The Nixon Administration: Secret Bombing in Cambodia

A variety of constituents surrounding foreign policy can often alter the behaviors and policies of individuals in certain times of political tension. Toward the end of the Vietnam War in 1969, several domestic and international factors constrained United States President Richard M. Nixon in his decision to secretly bomb sanctuaries held by the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong at the border of Cambodia. These risks of Cambodian outcry, retaliation from North Vietnam, slowed foreign diplomacy, and most importantly, domestic criticism and antiwar protests all put fear in the eyes of President Nixon and his administration.

One major factor that constrained President Nixon from deciding whether to bomb Cambodia was the fear of a potential protest from Prince Norodom Sihanouk. For twenty-nine years, Prince Sihanouk brought independence to his country through a complicated balancing act. This decree permitted the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Vietcong (VC) to station sanctuaries along Cambodia's border while the country remained neutral amidst constant fighting in Laos and Vietnam. In return, Hanoi promised not to support Cambodia's group of Communists known as the Khmer Rouge. With this neutrality and peace in Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk could only advocate the bombing of such sanctuaries if kept in secrecy. If the bombings became a public matter however, he would be forced to protest against the United States (Baird and Kuzma 2001, 5). Although Prince Sihanouk wanted the Communists to evacuate his country, he knew that bombing them would not be a successful method for removal. Knowing this, Nixon was restricted from taking action on Cambodia in fear of jeopardizing the balancing act as well as his relationship with Sihanouk.

The possibility of retaliation from North Vietnam was another concern that restricted President Nixon in forming his policy. Uncovering Nixon's "Madman Theory," the North Vietnamese were unwilling to negotiate with the United States. While Nixon and his administration looked to strike Cambodia, Hanoi knew that "'it was only a matter of time before the U.S. would have to pull out, no matter what'" (Baird and Kuzma 2001, 9). With this in mind, North Vietnam continued to escalate the situation with multiple air strikes on Saigon. These attacks left President Nixon caught in between protecting the South Vietnamese and preserving his public image for the American people. Moreover, the possibility of retaliation from the North Vietnamese would perpetuate the war, leaving the United States further away from a peaceful resolution. For example, the U.S. Green Berets had been operating secret commissions of two-man teams often traveling with ten local mercenaries. After the initial bombings on Cambodia, these men were ordered to move into Cambodia in hope of finding any Communist survivors. However, these men were immediately attacked and lost after reaching their given target area (Baird and Kuzma 2001, 14). Thus, the North Vietnamese were not afraid of the United States bombing Cambodia-the Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong were ready to retaliate back against the United States if necessary.

Disrupting foreign diplomacy for the United States was a critical issue that President Nixon had to consider before finalizing his decision to bomb Cambodia. By sending air attacks to the border of Cambodia, Nixon feared that a strong Soviet or Chinese reaction would disrupt the chances of maintaining diplomatic relations with either country. Consequently, these relations could later have bearing on whether the United States would be able to end the war peacefully with North Vietnam (Baird and Kuzma 2001, 9). In late February of 1969, President Nixon traveled to Europe in an effort to show the world that he was not obsessed with the war in Vietnam. However, North Vietnam's "mini-Tet" offensive left the President in a difficult situation as he began his European tour. Humiliated and infuriated, Nixon immediately wished to retaliate violently against Hanoi (Baird and Kuzma 2001, 7). At the same time however, Nixon was afraid that by retaliating in Cambodia, France would ultimately be convinced that he was obsessed with the war. With an American retaliation possibly spurring riots in Europe, President Nixon understood that it was important to set a good example on his first trip abroad. As peace talks in Paris continued to decline, the possibility of completely losing diplomatic negotiations quickly became a reality for Nixon. Thus, maintaining strong relationships around the rest of the world became an important factor for Nixon in considering the impending effects of bombing Cambodia.

While Cambodian protests, retaliations from foreign powers, and the loss of foreign diplomacy were all constraints for Nixon's decision to bomb Cambodia, public opinion in America became his largest risk. Many Americans had turned against the war, refusing to fight or support it. Many others believed that the war was slowly coming to an end. Therefore, Nixon knew that renewed bombing of the North would only cause a return of massive antiwar protests. Similarly, Nixon had always despised the press in the United States, believing that "the media was out go get him" (Baird and Kuzma 2001, 11). With his administration under heavy scrutiny, Nixon knew that the any leak of information could quickly destroy his reputation as President and ruin his chances for reelection. Under these terms, he worked to keep the bombings in Cambodia under tight secrecy. However, when the New York Times released a story revealing the strikes overseas, Nixon and his administration became furious, knowing that the American public would erupt in anger and rage as they had with previous President Lyndon B. Johnson. Before these events, Nixon had been enjoying his "honeymoon period" with the American public and did not wish to spark additional antiwar protests and riots throughout the country (Baird and Kuzma 2001, 11). Nixon explains in his memoirs that "'my administration was only two months old, and I wanted to provoke as little public outcry as possible at the outset'" (Baird and Kuzma 2001, 11). This negative sentiment from the American public forced President Nixon to hold the bombings in Cambodia under complete secrecy.

International and domestic actors can often transform the decisions and behaviors of central figures during political uprising and warfare. For President Nixon and his administration, instituting reasonable policies and tactics became a difficult endeavor in their attempt to quell the Vietnam War. The threat of Cambodian protests, North Vietnamese retaliations, unstable foreign diplomatic relations, and antiwar protests in America created tension for Nixon in his decision to secretly bomb Communist sanctuaries at the Cambodian border. While each of these constraints left President Nixon and his administration under extreme pressure, none of these risks transpired as relations between the United States and Cambodia continued to improve several years after the war (Baird and Kuzma 2001, 17).

Bibliography

Baird, Tara and Lynn M. Kuzma. "A Madman's Appetite-Operation Menu: The Nixon Administration and the Secret Bombing in Cambodia." ISBN: 1-56927-242-5. Published: 2001. 1-24.