The Nature of Reality and Appearance by Kant, Hegel and Fichte

St. Thomas Aquinas once said that what is in principle unintelligible, cannot be or exist. He said this because he believed reality and God cannot be apart from meaning. Are things limited to appearance or can we come to know things in themselves as authentically true? Can we come to know the "nature" of things? We all want to know what is authentic and not just theoretically asserted in the mind. For this reason, I would like to present a lengthy discussion surrounding concepts and objects.

In Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" the author tries to determine the cognitive powers of human reason in order to ascertain what can or cannot be achieved in the categories of knowledge. He was particularly concerned with "pure" reason which acting upon itself was not associated with any other faculties of the mind like sensibilities would be - mathematics was one example.

It was discussed whether through reason alone it would be possible to attain to a knowledge of ultimate truth about things in the world. This science would be genuine knowledge of being and what really is in existence and essence, beyond appearances. Kant did at one time believe this was possible, but eventually gave way to doubt because Kant was not sure whether our conceptual knowledge was reliable or certain. He thus attempted a "critical inquiry into the faculty of reason with regard to all the cognitions to which it may strive to attain independently of all experience" in his "Critique of Pure Reason" (Reardon, 41).

Kant believed that forms of intuition, such as space and time, and those things which he calls "pure categories of understanding" had no application beyond what is given in sense-experience. In other words, in order to arrive at knowledge "a priori" and the possibility of such synthetic principles, he believed we have to limit their application to the world of what can be experienced, or what he calls "phenomena." He explained this "is the cause of appearance and therefore not itself appearance, and which can be thought neither as quantity nor as reality nor as substance. We are completely ignorant whether it is to be met within us or outside us, whether it would be at once removed with the cessation of sensibility, or whether in the absence of sensibility it would still remain" (Smith, 412).

When we attempt to extend the application to things in themselves, or what Kant calls "noumena" by reason, we only "entangle ourselves in conceptual muddles" or what Kant calls antinomies which are outside the power of human understanding to resolve (Reardon, 42). Even the mere possibility of the object, presupposing the possibility of understanding being capable through non-sensuous intuition of apprehending it, we have no right to assert (Smith, 408). "The concept of noumenon is merely a limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility" (Hegel, 255; Smith, 408). "We must either abstract from all reference to the object," Hegel tells us, "and so be left with a merely logical representation; or, in assuming an object, we must postulate a special form of intuition which we do not ourselves possess, and which therefore we cannot employ in forming our concept of the object" (Smith, 410).

The philosopher Hegel believed Kant's distinction between phenomena and things in themselves to be an ontological one. Hegel dismisses what is usually called "method" and "the very idea that one should begin with a set of rules and cautionary principles before one enters into the subject-matter itself" (Solomon, 294). He thought that for Kant there existed two qualitatively and numerically distinct sorts of entity, one called appearances or phenomena and the other called noumena or things in themselves. You could even define phenomena as "subjective" and noumena "objective" or unconditioned objects in themselves which could only be known by God.

This problem of objectivity means that no set of mental states or propositions arrived at by the subject can be verifiable or falsifiable by reference to the subject's state of mind or belief. It is a transcendental problem in that we can know phenomena, but how do we know noumena or if it really exists? The problem empirically is that we can know our own experiences, but how does that prove there are physical objects which correspond to the sight, sound, touch, etc. Kant does give a response to the problem in the Prolegomena:

"...objective validity and necessary universality are equivalent terms, and though we do not know the object itself, yet when we consider a judgment as universal and hence necessary, we thereby understand it to have objective validity." (Kant, Prolegomena, 46, para.19; Priest 111).

The "transcendental unity of apperception" is a formal condition of experience. It is the requirement that "I think" be capable of accompanying any of my experiences and means that the content of my thoughts must allow for being first thought. This is a necessary condition of there being episodes in the single consciousness that I hold. This process has used the terms "intuition" "presentation" and "appearance". The world can be referred to as it appears to me or as I think of it existing independently of my perception of it. Unless there were phenomena, there could be no subjectivity nor objectivity. (Priest, 117).

There are four Kantian antinomies:

The first thesis is that the world has a beginning in time and is limited spatially. The antithesis of this is that the world had no beginning and has no limit in space. The conflict operative here is that the completion of the infinite is impossible, so likewise the concept of it. No synthetic proposition, either true or false, can possibly be asserted. There is an infinite regress which is an irrational or absurd task. It is also based on presuppositions regarding the beginning of the world or its determinate size. To say that there is empty time before the world's beginning would be nonsense, or even that the world is a "thing in itself" is speculation.

The second thesis is that every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts and nothing exists anywhere but the simple and what is composed of it. The antithesis is contrary to this. The conflict here is that the thing in itself cannot be taken out of its state of composition, also a mere idea cannot be shown in experience. The idea of irreducibility is absurd. No matter how small matter may be, it can still be divided even more.

