The Paris Conference: The Post-World War I Effect on Great Britain

We are situated now at a critical point in world history. The Great War, which entangled the key world powers as well as smaller nations, has recently ended, and the decisions we make at this conference will determine our future prosperity and the individual well-being of our respective countries.

The Great War was a time of undeniable difficulty for Great Britain and its vast empire. Through the course of the four war-torn years of actual wartime, we not only risked the lives of an incredible number of soldiers to the battlefield but also funded and loaned money to our fellow Allied countries engaged in the terrible war. We have lost many lives in this devastating war-approximately 900,000 in deaths not including those who died from disease, poisoning, or wounds (Morrow 285). It is therefore quite clear that we should punish Germany-not in vengeance, however, but for justice. A severe punishment will only result in an angry and resentful Germany that will seek revenge in the future.

When creating a treaty of this magnitude, we must keep in mind several historical precautions that may be overlooked in our desire to punish the Central Powers as thoroughly as possible. It is relatively easy to create a peace lasting thirty years now, because the world has seen just how bloody this sojourn has been. However, it is inevitable that this peace-desiring generation will eventually pass away and give rise to a generation that has not felt to true shock of war. The American public's fervent desire for war prior to the Spanish-American war is simply one of many instances depicting such a claim. History can provide many examples of a seemingly skillful diplomatic triumph that only ends, in the end, in danger to the victor seeking the most selfish post-war demands (Extracts 8).

To create a treaty that will last through generations, it is essential that we avoid giving the German people an incentive to rise back up in the future, seek revenge, and right the wrongs done to them. Germany's colonies may be taken, her grand army reduced into a "mere police force," and her navy reduced to "a fifth rate power," but in time, if a feeling of injustice still prevails in the German people, she will find a way to get even with her conquerors. Thus, we must draw up terms that are severe and appropriate to Germany's war actions, yet we must avoid ruthless punishments that would inspire Germany to rise up and reclaim its status as a world power in the future (Extracts 9).

Another viable reason to lessen sternness of terms comes in the form of an unexpected prospect-in the form of the Bolsheviks. A crushed Germany, searching in despair, may throw in her lot with the Russians; consequently, a vast red army under German command and equipment, which has proved devastating to the people of all nations, will truly threaten Europe. Harsh terms would impel the country towards a revolution analogous to the Russian revolution. Now, we are confident that the majority of the countries present would prefer kinder peace terms for Germany than the potential of Bolshevism. Therefore, once she accepts our terms and demands of reparations, we would give Germany a fair chance to restore its economy. As our leader, Prime Minister Lloyd George, so articulately put it, "[opening] to her the raw materials and markets of the world on equal terms with ourselves...We cannot both cripple her and expect her to pay" (Extracts 10-11).

Therefore, we proclaim a peace agreement that is not too severe like the French claims, but not too lenient and generous like President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Many of the Allied countries have convened together in Paris to formulate a consensus with regards to punishing Germany. All of the countries present have their own desires concerning the terms of the treaty. The three most prominent Allied nations in the Great War are The United States of America, France, and of course our country, Great Britain. Woodrow Wilson is quite resolute upon his fourteen points, which include the League of Nations and idea of self-determination. George Clemenceau represents the country of France, which holds true to honor and had already been invaded by Germany during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. Because of that war, France lost the essential lands of Alsace-Lorraine. We have come to this vital conference to determine the peace of the world by trying to expand on as many of our goals as possible. We believe success will be attained through important compromises (When 3). In our honest opinion, the possible spread of communism from Russia into Germany is more imminent and worrisome than a decimated Germany (Trueman 8).

To clarify further on the subject, we have not fought a war of aggression against the Germans. They may hold the mentality that they were fighting a war of self-defense against a "league of rival nations" trying to destroy Germany. The truth of the matter chiefly rests, however, on Germany's violation of public law and propriety in Europe and with the invasion of Belgium-Britain was forced to join in defense of these rights (Lloyd George 2). This noble reason our protective country entered the Great War proved costly. Two hundred forty thousand British men sacrificed their lives and left their wives as widows to protect the neutrality and prosperity of Belgium (Morrow 283-285).

