The Nature of Following Nature

(From Cicero, quoted by Montaigne in Of Experience)

Though the quote above applies to the ethics of both the Stoics and Michel de Montaigne, there is ultimately a radical distinction in the way each interprets how to live a life in accordance with nature. Montaigne, writing in the Sixteenth century, was responding to the epistemological pedagogy of the Dogmatists in much the same way as the Pyrrhonic Skeptics did. Montaigne was heavily influenced by Pyrrhonism and relied on his doubts about absolute knowledge to propound a lifestyle devoted to understanding and conforming to "nature." The Stoics, on the other hand, adopted a didactic moral theory based on cosmic determinism. For the Stoics, "following nature" is an absolute regimen in which we attempt to live in harmony with our destiny while liberating ourselves from unnatural passions. Yet for Montaigne, following nature is an individual process that involves harmonizing one's inner nature with one's outer behavior.

To establish their ethical views, the Stoics relied on a strict theoretical framework that places God at the helm of the cosmos. According to the Stoics, God is the architect of the universe and is responsible for creating the laws of nature. This means that God directs and orchestrates every detail of the universe, including our lives. Our lives are subject to God's will insofar as we are subject to the laws of nature. Thus, nature is the principle which organizes the cosmos and makes everything necessary. Because the Stoics believe that "the impossible does not follow from the possible," they must conclude that necessity is the mother of causality (Epictetus Discourses 2.19.1). Since everything is subject to the laws of nature and nothing impossible (i.e. contrary to the laws of nature) can follow from a possible cause, then we can trace any event to its prior causes. If such an array of causes exists, then whatever is necessary must also be fated since we can show that action Y logically proceeded from action X. When I drop my pencil and it falls, its falling is not simply necessary, but fated. It is necessary because gravity acts on the pencil, causing to fall. It is also fated because God is the author of the cosmos and He is responsible for "devising" the laws of gravity. For the Stoics, this reasoning must also apply to human affairs. Just as God is responsible for gravity which makes objects fall, so too is He is responsible for giving human beings logos, or reason, which is the rational principle from which human beings act. In this way, humans are subject to the same kind of determinism that dictates that a pencil, when dropped, must fall. Chrysippus sums up Stoic determinism with an interesting parable:

It is as though a dog is tied behind a cart. If he wants to follow, he is both dragged and follows, exercising his autonomy in conjunction with necessity. But if he does not wish to follow he will nevertheless be forced to. (Hippolytus Philosophoumena 21)

According to Chrysippus, since everything is necessary, everything is determined. Therefore, our lives are being controlled by the hand of Fate whether we like it or not. The best way to live, then, is to avoid struggling with what nature has imposed on us and follow the only principle which is in accordance with nature, namely, reason. If we succumb to irrational emotions, then we are only making our inevitable lives more arduous. By following reason, however, we can be happy and virtuous.

Given this framework, the Stoics intend to show that passions are incompatible with reason and that we must liberate ourselves from them. A fundamental Stoic maxim of how to live is that appropriate actions are those that follow reason, while inappropriate actions are those that oppose reason (Diogenes Laertius Ethics 7.108). Therefore, honoring one's parents, for instance, is an appropriate action because it follows from reason. What about eating an entire chocolate cake? Is this act appropriate for the Stoics? The Stoics take a strong stand on such matters, asserting that "pleasure is an irrational elation over what seems to be worth choosing" (Diogenes Laertius Ethics 7.114). By eating an entire chocolate cake I am effectively succumbing to my irrational inability to control my hedonistic appetite. Eating the cake is not morally blameworthy because it is unhealthy or gluttonous, but simply because when I eat the cake I act in accordance with pleasure, which is opposed to reason. Ultimately, the Stoics reduce ethics to four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice (John Stobaeus Anthology 2,5b). While eating a chocolate cake is morally blameworthy, committing suicide, ironically, is not. This is perhaps the greatest paradox for Stoic ethics. As long as I act in accordance with reason, suicide is okay. An obvious example is that of a spy. If I am spy and I am captured, it is reasonable for me to commit suicide to avoid being forced to divulge government secrets. But the Stoics would push this further and say that a person living in extreme sadness or bodily illness can commit suicide because this is completely in accordance with reason. This thinking, of course, flies in the face of our ideas of life. We generally do not allow euthanasia for cases of terminally ill people and many religions completely condemn suicide. The Stoics, by shunning passions, also shun Eros - the life instinct. It seems to be a law of nature, especially in the biological sense, that living beings struggle for survival. To give up one's life, despite illness or other setbacks, repudiates this essential feature of humanity and turns cosmic determinism into a biological defeatism. Another objection we can raise is that the Stoics declare that the wise man will not feel pain, since pain is an "irrational contraction of the soul" (Diogenes Laertius Ethics 7.118). The Stoics are contradicting themselves; if the wise man is truly wise, then pain will not be a deterrent in living a virtuous life. Clearly, for the Stoics reason is the only motive from which we are allowed to act; any other motive is discordant with nature and leads us to irrational feelings, vice, and unhappiness.

