The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Will Peace Ever Exist?

After more than forty years of bitter fighting and conflict, Israel and the Palestinians began to make headway during the Oslo peace process by exploring different options for sharing the occupied territories. While many considered the 1993 Oslo accord to be a major building block for future peace, it was only the beginning in providing an initial means for discussing an agreement between the two sides. Since then, more negotiations have proceeded in determining a just and acceptable way for Israelis and Palestinians to share the same land. But with no concessions agreed upon and no full-scale solution in the near future, the question remains how much each side will be prepared to sacrifice to ensure a partition plan and consequently a peaceful settlement. There are three prominent issues-settlements, Jerusalem and refugees-that must be compromised if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ever to end in peaceful resolution. Specifically, the Israeli and Palestinian positions of these issues are important for us to address because each of them reveal if a future peace agreement will ever arise.

Settlements:

Since Israel's victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, the Jewish settlements have long been the focal point of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although there are several issues at hand in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, resolving the issue of the post-1967 settlements in the Gaza Strip and West Bank continues to be the first step necessary for concluding a final peace agreement. Under the current leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Israel has begun conceding some of this occupied territory in hope of upholding the agenda "land for peace."

There are three main Israeli perspectives concerning the withdrawal from the settlements. Members of the Likud party and right-wing Israelis hold a religious-nationalist view that believes the 1967 victory liberated the Gaza Strip and West Bank as the centerpiece of biblical Jewish civilization and the birthright of the Jewish people. Because these territories are so sacred to these particular Israelis, the land is therefore nonnegotiable and more importantly, non-returnable. Along with these beliefs, these Israeli activists consider further redeployments as a betrayal of Zionists goals and a national tragedy (Klieman, 79). Other Israeli settlers are not as committed to the nationalist and religious vision of the Zionist movement and Israel rule. These people are more open-minded and realistic than the Israel activists, not dismissing the possibility for compensation and resettlement in return for peace. A final category of Jewish settlers are those living in the Jordan Valley, a vacant area that has been strategically important for sustaining Israel's defense militarily. Traditionally supporters of the Labor party and more recently advocates of the "Third Way" party, these people favor a territorial compromise with the Palestinians-that is as long as Israel continues to control the Jordan Valley (Klieman, 80).

Conversely, Palestinians believe that all of the 120 settlements acquired during the 1967 war should be rightfully returned to them under a full Israeli withdrawal. However, such a territorial compromise based on the existing borders would mean that the majority of Palestinians currently living within the original mandate borders would still not have their homes inside the predicted Palestinian state-neither inside the Gaza Strip nor the entire West Bank. Hence, partition of the settlements will not neatly separate the two ethnicities from one another into two homogenous states, Jewish and Palestinian (Klieman, 75). Even with partition, complete disengagement between Israelis and Palestinians still remains impossible to achieve.

In turn, a final status partition along the former 1967 "green line" would require many Israelis to vacate their homes or live under Palestinian rule. Because many of these settlers came to the West Bank in order to improve their economic status and uphold the Zionist vision, they have little desire to become inhabitants of a Palestinian state (Klieman, 76). Thus, herein lies the main controversy between the two sides-whether both sides will be willing to compromise their radical, adamant positions on the status of the settlements will ultimately determine whether peace will ever follow.

With Sharon proposing a withdrawal this summer from all the settlements in Gaza and four in the West Bank, a start toward ending the violence between Israel and the Palestinians has finally been set in motion (www.cnn.com 5/9/05). Although Sharon has reported that Israel will keep West Bank settlements outside of any final peace deal, the next step for Israel will most likely be to consider further withdrawal from the remaining settlements. While the Palestinians will continue to press for more concessions, Sharon will not allow Israel to withdraw from the entire West Bank any time soon. One major reason for this is the fact that many Israelis have made their homes in the West Bank. A full withdrawal all at once could prove to be problematic for these settlers, causing them to either quickly move out of their homes and into new territory or force them to abruptly live under the authority of a Palestinian government. By gradually withdrawing from sections of the West Bank, Israel offers these Jewish families a chance to find new homes elsewhere before completely conceding the land. Another reason Israel will use the strategy of long-winded concessions is to ensure that the Palestinians uphold their promise for peace and cease any terrorist attacks during this time. By taking this approach, Israel does not have to forfeit all of the occupied territories before peace between the two sides unfolds. This strategy could still prove to be dangerous due to the fact that neither side is assured all the provisions of a peace agreement until full withdrawal is complete. But with enough pressure coming from the current mediating "quartet" that includes the United States, Russia, European Union, and United Nations, Sharon and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will continue to follow the Road Map of 2002 and hold negotiations to produce a viable partition regarding the existing settlements in the West Bank (Smith, 515).