Our assistance was fundamental in defeating the Germans. Our nation contributed on the battlefield, in the seas, and monetarily toward the victory of the Allies and devastation of Germany. The British blockade was an enormous factor in defeating the Germans throughout the Great War. These blockades caused food shortages that led to an increasingly impatient German home front for the war to end. The German public had minimal support for or interest in their army in France when at home, the public was starving, and the minimal rations of food were being dispersed among the children of the nation. Furthermore, the British blockade denied Germany of essential war materials and therefore reduced Germany's armament resources to fight effectively and efficiently (Morrow 68).

Throughout the Great War, our country's economic contributions have greatly helped the Allied war effort. Our country was considered one of the most stable and most secure countries at the dawn of the Great War. Our country contributed about forty percent of its national expenditure towards the war, which is an outstanding amount. The nation of Great Britain spent $35,334,012,000 towards the Great War from 1914 to 1918. This amount is not including the contributions of our colonies such as India and Canada, which spent over two billion as well. Our country spent more on the war than all the other engaged countries and supplied approximately ten billion dollars, more than both France and the United States of America (Tucker 77).

The British were participants of many battles in the Great War. Without British soldiers on the field to protect France, the Great War would have ended months if not years earlier, with the German forces being victorious. The German Chief of General Staff, von Falkenhayn, who wanted "to bleed France white," planned the Battle of Verdun in 1916, which was the longest single battle in the Great War. The British thwarted the German plan by relieving some of the pressure against the French at the Battle of Verdun. At the Battle of the Somme, originally intended to be a dominantly French attack, the British took over the attack because of the French situation at Verdun. On the first day of this bloody battle, 1 July 1916, the British lost approximately 58,000 troops. At the end of the battle, our country's soldiers deterred a potential German victory at the Battle of the Somme by sacrificing the lives of about 419,654 British soldiers. Our nation's involvement could be seen throughout the Great War in numerous battles, such as The Battle of Marne, the numerous Battles of Ypres, and the Battle of Cambrai. These are only a few of the battles in which British participation was crucial in determining the outcome of the battle and leading to the outcome of the Great War (Morrow 125-135). With our continuous assistance in the Great War, it is only just for our allies to comply with our modest demands. The British demands are relatively minor in relation to our enormous contribution to winning the Great War.

With the amount of men and resources that we have put into the Great War over this tragic four-year period, it is only natural that we demand some level of reciprocation upon victory. Concerning land, the natural course is to have Germany give up parts of its land to those that she attacked, and to demilitarize various parts to deter possible aggression. Mr. Wilson's concept of "Self-Determination" Germany's colonial empire is to be dissolved as well (Kitchen 1).

Germany's military must be drastically subsidized especially given her strong military tradition. Additional constraints should outlaw such powerful military crafts like tanks and submarines that are clearly not necessary unless malevolence is intended. The navy should be surrendered to Great Britain, to ensure Germany does not pose a future threat on the seas. The size of Germany's standing army must be reduced down to 100,000 men. We feel that with the German army at this size, they will not dare cause any more uproars of violence to disturb peace in the world. We also advocate a reduction of the size of the German navy. Instead of the enormous naval fleet that she had before, Germany should only be allowed six basic naval ships and no U-boats and Great Britain should gain control of the large remains of the German navy (Kitchen 1).

Concerning the general desires of our allies, we have a few statements we would like to make. We have mentioned earlier that the conditions we agree to should not be too harsh, but not too lenient. We would like to enforce the idea that terms should be made on practicality, not idealism, vengeance, or pure sympathy. In addition, particularly in terms of territory distribution, most lands should be chiefly sovereign, without total control by the administrating country (Mee 98).

France is, in this particular circumstance, justified in taking Alsace-Lorraine, but such actions should be kept in moderation, for the matter of conquering and re-conquering lands in revenge quickly disintegrates into a meaningless "back and forth" attacks that never end. The same reasoning applies to the Japanese demands for Shantung and other Asian war-occupied lands. They should be given the province of Shantung, which was controlled by the Germans from 1898 until 1919 when the Japanese took it. The addition of the province would bolster the Japanese economy (Mee 189).