Montaigne, on the other hand, develops his ethical beliefs from the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum, namely skepticism. In his Apology for Raymond Sebond, Montaigne reveals to his reader the truth of human nature: "that the greatest part of what we know is the least of those parts that we do not know" (Inwood and Gerson 38). In other words, we strive to acquire knowledge and in so doing we fail to realize that our pursuit is futile, a consequence of the inevitability of human ignorance. Montaigne finds a paradigm in Socrates, who put forth his philosophical views but never asserted them unlike the Stoics, Peripatetics, and Epicureans. Socrates was wise because he questioned everything yet assumed nothing. Montaigne thus summarizes to the main aim of the Pyrrhonic school: to "present man naked and empty, acknowledging his natural weakness, fit to receive from above some outside power; stripped of human knowledge" (40). In other words, the greatest task for humankind is acknowledging our natural weakness, our inability to acquire knowledge. This concession ultimately empowers us because we rid ourselves of the angst associated with our futile quest for knowledge. What remains by professing ignorance is faith. Faith, for Montaigne, is the only source of true knowledge because it comes from God. So when we realize that customs, laws, and opinions vary from place to place, from person to person, and from one time period to the next, we always know that God's word is immutable and absolute. This reasoning culminates in an ethical theory based on the concept of ataraxy. Ataraxy, not unlike the Epicurean concept of katastasis, is a neutral state devoid of worries and anxieties (42). In short, for the Skeptics and for Montaigne, the highest good is ataraxy, which is the goal of living the good life.

From this Pyrrhonic version of Skepticism, Montaigne develops an ethics based on a harmony between inner thoughts and outer behavior. In true opposition to the so-called Dogmatists, Montaigne reveals his ethical beliefs not as a strict set of rules, but as rough guideline. One belief Montaigne stresses is the importance of living a private, solitary life apart from public scrutiny. This means that we alone are responsible for our own actions irrespective of the opinions of others. After all, if there is no absolute knowledge, then whatever I believe is just as sufficient as whatever someone else believes. This relativistic account no doubt echoes the saying of Protagaras that "human being is the measure of all things." This Protagarean relativism is central to Montaigne's ethical enterprise, further distinguishing him from the absolute dogmatism of the Stoics. Another key idea for Montaigne is bringing one's private life into harmony with his public life. This means we should not try to hide or suppress what is inside us. Thus, Montaigne would argue that to achieve a state of ataraxy, I should not fight my inherent nature. For instance, if I am left-handed I should not force myself to write with my right hand. This battle between my outward behavior and my inner nature is ultimately a losing one. Obviously, I am better off following my own unique nature (i.e. left-handedness) than trying to subdue it. Likewise, I should not struggle with the inevitable, because it is natural. If I am going to die, this is inevitable and therefore I ought to find happiness in knowing that nature intends for me to die. Clearly for Montaigne, living in accordance with nature is different for each of us; unlike the Stoics, there is no one way we all ought to live.

However, Montaigne's relativism and skepticism proves problematic for his ethical theory. For example, what happens when my inner nature is pernicious and I find enjoyment in, say, killing people? Should I not suppress my inner nature and instead aim for ataraxy by abiding by my bloodthirsty intentions? Montaigne would respond to this objection by first saying that vice itself is so egregious that to not recognize it would require ignorance and stupidity (Inwood and Gerson 47). Put simply, he would not believe that anyone could commit a vice without realizing it. He would further add that by definition, vices are those things that are condemned both by reason and by nature (47). Ultimately, Montaigne would object to this circumstance as follows: it is inconceivable that the nature of a person, insofar as they are a natural being, impels him to commit murder, because God is the author of our individual natures and would not have constructed us so erroneously. Yet this objection is unsatisfactory. We know that there are people who suffer from mental disorders where they are impelled to commit crime. We therefore cannot assume that God is incapable or unwilling to make a person a "madman." Montaigne might also argue that such madmen are incapable of living in accordance with nature because they simply are "unnatural." Again this is problematic because we have modern sciences, such as pharmacology, whose purpose is to find means that enable disturbed individuals to function normally. We cannot simply subjugate people, as Montaigne seems to suggest, by deeming them "unnatural" and relegating them to some substandard level of society.