Jerusalem:

At the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the fate of Jerusalem as the current capital of Israel. Many believe that the issue of Jerusalem continues to be the deciding factor in finalizing peace between Israel and the Palestinians-that without a solution on Jerusalem, no peace accord will ever be made between the two sides. Since the Oslo peace accords, many Palestinians have become hopeful that they could soon share a part of the Israeli capital. Nevertheless, Israel and the Palestinians today continue to struggle to come to terms with each other's demands due to several underlying issues in regard to the city's future implications.

Signifying the Old City of Jerusalem, East Jerusalem has remained a sacred site for Israelis with the Temple Mount and Dome of the Rock inside its walls. With this religious and nationalist-political attachment to Jerusalem, Israel has not progressed in its negotiations with the Palestinians because it refuses to concede the eastern half of the capital. Since capturing Jerusalem as a part of the occupied territories in the 1967 War, Israel has held a firm stance that the holy city remains separate from the West Bank. Following the war, the Knesset enacted legislation that unified east and west Jerusalem under an Israeli government and gave Israel direct jurisdiction and civil law over both sections. The West Bank however, was never annexed but instead was maintained under military rule. To reaffirm Jerusalem as the sole capital of Israel, the Knesset passed the Basic Law in 1980 (Klieman, 143). Furthermore, public opinion surveys reveal that the majority of Israelis are unwilling to divide Jerusalem, restore the holy city to its pre-1967 status, or even give foreign powers control. Rather, this perspective favors an undivided, open capital under Israeli sovereignty (Klieman, 139). The attitudes of Israelis demonstrate that the retention of East Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty should never be comprised. Israel continues to claim that all of Jerusalem, West and East, as the capital of Israel ever since the conclusion of the 1967 war. Without compromise however, Israel will never be able to finalize a peace agreement with the Palestinians.

On the other hand, Palestinians insist that East Jerusalem has the same status as the rest of the West Bank. Since the losing the West Bank in the 1967 war, Palestinians have seen East Jerusalem as theirs-the capital of a future Palestinian state. While Israel does not consider this half of Jerusalem to be a part of the West Bank, the Palestinians have had contrary thoughts on the matter. They believe that East Jerusalem is an integral piece of the occupied territories, which Israel must concede as a part of its post-1967 rule. Withdrawal from East Jerusalem would grant Arab residents the right to vote in Palestinian Authority elections and place the city under complete Palestinian rule. Like the Israelis, Muslims have worshipped the Temple Mount as one of the holiest cities in the world apart from Mecca and Medina. During the 1993 Oslo Accord, Israel had deliberately avoided the issue of East Jerusalem in its talks with Palestinian Prime Minister Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (Smith, 441-442). After the Oslo Accord had been signed, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had become skeptical that the Palestinians would agree on a "united Jerusalem that remained under Israeli control (Smith, 443). Rabin was determined to keep Jerusalem united under Israeli sovereignty, believing that it must remain as the capital of Israel forever-there was no room for an additional state between Israel and Jordan. For Arafat and his chief negotiator Nabil Shaath however, the 1993 accords had signified the first step in ultimately creating a Palestinian state that would feature East Jerusalem as its capital (Smith, 444). In 1999, Arafat held his position in demanding that Jerusalem be the capital of the two states if there were to be any peace between them and Israel (Enderlin, 165). With both sides strongly positioned on opposite ends of each other, little advancement has been currently made on deciding the final status of Jerusalem-whether Israel will continue to hold sovereignty or grant the Palestinians what they believe was once rightfully theirs.

With the religious and political significance of Jerusalem largely affecting an Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem, it will be difficult for the Palestinians to pressure Israel to make any concessions in regard to the holy city. It is unthinkable that any Israeli government would be willing to back down and hand over a city with such religious and political ramifications. Rabin, an activist of peace and member of the Labor party, was at no point in time during his term willing to sacrifice East Jerusalem for Palestinian peace. Today, Sharon will continue to remain even stronger in ensuring that Jerusalem does not leave the hands of Israel and the religious right. If the Likud party continues to hold control of the domestic politics in Israel, little progress will be made on settling East Jerusalem. Even so, there is only a slight chance that a Prime Minister representing the Labor party would finally concede if a reasonable proposal were composed. For Israel, it has everything to lose by giving up East Jerusalem-there is no guarantee that peace will be achieved in exchange for land. Thus, Israel will continue to refuse to negotiate East Jerusalem unless a third party can take control of the situation. If however, some concessions are made, the most likely option that the Sharon government will implement is dual sovereignty for Jerusalem. This arrangement would leave West Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty and grant the Palestinians their request for full control of East Jerusalem. In considering the needs and desires of both sides, dual sovereignty seems to resolve the problem temporarily. Even though Israel would no longer maintain full sovereignty over Jerusalem, such a strategy allows Israel to preserve half of the capital. In addition, Jerusalem's Arab and Jewish residents would still be Palestinian and Israeli citizens (Klieman, 154). For most Israelis, controlling half of Jerusalem is still a better situation than having no sovereignty at all. Therefore, dual sovereignty is the most moderate concession that can be made if Israel wishes to still maintain a portion of the holy city.