Our country was not the only reason that justice prevailed on this continent. Success was a cooperative effort and we support the demands of the other participants in the Great War. Italy supported the Allies and suffered great losses. Therefore, we support Italy in its claim for the additional territory to its north, but we do not advocate for concession to all of Italy's demands. Italy should be granted part of the Dalmatian coast along with its nearby islands, the area from Tyrol up to the Brenner Pass, and Trieste, the islands of Dodecanese. In exchange for these concessions, Italy should give up the port of Fiume to Yugoslavia (Mee 56). Italy's cooperation and signature on the treaty would provide a united Allied front. Therefore, we should make a few concessions in favor of Italy to ensure the efficacy of peace terms (Mee 183).

The United States suffered relatively low casualties and therefore should not require as much in reparations. Its issue can be addressed separately and in a different manner. While we wish to check deleterious and imperialistic land-grabbing, we also wish to teach Germany a lesson. If the Germans do not feel defeated and crushed, they will remain capable and ready to fight another war. Several points of Wilson are clearly too lenient to the Germans, and many of those points will probably not be agreed upon; such is the war-grieving atmosphere the United States will have to work with. After all, the United States only saw a small fraction of the fighting and only risked little of its resources (Macmillan 53-56).

We support the United States and its concept of a League of Nations, but we oppose the concept of an international army that France has proposed. The United States and Great Britain have little to gain from the League of Nations, whereas France would receive protection from Germany and other benefits. The United States does not have to put its support behind the League of Nations and neither do we. If both countries did act in such a way, France would be left alone on the continent with Germany. A military alliance would be the alternative to the League of Nations, but it would be between the United States and Great Britain. This alliance would leave France out completely but we do not wish for that to happen (Mee 95). On the contrary, we believe that an alliance with France is beneficial for both of our countries, because we would be able to control future German aggression together. Despite the Anglo-Franco competition, we have sacrificed millions of men and expended innumerable amounts of money to protect the people of France. Because of our benevolent actions towards France, we should be offered most, if not all, of our demands, which are not radical, excessively harsh, or unreasonable.

Great Britain supports "a quintuple alliance" which would include major powers of the world. Such a committee would control international relations and maintain worldwide peace. The major five world powers, Great Britain, France, United States, Japan, and Italy will dominate the executive council. We should take control of the Germany's East Africa colony because the Germans will not be able to control their colony adequately and efficiently. East Africa should become one of our mandates. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire should be divided up and placed under the control of our nation and France as mandates (Mee 63).

We also demand that India and our other dominions be represented at the conference in Paris. India has provided our army with 1.25 million soldiers, raw materials, and loans. Australia had more losses than United States by 1918. With this said, our colonies' contributions to this war have been overlooked, and our empire deserves the proper representation of power at this conference (Macmillan 44-45).

Though the other countries have expressed little concern for Russia to join the peace conference, we suggest that a formal invitation should be extended to Russia. The United States supports this action. We have shown our support for all the Allied countries, including Russia (Mee 114-116). Russia rescued France from possible defeat in 1914 by attacking Germany on the Eastern front. If the Russians were not present during this bloody war, most divisions of the German army would have been directed towards the invasion of France. With the majority of the German forces concentrated on the French army, France would have been easily invaded. Because Russia was an essential force of the Allied war effort, she should be invited to this peace conference (Macmillan 63).

Reparations should be paid chiefly by Germany because she was the main cause of the war. This may seem harsh but when compared to the disastrous desolation of the war, it is justified. In addition, the factories, railroads, etc. of abandoned lands should be left intact for the victor's possession (Hacken 1). Most prominent in annual payments should include 40 million tons of coal (Kitchen 1).

We should also be granted reparations despite the fact that the war was not fought on British soil. British soldiers still fought in the war and millions gave up their lives fighting to protect the French and Belgian people. We should be compensated for damage to persons, which would include disability pay and the cost of pensions for widows. Allotment of reparations should be as follows: fifty percent to France, thirty percent to Great Britain, and twenty percent divided among the other claimants (Mee 148). Furthermore, we should receive British mandates for Palestine, Mesopotamia, East Africa, South-West Africa, and the South Pacific Islands (Mee 151).