Despite his criticism of the Stoics and other Dogmatic philosophers, Montaigne cannot avoid agreeing with Stoic principles in many accounts. For one, like the Stoics, Montaigne expresses his disgust for the meretricious nature of the society in which he lived. He declares in his On Physiognomy that "it is far more hazardous to acquire any other than food or drink" (Inwood and Gerson 58). Montaigne is saying that having excesses of wealth only paves the way for vices like begging and borrowing. If we all live modestly then we can eliminate these pedestrian activities and live more peacefully. Furthermore, Montaigne talks about the fear of old age. Montaigne's response to this avoidable anxiety is simple: old age is entirely natural. Why should we dread something that is natural and inevitable? Clearly the Stoics would argue in much the same way given their deterministic account of human nature. Since God has determined that I am going to age, then this must bring me joy because it is in accordance with nature. A final point of agreement can be in the way Montaigne seems to propitiate the idea of what the Stoics referred to as a "smooth flow of life." Happiness for both the Stoics and Montaigne involves concession. While Montaigne concedes to ignorance, finding nature as the only guiding light, the Stoics concede to determinism, declaring that following nature is the only way to reach the end of life peacefully and happily. Both the Stoics and Montaigne place God at the top of their moral theories. We might say that Montaigne and the Stoics adopt a kind of voluntarism with respect to God's will. Since God is the author of nature, then whatever He decides constitutes morality insofar as it is in accordance with nature.

In contrast, Montaigne's fundamental opposition to the Stoics regards his view that passion and reason are compatible. Regarding sensuality, Montaigne expresses a view discordant with the Stoics: sensual pleasure is not only permissible, but commendable! Montaigne begrudges the view that the "wise man" must shun all sensual appetites. To the contrary, it is in our nature to enjoy those things which bring us sensual pleasure. As Montaigne argues, "Temperance is the moderator, not the adversary of pleasures" (Inwood and Gerson 60). In Montaigne's view, the Stoics had it all wrong. Temperance does not mean blocking out all the things which provide pleasure, because this is contrary to our nature! Thus, Montaigne would condone a drunken night of revelry or two (as long as the person does not drink potentially harmful amounts), while the Stoics would assert that virtue lies in drinking without getting drunk. According to the Stoics, drunkenness is the opposite of reason because we obviously cannot think rationally while intoxicated and so we must abstain from it. As was discussed earlier, the Stoics condone suicide. For Montaigne, this is unacceptable. In Of Physiognomy, he writes, "death is indeed the end, but not therefore the goal of life" (58). Later he adds, "life should be an aim unto itself...its rightful study is to regulate, conduct, and suffer itself." Montaigne is obviously fed up with the ancient idea that philosophers ought to be eagerly anticipating death in order to unburden the mind from the body. Instead, Montaigne says that life is its own reward. Life is part of our nature. Though death is also part of our nature, it does not follow that we should rush into it, especially in cases of suicide where one takes his or her own life prematurely. Moreover as a Christian, Montaigne could not condone suicide because he would argue that God, as supreme author of human nature, would not construct man in such a way to lead him to commit suicide.

We have seen that following nature for the Stoics is not so much a philosophy but a way of life, delineating how precisely we should act. For Montaigne, following nature is merely a guide to how to achieve a state of sedation. The fundamental difference between both accounts of following nature is that Montaigne does not emphasize or even place importance on reason. Rather, he emphasizes acting in accordance with our individual will without trying to appeal to some transcendental standard of human behavior. All we have to do is accept who we are and follow God. The Stoics do just the opposite: they lay down a universal code of human behavior based on a transcendental cosmic theory that allows for determinism. We have to realize the absolute truth of the cosmos -that fate is unavoidable -in order to live a good life. Both doctrines reach a similar conclusion: we must realize that we cannot escape nature, so to be happy, we might as well conform to it. However, Montaigne's account is much more preferable because he is an individualist. Following nature really is an individual process. What is best for me is certainly not best for everyone. Montaigne's philosophy allows us to live the best lives in our own, unique ways without giving up the things we as humans seem to enjoy. A Stoic account is basically inhuman. We are forced to surrender our humanity - our pleasures and emotions - to become torpid drones, who like moths to light, are drawn to follow reason regardless of the expense.

Bibliography

Inwood, Brad, and Lloyd P. Gerson, trans. Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co Inc, 1998.

Schneewind, J B. Moral Philosophy From Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2003.