Although dual sovereignty remains the most likely plan for resolving the issues surrounding West and East Jerusalem, I disagree with such a proposition and instead believe that internationalization offers the most effective long-term solution to the problem. Whether this intermediary becomes the United States or the United Nations, internationalizing Jerusalem remains the only foreseeable solution for resolving the issue between the two sides. By leaving Jerusalem out of the hands of either side, Israel and the Palestinians can both have access to the holy city without one side having complete control. While forcing the Jews to relocate to Tel-Aviv and the Arabs to Ramallah will be difficult, this policy does not favor one side over the other. With Israelis and Palestinians holding a deep sentiment for Jerusalem, both sides must be treated equally and given equal access; internationalization of Jerusalem avoids single sovereignty and domination of either side under a single, neutral government. But why not follow through with the idea of dual sovereignty instead? Even though dual sovereignty keeps Jerusalem as an undivided city and the political capital of two states, two governments operating under one city would be an unusual situation and a difficult task to coordinate and accomplish. With Israelis and Palestinians dispersed within the western and eastern part of the capital, the two states would have to cooperate with each other in passing legislation for both halves of the city (Klieman, 153). Knowing the difficulties that both sides have had in forming a peace agreement to this date, dual sovereignty of Jerusalem does not seem plausible in creating a smoothly functioning society for Israeli and Palestinian citizens.

Refugees:

After the 1967 war, many Palestinian Arabs were pushed out of Israel and into Lebanon, Jordan, and throughout the Middle East. Since their removal from Israel, these Palestinian refugees have desired to return to what they believe is still their original homeland. Thus, the question of whether these refugees should be readmitted into Israel has yet to be resolve between Israel and the Palestinians.

Throughout his negotiations with Israel and the United States during the 1990s, Palestinian Prime Minister Yasir Arafat made clear that refugees from the 1967 war must be guaranteed the right to return to their homeland if a peace accord was ever to be completed (Enderlin, 164). In the 2000 Camp David Talks, Arafat's position did not change at all. Once again, he presented Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak with the claim for the Palestinian right of return to the 1967 boundaries-Arafat refused to compromise his stance on the matter. Barak, on the other hand, offered his counterpart the right of return to the future Palestinian state along with a certain number of Palestinians allowed to reenter pre-1967 Israel (Smith, 498). This proposal was a generous concession on behalf of the Israelis yet still unacceptable to the Palestinians. For a long time, Israel had refused to readmit a substantial number of Palestinian Arabs into Israel and the Jewish settlements. At the present time, many conservative Israelis and supporters of Likud continue to follow the Zionist vision of David Ben-Gurion. These individuals believe that Israel should never allow these Palestinian refugees to return due largely to the economic, cultural, and security problems that the reentry would create for the Jewish state (Klieman, 130). As with the issues regarding the settlements and Jerusalem, Israel and the Palestinians must also be willing to compromise their hardnosed positions in reaching an agreement on the status of the Palestinian refugees.

In due time, Israel will most likely begin an incremental process to allow these refugees back into the West Bank and Gaza. Such a plan would include first and foremost these refugees being allowed to reunite with their families in territories before the 1967 war. Additionally, indemnification, monetary compensation, and the option of repatriation and resettlement under Palestinian rule would also be offered to those currently living in refugee camps located in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere. If such a plan is adopted, this concession would present these people with the opportunity to establish a permanent home and move on with their lives (Klieman, 130). Moreover, the support and funding of the United States could allow these refugees to be monetarily compensated so that they build homes and start new lives in a future Palestinian state. While such absorption increases the Palestinian population, the right of return might actually prove helpful for the Israelis in building a stronger economic infrastructure, attracting more people to major Israeli cities and Jewish businesses. Still, there are several questions that the Palestinian refugee issue raises for both sides: where are these Palestinians refugees expected to establish their new homes? How many refugees should be allowed reentry? How can Israel identify those allowed to reenter and monitor the numbers properly? With these logistics still undetermined, Sharon and Abass must come together to resolve issues with regard to the settlements in the West Bank and the partition of Jerusalem before they can attempt to conclude an agreement on the right of return.

If concessions can be made for both the West Bank and Jerusalem, the possibility of gradually allowing the reentry of Palestinian refugees becomes a greater reality. More importantly however, through extended compromise and an eagerness to settle these issues at hand, Israelis and Palestinians could subsequently live civilly among each other for the first time. If so, the stage would finally be set for a long-awaited peace agreement within the Middle East.

Bibliography

Enderlin, Charles. Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002. New York: Other Press, 2003

Klieman, Aaron. Compromising Palestine: A Guide to Final Status Negotiations. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents. New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2006.