We propose a less crushing way of repayment. We think that Germany should be responsible for the war costs, but did not feel as if they needed to pay them back in such a way that its economy would sputter and come to a halt. If this did happen, it would also be detrimental to other European countries as their payments and trade would be disrupted by severe inflation, all except for France. Therefore, we would like to present a long-term solution. We believe that we should allow Germany to repay the countries over a period of thirty to forty years and would not make them pay complete war costs. The alternatives such as either making Germany pay back the war costs quickly or making them pay complete war costs would be too crushing of a blow to the German economy; nonetheless, we still want Germany to cover some, if not all, of the war costs (Sontag 5-7). We are trying to remain persistent for our plan of action because we feel it is correct, even though we are being pressured by the other European countries not to be so sympathetic to the Germans. We have undertaken the role of being an intermediary between the harsh European countries and Germany, and hope to be abetting to the success of the conference, trying to remain levelheaded and pragmatic rather than destructive and forceful.

We also believe that Germany's liquid assets should be confiscated and used for food. They must pay for the food and the shipments would begin as soon as Germany delivered ships. Payment for the food is necessary and the Germans will pay with their gold. However, the reparation demands on Germany should not be excessive and overly harsh, because that would possibly drive the Germans to bolshevism, something we all wish to avoid. We must not take away all of Germany's colonies and reduce its army and navy down to a bare minimum because if it feels it is unjustly treated, they will find means of retribution. Hard peace is not what we are seeking. Instead, we must impose a "soft" peace. Reparations should not be demanded if they could not be paid by the generation that started the war. We should not impose the reparations on future generations because that would only create enmity among the European countries and pave the way for future wars (Macmillan 30).

Furthermore, we should avoid splitting up large portions of the German population and giving it away to other countries such as Poland. No Eastern Europeans should be moved from one state to another. The Rhineland should also not be taken away from the Germans, yet it should be demilitarized for the safety of the French people. We suggest that the coal basin of the Saar be placed under French control for a ten-year period as compensation for France's loss of coal production. In addition, a trial should be held for the Kaiser. Finally, the League of Nations should be set up to deal with international quarrels. We have proposed and supported numerous claims that are reasonable, well justified, and not excessively harsh. Though we had no obligations to certain countries, we still provided aid to them. As a result, our demands should be accepted and incorporated into the treaty because they would most ideally benefit Europe as a whole (Mee 150-153).

Though the Rhineland should remain a part of Germany, Great Britain and the United States are willing to provide military help to France as protection against the German. This would continue until the League of Nations could safely guarantee the security of France. We must make a peace treaty that can ensure peace for our future generations. That kind of peace can only be attained if we impose harsh, yet practical demands against Germany (Macmillan 80).

We wish to make demands with the intent on keeping a stable economy and environment. The primary aim of our nation is to secure what is necessary for the stability of the British Empire, both territorial and financial. Since the British were trying to be less harsh on the Germans, they made demands less crushing to the creators of war. Lloyd George was much more sympathetic to the Germans and thus did not propose any severe measures that could possibly annihilate Germany in its entirety (Sontag 2-3).

Our demands are not excessive, but rather well justified based on our contribution to the war effort. Germany conducted an act of war by invading France via Belgium, which was a neutral country. As a result, we entered the calamitous war to liberate the Belgian people from German occupation. We believe that the terms of the peace treaty should be tolerable enough for the German people so that they will not turn to Bolshevism. Yet justifiably, we must also pass terms that would compensate for the significant number of deaths among all nations. We must compromise between the two extreme viewpoints of Clemenceau and Wilson because Clemenceau's views are too harsh and will impel the Germans to communism while Wilson's proposals are too lenient. Germany should accept blame for instigating the war and should therefore pay reparations to the Allies for damages sustained.

Furthermore, their military forces should be limited. Finally, we should receive the lands specified because we would be able to provide sufficient support for the people. We would control these lands as mandates by providing economic support and military protection. We contributed enormously to a war that did not initially involve us and provided essential aid to France and Britain.

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