The third antinomy is that causality according to the law of nature is not the only causality from which all phenomena can be deduced. Freedom must also be deduced. The antithesis of this, however, is that there is no freedom and that everything in the world takes place according to the laws of nature. Here the problem is that where cause begins of self [first cause], then freedom even by a series of appearances can never be complete. Where there is no freedom, the laws of nature are ordered which means the cause is blind and abrogates the rules. This presupposes the preexistence from cause to effect or arising out of a preceding state of events. Antecedents presume an object is caused into being. You cannot have an infinite regress of causes or there will never be a first cause or answer. Also, the very act of deliberation means choice, alternative courses of action, desires, environmental circumstances which may or may not be impartial or rationally caused. Finally, our reflection of any experience (cause and effect) is simply expression.

The fourth antinomy is there exists an absolutely necessary Being which is either a part of the world or a cause of it. The antithesis denies this. How can one relate the sheer idea of God to existent reality? By examining the beauty and order to the cosmos, the design, one can infer that things are acting for purposes or designed aesthetically which implies more than a cause and effect relationship.

What Kant has proven is that the metaphysical propositions which had generally been held by tradition cannot be objective or scientific knowledge since each contains contradictions which are logically possible. The problem Kant deals with in the latter part of the "Transcendental Dialectic" arise from his attempt to conceive of a whole which would include both the known world and the mind that knows. This Kant calls the "Ideal of Pure Reason" or a higher power which he regards as "originating a unique concept, that of the unconditioned" (Smith, 414) which Reason demands for its own satisfaction. He includes these in his proofs such as cosmological, ontological and physio-theological for the existence of God as a supreme Being in whom all possible perfections are united into one concrete individuality.

Reason is able to convert a concept into a transcendental idea by extending beyond the limits of the empirical understanding and frees the concept of understanding from the unavoidable limitations of possible experience. When one has a sensory awareness of a particular object, one recognizes it by rules of characterization which is a product of the understanding. Time and space are a form of this relation between the sensory image and the organized intuition.

Kant also makes the distinction between Empirical self - the individual or concrete Being; the transcendental self which is the Ego, the logical unity of apperception or self-consciousness and self-sense; and the transcendent self - the self in itself, myself independent of experience and beyond empirical confirmation. "I think" is considered distinct from the body, which unlike the philosopher Descartes, Kant believed to be invalid.

The philosopher Hegel thought Kant's claim that we cannot know things in themselves is absurd beyond refutation. It would lead to skepticism where one would never reach reality. Hegel compares the pursuit of knowledge to swimming by comparing the abstract with the concrete. One simply cannot know how to swim until they are in the water and doing so. He felt the first task of knowledge was to learn the scope, nature and limitations of our capacity to know.

Hegel believed that using the lens, mirror or medium metaphors meant that there was an assumption that the means distort the truth, but we cannot know whether they do or not. Although we provide our own criterion for interpretation and it is unknown whether the thing experienced is true or not, our consciousness is our reality. Hegel believes becoming reason itself had its own transcending dynamic. Is the understanding adequate or sufficient? We need to be able to differentiate this, from that. He disputes Kant's antinomies as false suppositions and a dialectic process. The antitheses needed more revelation of reality. It can be transcended by a higher viewpoint to equal a synthesis of truth. For Hegel, the antinomy is its own dynamic prompting the mind.

Hegel responded to Kant's criticism of the ontological argument by stating that if the term Being does not lie within the content of existence, then it adds nothing to the content of the concept. There is a difference between Being in thought and Being in fact. The unity of concept and Being is a presupposition. Does this mean logic generates Being? For the idealist, ultimate reality is thought, for example, God doesn't have existence, God IS existence. There is a unity of Being and thought.

Hegel needed to invoke the world of spirit because he presumed that there was a relation between subjects and objects which was not explicable psychologically or physically. Yet he criticized Kant for setting up conditions of knowledge which make pure knowledge impossible. Hegel claimed Kant was self-contradictory. He accused Kant of setting up an epistemology which makes reality as it is in itself unknowable and is thus, no epistemology at all. Worse, that nothing can be said about reality as it is in itself. Not only our concepts, but that there is nothing in principle that can be said about things in themselves. There are no predicates, nor properties which can be ascribed. Therefore, Hegel points to the fact that Kant's model led to unknowable reality, which is a paradox.

Hegel understands appearances as mediators between our understanding and the essence of things:

"The true essence of things has now the character of not being immediately for consciousness; on the contrary, consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner being and, as the understanding, looks through this mediating play of forces into the true background of things. The middle term which united the two extremes, the understanding and the inner world, is the developed being of force which, for the understanding itself, is henceforth only a vanishing. This being is therefore called "appearances". (Hegel, Phenomenology, 86).

Hegel required that there be knowledge of reality as it really is in itself. Although both Kant and Fichte take the individual self as knower, self-certainty and "a priori" knowledge to be immediately known by us, Fichte's response to Kant was that he practiced "subjective idealism." He said it was not the logic of "perfection" but action which determined the worth of the knowledge. It was not just that beliefs be self-evident, but that our actions as a result of those beliefs make the knowledge coherent. He suggested that the interpretations we put upon experience are not susceptible to a purely "theoretical justification or demonstration." Fichte emphasized the primacy of practical interest and moral commitment in determining the outlook we adopt (Gardiner, 18).

