillgarth told the vice-consul to be sure the brief case was retrieved, but the Spaniards told the vice-consul the case was being retained for judicial purposes. At the same time the Spanish had informed the Abwehr. As a doctor established the fact that the man had died of drowning after a plane crash, Spanish authorities were photo-copying the documents.

Hillgarth continued his insistence that the dead man's papers be returned, a fact the Abwehr did not fail to notice. At Huelva, Martin was buried with full military honors; his "fiance" sent a wreath with a card of remembrance.

The Spanish meticulously extracted the documents without breaking the seals, photo-copied the documents and gave the photos to the local German Abwehr. The brief case and its papers were returned to the British by the Spanish Foreign Office. The photos were sent to Berlin for analysis and evaluation. The Germans in turn studied the material very closely. Eventually they were led to believe that the documents were completely genuine.

Now Hitler's paranoia about the Balkans were all the more real. In a letter to Miscellany he said he was not concerned about a Second Front in the West in 1943; he was still worried about the Balkans " . . . an enemy landing in the area, backed by local nationalist and Communist uprisings, might lead to the worst nightmare of all, to the exposing of the German southern flank in the East and . . . into Germany itself."

Italian troops were the main defense in the Balkans for the Axis. But Hitler had his doubts about how dependable Italy was as an ally. As Hitler considered new information that there were plots in Rome to overthrow Mussolini, he also wondered how to make sure the Balkans were properly defended. Then a second corpse was found near Cagliari, Sardinia; a British commando who carried documents that again showed the Allies' interest in the Balkans. The corpse was another deception by LCS.

On May 12, 1943 Hitler declared that "measures regarding Sardinia and the Peloponese take precedence over everything else." Field Marshall Rommel was sent to Sardinia, a panzer division was sent by train from France to Greece and two panzer divisions were sent by train from their Russian front position to Greece.

On July 9, 1943 Sicily was attacked and occupied by the armies of Montgomery and General George Patton while Rommel continued to set up his headquarters in Greece. Hitler's fears had become a reality: the encirclement of his Third Reich; but this time the final thrust into "the soft underbelly of Europe," might not come from the Balkans but from Italy. But could Hitler be sure? He never was.

Documents declassified and made public in 1995 seemed to show that Montagu had deceived the public for years concerning the real body used as Major Martin. It seemed that the importance of having a body that appeared to have drowned was not of particular need. The documents seemed to show that the body Montagu used was a Welshman, Glyndwr Michael, a thirty-four-year old drifter who committed suicide by rat poison.

The mystery has been complicated with information provided by British documentary filmmaker Colin Gibbon in his 2003 documentary "Who Was the Man Who Never Was?" In the documentary, Gibbon presented his case that the body used was a British naval seaman Tom Martin. A Tom Martin was killed along with 379 fellow seamen on the British aircraft carrier Dasher. Fourteen years of research led Gibbon to believe that a body tainted with poison would have been unacceptable to the finely detailed plan. Gibbon noted that Tom Martin shared the surname of the corpse and that Montagu left clues to the real identity of the corpse in his book Top Secret. In the book, Montagu referred to a Tom Martin as "a good friend." Gibbon found there was only one Tom Martin in the navy and that was the same Martin who died of drowning on the Dasher. Gibbon learned from Martin's sister that her brother had always carried a crucifix and a St. Christopher's medal in his wallet. The corpse carried a wallet containing a crucifix and a St. Christopher's medal, items that may have been placed on the body at the request of the family.

The 1955 film The Man Who Never Was made a distinct issue of the man's father asking Montagu (Clifton Webb) to promise that his son would have a proper Christian burial. The final scene of the film shows Montagu pinning the medal he received for Operation Mincemeat on a floral wreath that adorned the gravesite. The film includes a romantic subplot and a German agent who intends on investigating if Martin is real or imagined.