The Rationality of the Escalation of the Civil War in Yugoslavia

From the viewpoints of the participants, the civil war in the former Yugoslavia that led to its breakup between 1991 and 1995 was completely rational. Likewise, the escalation of the conflict was rational within context. In part because of a variety of structural, political, economic, and cultural factors, the government of what was once Yugoslavia felt that it was in its best interest to deny secession to certain breakaway republics. While those republics may have preferred to avoid armed conflict in their quests for independence, the appeals of peace could not match the disadvantages of surrender. In situations of unequal power distribution, such as between Bosnia and Serbia, weaker parties are unlikely to willingly accept a peace that preserves an unjust status quo and stronger parties are unlikely to compromise or flatly accept undesired outcomes if domination seems possible.

Once the armed conflict actually began, it was quickly recognized to be intractable. Every party's demands and desires were mutually exclusive to those of at least one other party, and therefore the conflict could not be resolved through communication and negotiation among the participants. The context that made the conflict so predictable also made it incredibly difficult to end once it had begun. Once the lines were drawn and the guns fired their first shots, few people needed to be convinced that they were on the right side. In an ethnic conflict in which any member of group A is defined as an enemy of any member of group B (and vice versa) regardless of his or her stance on the substantive causes of the conflict, everyone's side is the right side (and it is the only side that he or she can be on as long as A's and B's live amongst each other nearby). In a kill-or-be-killed situation, every species on the planet instinctively acts accordingly.

Because the Yugoslav breakup can be easily understood within this analytical framework, the Western world simply should not have been taken by surprise by the extent of the conflict in Yugoslavia once it had begun. Like most wars, the escalation of the Yugoslav conflict was a predictable result of competing rationalities, easily understandable given sufficient information about the context from which it sprang. In fact, it is likely that a number of experts did understand the context and the competing rationalities of Yugoslavia, and correctly predicted that the conflict would occur (though perhaps not exactly how or when it would do so).

Most events that shock "the world" are shocking only because of the prevailing level of ignorance among politicians and the general population. Because some of the most "shocking" incidents in American history (including 9/11 and Pearl Harbor) fall into that category, when we look back on the past, perhaps we should not ask if we should have been as surprised as we were when it happened; unfortunately, the answer will usually be "No." Instead, let us ask this: Why does "the world" consistently allow ignorance to overrule expertise, and what should we do about it in the future? The answer to that question will be far more useful to all the Yugoslavias of the future.