According to the philosopher Fichte, Kant failed to investigate the scope and limits of reason. Fichte believed Kant to be dogmatic or one-sided in favor of transcendental realism or to favor the object. This was the polar opposite of Fichte's idealism and partiality to the subject. Where Kant supposed that if one of the pair of antinomies is true, the other opposed judgment must be false, Fichte believed our experience of the thing and our intelligence are inseparately connected as an "undifferentiated subject" called the Absolute, and what Kant called the "transcendental ego" (Solomon, 305).

Fichte thought human consciousness contained two selves: the divine and mine, like Augustine. Fichte embodies this "unhappy consciousness" because he is aware of his own immortality and limitations. He also saw mankind as opposed to nature. The lack of freedom mankind has means we cannot even know the world - which would be impractical if we imagine we can change the world.

Fichte believed that perceivable objects are present to us solely as a consequence of a determination of our external sense. Knowledge that I know or see is simply by my own condition and immediate consciousness which is an extension of my sensations and conditioned by it, which is then extended into a field of intuition. He felt we have immediate knowledge and mediated knowledge. He allows that we are aware retrospectively that we have processed data, from the inside out. By conscious activity of the self, I become the knower or subject of objectivity and the knowledge is innate.

Hegel was later to show that feelings themselves do not require self-consciousness, even animals have feelings. He suggested that perhaps another kind of self-consciousness is necessary, perhaps that of the divine. He also stressed that we need to get away from the fear of error. He felt that Fichte did cause his arguments to eventually progress to infinity. While Kant was committed to the thing in itself, Fichte supersedes this by a philosophy of "oughts" in the Kantian Ideal thereby bringing into question the whole notion of freedom and determinism. For Fichte, the freedom and striving of the ego ended in the rubble of Kant's romantic rationalism.

For Fichte the thing in itself is that which is projected before you via the thought thing. It is a mass which occupies a space [field onto which we project our sensations] and a bearer or properties. Consciousness of this for Fichte is nothing more than a product of our own "presentative capacity" (Fichte, 59). Fichte essentially does away with the necessity and being of objects, including himself. Knowledge is only speculative until we move on to the subject as agent in the activity, which generates meaning. "The only intelligible question, therefore, is not whether or even how we know the world but why we supply the forms to understand as we do. This is Fichte's view precisely." (Solomon, 315).

Hegel clearly replaces this dualism between consciousness and the thing in itself (developmental coherence theory of truth) with the science of spirit. He presupposes that we are not merely observers and that knowledge depends upon our self-knowledge. It is consciousness coming into agreement with itself. Hegel wants to know what are the reasons why consciousness sees things this way rather than that way. One can even misunderstand one's own intensions, actions and motives.

Let's take another look at consciousness. Kant went from the "I think" of appearance to actual reality or things in themselves. Fichte goes from immediate intuition or background to a sort of abstract projection. Hegel goes from appearance (as we appear to ourselves) to the absolute. For Hegel, consciousness is not a lens or mirror, but the partial disclosure of reality through which things manifest themselves. Even the imagination is a kind of disclosure of reality. Our point of view is relational and includes the other in relation to me in the first person. Our expression is part of our being and a disclosure of my reality, rather than the cause and effect model of Kant, or the dialogic and communicative model of Fichte.

Where Kant and Fichte take a first-person approach, philosophers like Schleiermacher do not. Self-consciousness is not enough, there needs to be social relationships in order to have an awareness or interconnectedness with society and a better understanding of self. You cannot even have thought without language, even if this means a dialogue in one's own head. Scientific reasoning is dialogical and argumentative and is a communal endeavor. I only bring up Schleiermacher here to show that there are differences in perspectives and how one interprets appearances and intuitions in relation to others.

Essentially, post-Kantian philosophy now recognizes that the concepts through which we understand our experience contribute to the formation of our experience (Solomon, 311). The very foundations of knowledge depend upon self-knowledge and the forms of the world are in fact our forms of consciousness. The three categories, "consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason are, of course, the three-part structure of Phenomenology" (Solomon, 312). Hegel suggests that we can thus become transparent to ourselves, however reflection is an endless task which can never be completed. The critical examination of one's being aware of oneself in the world although impossible to judge with any reliability and accuracy is nonetheless the only path we have to understand. Even if one accepts the truth of divine revelation or Ideal Reason, there is still the problem that it can only be known through our personal mind's eye or, in the alternative, by acceptance of the validity of the appearance which is done by reason.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fichte, Johann "The Vocation of Man"

Forster, Eckart, "Kant's Transcendental Deductions" Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989

Gardiner, Patrick, "Nineteenth Century Philosophy" NY: The Free Press, 1969

Hegel, G.W.F., "The Phenomenology of Spirit" from Self-Consciousness (1807)

Kant, Immanuel, "A Critique of Pure Reason"

Priest, Stephen, "Hegel's Critique of Kant" Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987

Reardon, Bernard, "Kant As Philosophical Theologian" Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1988

Smith, Norman Kemp, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, "Phenomena and Noumena, Chapter III" NY: Humanities Press, 1962

Solomon, Robert, In the Spirit of Hegel, "Chapter Six, Against Method the Introduction to the Phenomenology."