The Myth Behind Foreign Intervention and Civil Wars

Ingmar Northcott, a writer for the Daily Bruin, says that, "U.S. should stay out of Iraq Civil War," and while he seems to acknowledge the truth of the matter that a civil war doesn't currently exist, he goes into detail about the futility in attempting to intervene in a foreign civil war, that such a conflict is unbecoming and well nigh unwinnable. He backs this assertion by pointing out that both sides have to reconcile, something the anti-Federalist Sunnis and pro-Federalist Shi'ites simply won't do (this is an interesting way to deflect thousands of smaller issues that have nothing to do with federalism). Nevertheless, as Roman history has taught us about thousands of other subjects, civil wars are not simply the domain of those fighting them - nor is it exclusively beneficial to "stay out of" those forms of conflicts.

Case in point in this example is Egypt - whose own civil war was tearing the country apart just as surely as the Roman Civil War was tearing the Roman Empire apart. Naturally I realize it would not be known by historians as the Roman Empire for a number of more years, but it needs to be acknowledged that it was the entire territorial body that was at risk, not just the simple, already fragile government. Governors, commanders, legions, and protectorates looked upon Pompey Magnus and Julius Caesar eagerly to see who would emerge the victor - and if that victor would be worth attempting to secede against. Beyond that, nations saw this as their chance to spring back onto the global theater: could Egypt perhaps benefit by using grain as a valuable form of extortion against Rome? Could the Zealots finally become a major political party and oust the newly conquering Romans?

Would the Parthians follow up their victory at Carrhae with a follow up campaign into Asia Minor? Would the Greeks revolt? What about Hispania?

These were all very important questions as the two titans of Roman history danced around one another and finally answered that question at the Battle of Pharsalus. While Pompey's flight to Egypt naturally led Caesar there it was a trip he was going to have to make regardless of his foe's final destination. As was previously stated, a dynastic dispute where the young Ptolemy XIII was being manipulated by his eunuch advisers was ripping the country in two, disrupting the all valuable grain supply to Rome. While today the Middle Eastern hot topic is oil, one must consider the fundamental importance of grain from Egypt to the Roman Empire. The importance of it would dwarf that of oil today many times over, and Egypt more or less held the international monopoly on this wonder food.

The Ptolemies had long been allies to the Roman Republic - Pompey himself had been good friends with Ptolemy XII and expected to be welcomed with open arms from his son, Ptolemy XIII, who rather betrayed and murdered him, presenting his head as a gift to Caesar upon his arrival in Alexandria. This resulted in a fit of anger from Caesar, who demanded the heads of those responsible for Pompey's death, on the grounds that he was a consul of Rome, and thus was not subject to such barbarity. Caesar than proceeded to shake the very foundation of Egypt with his declaration that the civil war would end to insure safe grain shipments to Rome (which he demanded at a far lower price than was expected, based highly on the debt of Ptolemy XII to Pompey and the Republic). With the young Ptolemy XIII and his advisers facing a lifetime of politically indentured servitude to the new dictator of Rome a plan was hatched to end the civil war with Ptolemy's sister's (and wife's) death and an attack on Caesar himself.

The Egyptian Civil War took a bloody turn where Ptolemy's forces attacked Caesar while pressing hard against Cleopatra's, hoping to seize the valuable grain producing regions while forcing the already weakened Rome to a heel. The goal was to solidify Ptolemy XIII, and by extension his advisers, as the sole ruler of Egypt - as this is truly the only logical conclusion to a civil war. Someone has to win - as Mr. Northcott points out, two sides with widely different beliefs and goals are not likely to simply come to the table, they are going to battle one another until someone wins, taking control of the central government. In Ptolemy's case, he intended to act in brazen defiance of the will of his father (who had conveniently made Rome the executor to his will), expelling Cleopatra and ruling as sole ruler. With neither side able to come to terms, the answer was a civil war.

This is without factoring in the relatively unpopular Arsinoe IV, who herself believed she deserved the throne. This proved an important aspect of the war however, as Ptolemy XIII saw the increasing strength of the Cleopatra-Roman alliance.

Common thought, if one were to base Roman opinion on the same thought process as Mr. Northcott, would be for Caesar to withdraw. His soldiers were tired, his army was stretched thin, the people were more or less tired of war, and after all, this was the Egyptians' war. By all means, shouldn't it have been a quagmire? It was not however, as rather than assume that all sides need reconcile, Julius Caesar elected to put his weight behind Cleopatra VII and summarily destroyed the heavily outnumbering Ptolemy-Arsinoe alliance.

With Caesar's help, the Egyptian Civil War came to a close, Rome developed an important ally (and later province), the grain shipments flowed smoothly, and violence had been quelled.

The world was later changed - in many ways for the better - as a direct result of these actions here. Rome would not starve, it forced the showdown between Marcus Antonius and Octavius and the land became known as Aegyptus, the private domain of Roman Emperors. None of which would have happened - and arguably the bloodshed would have continued - if Rome had stuck to current political thought of "it's their war, let them fight it out".